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ABSTRACT 
             
 
RIVERS, LUCAS: The BRICS and the Global Human Rights Regime: Is an Alternative  
           Norms Regime in Our Future? 
 
ADVISOR: Çiğdem Çıdam 
 
Since the end of World War II, the ‘West’ has enjoyed economic and ideological 
dominance in the international arena due to institutions built around favorable 
multilateral agreements.  This position has allowed the ‘West’ to craft an international 
system rooted within the individualistic norms of democracy and capitalism.  However, 
the BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa] – a global unit of states with 
increasing economic power – views this international system as unfair.  Accordingly, 
these states have increased their cooperation to advocate for a developmental-multipolar 
world order.  But what implications does this shared interest by the BRICS have on the 
existing global human rights regime?  Will these countries’ strong emphasis on the “right 
to development” undermine prevailing human rights norms?  Could the BRICS challenge 
the current norms regime with an alternative one focused on development?  
Concentrating on the existing labor regime, I will examine how China, the self-
proclaimed leader of the developing states, employs the “right to development” as a 
means of circumventing fundamental labor rights in Chinese-owned companies in Africa.  
In the end, I seek to determine whether the BRICS’ newfound economic power and 
cooperation will allow these states to promote an alternative norms regime that exists 
concurrently with the prevailing one. 
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INTRODUCTION 
             
 
 
 
The twenty-first century will undoubtedly be characterized by the economic, 
philosophical, and geopolitical trends emanating from the rise of the global South.  
Accelerated achievements on many fronts have caused these trends to emerge as new 
issues and actors, permeating the existing international system and global landscape.  
Countries like Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – a group that has been 
coined by analysts as the ‘BRICS’ – have been at the forefront of these achievements, 
with unprecedented levels of growth and increased multilateral interactions.   
G. John Ikenberry takes notice of the greater influences these emerging issues and 
actors have begun to have on the existing order by exclusively focusing on the rise of 
China.  In his Foreign Affairs piece, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can 
the Liberal System Survive?” Ikenberry depicts the East Asian giant’s extraordinary 
economic growth as “one of the great dramas of the twenty-first century” (Ikenberry 
2008, 23).  Referencing the possible decline of what he refers to as the “American era” in 
global politics, Ikenberry addresses the conventional belief that the reorientation of the 
world – from the existing Western-centered order to one focused on the East – is 
inevitable.  In response to this seemingly inexorable global phenomenon, Ikenberry 
proposes the following question: “Will China overthrow the existing order or become a 
part of it?”  
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The existing order Ikenberry references finds its roots in the years following the 
conclusion of World War II, when the Western world – specifically the US – possessed a 
preponderance of economic power and influence within the international structure.  Yet 
this newfound influence was not solely utilized for the establishment of the US as a 
leading world power, but also for the creation of universal institutions that reflected the 
“interests of a liberal world economy” (Cox, 1996: 222).  As Ikenberry states, these 
universal institutions “not only invited global membership but also brought democracies 
and market societies closer together[;] [they] built an order that facilitated the 
participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent 
states” (Ikenberry 2008, 24).  Institutions like the United Nations (UN), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank embodied the desires and interests of the 
Western world and combined these with rules that would “facilitate the expansion of the 
dominant economic and social forces” (Cox 1996, 222).  The intrinsic values and 
individualistic norms of democracy and capitalism found a platform in which they could 
be realized within the global context.   
Embedded within these individualistic norms of the Western-centered world order 
is the global human rights regime.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR)1, adopted in 1945 in response to the atrocities of the Holocaust, established the 
discourse for the human rights norms that pervade the existing international system.  By 
virtue of the current world order, human rights are granted to all individuals for purposes 
of protection from the actions of the state. The contemporary human rights regime is a 
mélange of international treaties, multilateral agreements, strong domestic standards, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is reproduced in the appendix.	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scholarly interpretation that has since become the theoretical cornerstone of international 
law. 
Given this, Ikenberry’s question – will China overthrow the existing order or 
become a part of it? – still remains unanswered. According to Ikenberry, there are two 
possible answers to this question: 1) China will overthrow the world order and associated 
institutions that have been created in recent decades; or 2) China will assimilate into the 
structures and institutions of the current Western-led order.  But is Ikenberry’s 
dichotomous approach truly appropriate for the multidimensional rise of China?  
Likewise, when contextualized with the remainder of the global South, is this binary 
approach accurate for the circumstances we see in today’s international system?  Perhaps 
China will not overthrow the norms regime of the existing world order nor assimilate to 
it.  Instead, what if China – in cooperation and collaboration with the other BRICS 
nations – will offer an alternative to the contemporary norms regime of the international 
structure? 
In this paper, I will argue that Ikenberry’s dichotomous approach does not 
appropriately consider the existing world structure when characterizing the rise of the 
global South.  While Ikenberry does engage with elements of power and institutions, his 
suggestion that China’s rise will follow a path of either destruction or assimilation falls 
short, failing to engage with the importance of identities and norms in the international 
context.  When these components are considered, I suggest that a third possibility arises: 
the rise of the global South – specifically the BRICS – signals the emergence of a new set 
of norms and, consequently, a new norms regime with concomitant institutions.  This 
new ordering, I argue, has the potential to act as an alternative to the existing regime. In 
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contrast to the current norms regime, this alternative regime emphasizes the rights of the 
states over the rights of the individual by claiming that the “right to development” is the 
most fundamental human right. 
     The paper begins with an introduction and overview of the discourse 
surrounding the geopolitical association that is the BRICS.  From their initial recognition 
as economic engines of growth in 2001 to their formalized institutionalization of power 
that exists today, these developing states have made transformative statements on the 
existing international structure.  First, I will discuss why these states are considered as 
strong developing countries with the potential to impact the international system.  I will 
then delve into the ways in which the BRICS have become an omnipresent political entity 
in the international system, particularly due to their multifaceted cooperation.  Here, 
focus will be given to the role identities and interests play – if any – in these states’ 
cooperation.  Chapter One will conclude with an account of the right to development 
(RTD), as it exists within these states.  The RTD – what the BRICS countries see as the 
most fundamental human right – is the subject of controversy between states who 
emphasize individual rights – the West – and those who believe in state rights.   
Chapter Two will engage with core international relations theories to 
contextualize the existing human discourse via three varying interpretations.  First, this 
chapter will provide a much-needed definition of the contemporary understanding of 
human rights, particularly as they relate to the individual.  This definition will then be 
applied to an understanding of the global human rights regime as an elaborate system of 
states and multilateral institutions that promotes human rights via a network of principles, 
rules, norms, and procedures.  Finally, I will provide an overarching and extensive survey 
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of realism, liberalism, and constructivism and how their respective theoretical lenses 
interpret the existence and sustenance of the current norms regime. My argument is that a 
comprehensive image that brings together components of all three theories is necessary in 
not only understanding the existing human rights regime, but also in contextualizing the 
importance and relevance of the global rise of the BRICS. 
Due to the BRICS states employing a majority of the world’s workers in the 
coming century, labor conditions and the rights of workers will be at the forefront of 
much of these states’ involvement in the human rights regime.  Chapter Three will focus 
specifically on the existence of the global labor regime and discuss its interconnectedness 
with the existing norms regime and the RTD.  After establishing the human rights 
discourse as inclusive of labor rights, an analysis of the labor regime will be provided that 
focuses on the International Labor Organization (ILO), its central ideas, and how these 
were established via UN and ILO documents.  This chapter will primarily serve as a 
foundation for the final chapter by offering an extensive look into the existing labor 
regime and how the BRICS associate with it.   
At the 2014 BRICS Summit in Fortaleza, Brazil, the BRICS states came together 
to affirm their commitment to “the purpose of mobilizing resources for infrastructure and 
sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing 
economies” (Fortaleza Declaration 2014).  For this reason, Chapter Four addresses the 
current circumstances surrounding this partnership between the largest developing state – 
China – and the largest community of developing states – Africa.  Chapter Four will 
contextualize the BRICS’ Fortaleza statement and commitment to the RTD with 
examples of what this entails when practiced within the international system.  Chapter 
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Four will build upon Chapter Three’s labor rights discussion by examining the ways in 
which core labor standards are circumvented for the pursuit of the RTD.  With this in 
mind, I will explore the labor conditions and practices in Chinese-owned companies in 
both Ghana and Zambia.  The Chinese managements’ blatant disregard for core labor 
standards within Ghanaian infrastructure projects and Zambian copper mines will provide 
crucial evidence demonstrating not only how China manifests its RTD discourse, but also 
how the promotion of these norms by the BRICS will affect the current human rights 
regime.  The labor violations that occur within the Ghanaian and Zambian sites 
demonstrate how the focus on the RTD comes at the expense of individual rights, thus 
undermining the existing human rights regime.   
This paper seeks to elaborate on the global phenomenon that is the rise of the 
BRICS by exploring the possibility of whether or not these states’ rise will impact the 
existing human rights regime and, if so, in what ways.  The BRICS’ cooperation with 
each other is not only a rare example of life-imitating research, but also a substantial shift 
within the existing international context that posits new interpretations of international 
politics.  I claim that Ikenberry’s dichotomous approach to China’s rise is too stark, 
particularly when the BRICS countries are taken into consideration. This third possibility 
focuses on China’s willingness to cooperate with other states – as the leader of the 
developing world and the guiding force in the institutionalization of the BRICS – to 
pursue its desires and establish a new norms regime centered on the notion of the RTD.  
This norms regime, by virtue of its focus on the RTD, emphasizes the right of the state 
over the individual, which contradicts and undermines the discourse present in the current 
regime.  Due to the global rise and increased economic and political cooperation among 
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the BRICS states, there now exists the possibility for these new norms to be supported via 
international institutions – similar to the paradigm that followed the creation of the UN 
and the Bretton Woods institutions.  On par with this example, this institutionalization of 
power among the BRICS has been made possible by these states’ augmented economic 
capacity in recent years.   
The RTD is inherently contradictory to the individualistic norms that are present 
within the existing human rights regime, and it becomes impossible to ignore this 
contradiction in light of China’s abusive labor practices present in Africa today.  That 
being said, the BRICS states have relied on and utilized the language of the existing 
human rights regime to substantiate and promote their claims regarding the RTD.  The 
focus on the RTD by the BRICS states has received increased multilateral support from 
the developing world, largely because the institutionalization of the BRICS has been 
made possible due to these states’ increased economic power.  Given this, a claim can be 
made that the BRICS states could in fact create an alternative norms regime, focused on 
the RTD and the right of the state, that exists concurrently with the prevailing regime.   
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1| THE BRICS   
             
 
 
 
 
I.  ‘WHO’ & ‘WHAT’ ARE THE BRICS? 
 
The rise of the international economy as a principal influence on nations, governments, 
and people all around the world will inevitably trademark the politics of this century.  
O’Neill’s 2001 article illustrates this phenomenon in a way that not only positions four 
key countries at the forefront of this global economic focus, but also as safe havens for 
investors in the upcoming century.  The “BRICs” – as first imagined – were merely a 
forecast of “a healthier outlook in some of the larger emerging economies compared to 
the G7” (O’Neill 2001, 3).  This transformative statement on the future of the 
international economy was concentrated on the idea that the “relative positions of key 
countries in the world are changing” (O’Neill 2001, 6) in so much that these countries are 
fated to become global leaders and engines of economic growth. 
 In historical context, the nineteenth century saw the inclusion of the United States, 
Germany, and Japan into the international economy in a way that drastically impacted 
global output.  Likewise, the twenty-first century has thus far been widely characterized 
by a similar increased participation of developing states in the global economy.  But in 
what ways is it appropriate to disregard the dozens of similar developing countries in the 
world to specifically focus on the BRICs? What constitutes this attention given to these 
four countries as sensible and necessary for imminent global economic and political 
environments?   
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 The BRICs are, indubitably, the most important of the developing states in 
today’s global arena.  Such prominence is chiefly due to one particular characteristic of 
these four states – their size.  When juxtaposed to the rest of the developing world, Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China demonstrate how their geographic, demographic, and economic 
size are tremendous advantages.  Therefore, when attempting to contextualize the BRICs 
in the framework of global development and the international economy, it is important to 
discuss three particular features: 1) their geographic size and location; 2) their population; 
and 3) the size of their economy.  
 What is crucial in understanding the BRICS as a global phenomenon is to first 
understand each of the states’ respective position as a regional power.  And with the 
addition of South Africa in 2010 by the four original BRIC countries, the ‘BRICS’ now 
represent powerful state entities in all of the principal corners of the planet: Brazil in the 
Americas, Russia in Eurasia, India in South Asia, China in East Asia, and South Africa 
on the African continent.  Moreover, each of these states – with the exception of South 
Africa – possess a preponderance of land within each of their respective regions.  As 
Figure 1.0 illustrates, one of the BRICS’ greatest assets is the share of the world’s 
geographic area these countries each occupy. Considering every country in the world, the 
four of the five BRICS states are in the top ten geographically ‘largest’ – Russia (first), 
China (second), Brazil (fifth), and India (seventh).  According to World Bank indicators, 
the BRICS’ total land encompasses 26% of the world’s geographical area (World Bank 
Data 2014).  To be clear, discussing a country’s geographical area in regard to its 
international capacity is not of superfluous nature.  The land a country possesses is 
essential in understanding its economy, political system, culture, and history.  For 
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example, the geographical area in which a state exists is widely dependent on the land’s 
resources for economic reasons – Russia’s oil supplies being the most obvious and 
perfect illustration among the BRICS. 
 
  Figure 1.0 
Country Land Area (sq. km) 
Brazil 8,358,140.0 
Russia 16,376,870.0 
India 2,973,190.0 
China 9,388,211.0 
South Africa 1,213,090.0 
Total: 38,309,501.0 
 *Data as of December 2014 from World Bank Data 
 
 
The second feature of the BRICS is the rather substantial populace they each 
boast, outlined per Figure 1.1’s portrayal of the available 2014 World Bank Data.  China 
and India each possess not only the BRICS’ most substantial population size, but are also 
the first and second most populated countries in the world respectively.  Together, the 
BRICS embody almost 43% of the world’s population – a tremendous and overwhelming 
statistic that truly bespeaks to the importance and capacity of the BRICS countries 
(World Bank Data 2014).  As per the previous discussion regarding geographical area, 
the greater human capital a country has at its disposal, the greater economic output it is 
likely to experience due to its sizeable labor force.  Given this, it is appropriately 
suggested that the BRICS “will supply the majority of the world’s new workers and 
consumers in the years ahead” (Mandelbaum 2014, 127).  For that reason, this paper will 
discuss the existing labor regime and its relationship with the BRICS states in greater 
detail in Chapters Three and Four. 
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  Figure 1.1 
Country Population 
Brazil 202,034,000 
Russia 141,049,000 
India 1,267,402,000 
China 1,369,811,000 
South Africa 52,518,000 
Total: 3,032,814,000 
*Data as of December 2014 from World Bank Data 
  
 
The third – and certainly most definitive feature of the BRICS – is their economic 
size and involvement in the global economy.  As a unit, the BRICS states each boast 
unique economic histories before their conversion to free markets. Russia and China, for 
example, boasted communist economic systems, whereas Brazil and India relied on 
import-substituting socialist economic policies.  Nonetheless, as a present-day economic 
unit, the BRICS now possess similar capitalist systems, which is a critical component of 
their current cooperation – particularly given the fact that “each stood partly or entirely 
outside the globalized international economic order after World War II” (Mandelbaum 
2014, 127). This specific point provides an accurate foundational approach to 
understanding the varying economic circumstances these states have recently endured.   
 In Jim O’Neill’s original conception, the BRICs states were emphasized in 
accordance with their economic size, most notably by measuring their real GDP growth 
in both 2001 and 2002.  O’Neill additionally relied on claims that at the end of 2000, 
Brazil, Russia, India, and China’s combined GDP in US dollars on a PPP basis was 
approximately 23% of the world GDP (O’Neill 2001). Of course, the data presented by 
O’Neill’s original paper is predominantly outdated and reflective of only the beginning of 
the BRIC’s economic rise, but it nonetheless still provides an accurate portrayal of the 
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original circumstances that ultimately led to O’Neill’s recognition and coining of the 
BRICs in 2001.  Figures 1.2 and 1.3 both reflect the most recent data provided by the 
World Bank in regard to the BRICS’ GDP in current US dollars and GDP annual growth, 
of which the aggregate GDP of the four original BRIC countries “quadrupled between 
2001 and 2011” (Mandelbaum 2014, 127).  As Figure 1.2 depicts, the BRICS share of 
world GDP in 2013 continued to increase and ultimately superseded $15 trillion. This 
number, regardless of the apparent slowing of economic growth that has impacted these 
countries in recent years (though not a substantial amount), is, according to IMF 
estimates, “predicted to surpass the G7 in or around 2020” (Brütsch & Papa 2013, 300).  
More importantly, a 2011 prediction by economist Arvind Subramanian forecasts that by 
2030, China, the United States, and India will be the three most economically dominant 
countries in the world, each boasting 18.0%, 10.1%, and 6.3% share of global economic 
power respectively (Subramanian 2011).   
  Figure 1.2 
Country 2013 GDP (current US dollars) 
Brazil 2,245,673,032,354 
Russia 2,096,777,030,571 
India 1,876,797,199,133 
China 9,240,270,452,047 
South Africa 350,630,133,297 
Total: 15,810,147,847,402 
*Most recent data available as of December 2014 from World Bank Data 
 
  Figure 1.3 
Country 2013 GDP growth (annual %) 
Brazil 2.0% 
Russia 1.0% 
India 5.0% 
China 8.0% 
South Africa 2.0% 
 *Most recent data available as of December 2014 from World Bank Data 
In a 2011 Foreign Affairs piece, Subramanian states that, “…economic 
dominance is the ability of a state to use economic means to get other countries to do 
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what it wants or to prevent them from forcing to do what it does not want” (Subramanian, 
2011: 2).  In this regard, the BRICS have established themselves as a critical component 
of global politics – with increased economic capacity comes economic dominance, and 
with economic dominance comes the ability to impact global politics in a significant way.  
Because of this paradigm, O’Neill’s original conception of the BRICs as solely economic 
engines of growth has shifted into a political organization.  Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
and South Africa have recognized that their cooperation isn’t exclusively based on 
economic patterns of GDP growth.  Instead, these states have begun to realize the strong 
political implications of their collective economic power via institutionalization and 
cooperative organizations. Consequently, the BRICS have presented themselves in global 
politics as a robust and potentially omnipotent political reality with the potential of 
altering the existing international system and world order. 
 
II.  THE BRICS AS A POLITICAL REALITY 
The BRICS are substantively characterized and defined by economic power.  For that 
reason, assuming that these states boast a significant amount of political influence may 
seem a bit troublesome – after all, economics and politics have fundamental differences 
in terms of objectives, outcomes, institutions, and actions.  Michael Mandelbaum, in his 
most recent book The Road to Global Prosperity, provides an excellent account of the 
juxtaposition of economic and political power. Politics, he claims, is often viewed as a 
“zero-sum game:” one man’s gain is another man’s loss; whereas wealth, in comparison, 
is a “positive-sum game:” everyone involved can gain simultaneously.  Additionally, 
politics is generally governmental, driven by institutions that are hierarchical, 
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concentrated, and forceful; economics is market-based, propelled by unrestricted and 
egalitarian free-markets.  Competition and disputation dominates the political sphere, 
whereas cooperation and ‘healthy’ competition dominates the economic.  All of these 
contribute to Mandelbaum’s claim that, “The heart of politics is power; the aim of 
economics is wealth” (Mandelbaum 2014, XVI).  But does this statement veraciously 
illustrate the BRICS’ current role and objective in the international system?  Can it not be 
argued that the economic power and wealth these specific developing states have 
garnered are ‘stepping stones’ for increased political participation and, as a result, 
augmented power within global politics?  
 On June 16, 2009, the original BRICs met in Yekaterinburg, Russia for the first of 
what would become an annual summit dedicated to the interests and cooperation of the 
four nations.  Henceforth, the BRICs had personified O’Neill’s claims into an 
international organization with concrete annual summits surrounding policy efforts, 
national interests, and developmentalism.  In a rare example of life imitating research, the 
original BRIC states went from “four countries destined to become global leaders in 
economic growth” (Mandelbaum 2014, 126), to a permanent organization bringing 
together the leaders of four – later five – rising economic giants.   
The cooperation of these states in formalized summits has proven to be beneficial 
in the promotion of common interests and objectives. As per the 2014 summit in 
Fortaleza, Brazil, a joint announcement by the BRICS resulted in the establishment of a 
formal international organization funded and led by these states – the BRICS New 
Development Bank.  
BRICS, as well as other EMDCs, continue to face 
significant financing constraints to address infrastructure 
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gaps and sustainable development needs. With this in mind, 
we are pleased to announce the signing of the Agreement 
establishing the New Development Bank (NDB), with the 
purpose of mobilizing resources for infrastructure and 
sustainable development projects in BRICS and other 
emerging and developing economies. We appreciate the 
work undertaken by our Finance Ministers. Based on sound 
banking principles, the NDB will strengthen the 
cooperation among our countries and will supplement the 
efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for 
global development, thus contributing to our collective 
commitments for achieving the goal of strong, sustainable 
and balanced growth (Fortaleza Declaration 2014). 
 
Brought to fruition by the economic cooperation and the agendas of Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa, this multilateral finance-based organization is posed to address 
and circumvent the disadvantages each country feels in regard to the existing structures 
of international trade and finance, while simultaneously pursuing a strong focus on 
development.  Additionally, the “BRICS New Development Bank makes its intentions 
clear as far as the global economic architecture is concerned…[coming] together to 
provide collective humanitarian assistance2 and fund infrastructural development in each 
other’s countries…and other countries from the developing world” (Thakur 2014, 2). In 
many respects, this Bank has been established as a tool and resource for the pursuit of the 
right to development in the international context.  This cooperation has resulted in 
economic and political collaboration in the establishment of this Bank – China housing 
the Bank’s headquarters, India holding the first rotating Presidency followed by Brazil, 
Russia’s oil reserves augmenting the needs of China and India, and South Africa holding 
the first regional headquarters.  In addition to the Bank, Brazil has further 
institutionalized the BRICS through the recent establishment of the BRICS Policy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  In this context, what the BRICS mean by the term “humanitarian assistance” is rather unclear.  It is 
inferred, however, that the use of this term implies the offering of aid to developing states for purposes of 
developmental projects.  
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Research Institute in Rio de Janeiro, welcoming researchers and scholars from all of the 
participating countries (Thakur 2014). Together, this international organization of 
developing states has demonstrated its intention to institutionalize their increased 
economic power in order to augment their global political power.  Such a phenomenon is 
thus producing what could be referred to as a “soft balancing” of the BRICS nations to 
the Western-dominated international system. 
 This recent institutionalization of the BRICS has many international relations 
scholars puzzled.  The current international system, wholly directed by the Western states 
through their creation of international institutions, was founded on the convergence of 
both interests and identities.  In terms of the latter, a state’s identity as a liberal 
democracy was essential and of the utmost importance for full integration and influence 
within the international institutions.  Yet the BRICS have engaged and cooperated with 
one another regardless of this previously crucial idea of political ‘identity.’ While these 
states do in fact relate to one another on the basis of a mutual identity as developing 
states and rising economic powers, a shared political system is not of primary concern.  
The BRICS, countries who boast both democratic and authoritarian political systems, 
have not, unlike their Western predecessors, focused on similar political identity as a 
prerequisite for cooperation in the international arena.  As a result, questions regarding 
the capability of five countries with foundationally different political identities to merge 
into what appears to be an increasingly important political group have developed.  How 
can states with fundamental variances in histories, cultures, and political systems 
converge into a united political entity?  
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Whereas Western states, upon their creation of the existing international system, 
focused on state mutual interests and identities, the BRICS’ predominate focus lies in 
their combined and common interests as they relate to the current international system 
and the perceived unfairness of the current world order.  This overarching set of interests 
in relation to the existing international system is “a shared view among the BRICS that 
has contributed to their emergence and consolidation” (Mielniczuk 2013, 1076) as an 
economic and political entity.  This strong sentiment is exemplified in the statement that 
has been repeated at every BRICS summit since its formation: “We are committed to 
advance the reform of international financial institutions, so as to reflect changes in the 
global economy. The emerging and developing economies must have a greater voice and 
representation in international financial institutions” (Thakur 2014, 1). 
 In a recently published article, Fabiano Mielniczuk does an exceptional job in 
compiling recent United Nations speeches of representatives from each of the BRICS 
states to illustrate this common interest – what he refers to as a “developmental-
multipolar set of social claims…that position development and multipolarity as the 
cornerstones of the BRICS initiative” (Mielniczuk 2013, 1088).  The rhetoric used by the 
BRICS representatives that Mielniczuk references is worth recounting in this paper, 
particularly as it relates to the later discussion of human rights discourse.  Additionally, it 
assists in presenting a portrayal of the BRICS’ amalgamation for what they believe to be 
a fairer world order – a transition from a liberal-unilateral international system to one 
representative of the demands of developing countries and a stringent focus on the right 
to development as the most fundamental human right.   
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 In the early 21st century, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva gave his 
first speech at the United Nations General Assembly in which he formulated a blueprint 
for foreign policy initiatives and national projects that accentuated his developmental 
rhetoric. Lula also addressed the representation of developing states in the UN – more 
specifically within the Security Council – by buttressing the Brazilian candidacy for 
permanency.  And in his 2008 UNGA address, President Lula endorsed an even stronger 
commitment and stance on development by unveiling a strong “assessment of the new 
world geopolitics” (Mielniczuk 2013, 1080), particularly as they relate to existing 
international relations.  “Gradually, countries are moving beyond old conformist 
alignments with traditional centers…developing countries have stepped into new roles in 
designing a multipolar world” (Lula da Silva 2008).   
 Whereas Brazil emphasizes both development and multipolarity, Russian twenty-
first century diplomacy is predominately characterized by the “denial of unipolarity and 
the affirmation of different poles” (Mielniczuk 2013, 1081).  Unlike Lula, the leaders of 
Russia give little reference to development or developmentalism – though a “countries’ 
right to development” (Lavrov 2007) is mentioned in Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey 
Lavrov’s 2007 speech to the UNGA.  Instead, a very strong sentiment against the current 
injustices of global governance and the international economic order has subjugated 
Russian rhetoric.  In the same 2007 speech, Lavrov states how “an essentially new 
geopolitical situation has been developing in the world, one that is primarily defined by 
emerging multipolarity,” and that the “international landscape is changing due to the 
newly emerging centers of global growth” (Lavrov 2007).  The Minister further affirmed 
that today’s world community needs a “collective leadership of major states that should 
	   19 
represent the geographical and civilizational dimensions” (Lavrov 2007) of the emerging 
developing states.  
 More than a decade before these statements by both Brazil and Russia were made, 
India’s then Minister of External Affairs – and current President – Pranab Mukherjee 
stood before the General Assembly and asserted that development was “the single most 
important task for the international community” (Mukherjee 1995).  In 1997, India’s 
Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Inder Kumar Gujral, also averred that 
development should be the priority of the UN, further reinforcing this Indian national 
interest.  And while India certainly stresses development as crucial to its national interests 
and involvement within the international community, criticism of the unfair existing 
international system is also evident.  Starting with Mukherjee’s claims that the UN 
represents the “privilege of a few rather than the interests of the many,” (Mukherjee 
1995) Indian rhetoric has since been characterized by the need and desire for “collective 
multilateralism” (Vajpayee 2002) and a restructuring of the international system.  And 
this joint emphasis on development and yearn to reorganize the international structure has 
been a cornerstone of Indian national interests and diplomacy in a way that affirms the 
belief that developing countries should have greater responsibility and capacity within 
international governance.  
 In 1993, China’s Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, addressed the United Nations 
General Assembly with an insistence that the Security Council “should take due account 
of the principles of equitable geographical distribution [by accommodating] the interests 
of the developing countries which make up the overwhelming majority of the 
membership” (Qian 1993).  Similar to India, we see China boasting a similar mentality in 
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regard to the international structure’s unfair treatment and environment for like-minded 
developing states.  An unfair economic order forbade the developing countries – like 
China – to “equal participation in world economic decision-making and the formulation 
of relevant rules” (Jiaxuan 1999).  However, what is particularly important in regard to 
China’s interests is its importance and rising power within the world community, 
especially among the developing states.  Due to its immense geographic, population, and 
economic size, China has predominately identified itself as the leader among developing 
countries and subsequently correlated its interests with this duty.  In doing so, China 
works to promote “the interest[s] of other developing countries in an international context 
marked by the transition to multipolarity” (Mielniczuk 2013, 1084).  This leadership role 
will be revisited later in this section, as well as in chapter four, as it relates to China’s 
leadership role within the BRICS. 
 Although it was not included in the BRICS until 2010, South Africa has 
demonstrated similar multilateral tendencies compared to its organizational counterparts 
in recent years.  Under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki from 1999-2008, “the 
irreconcilability between the developed and developing world became the tone of South 
Africa’s speeches at the UNGA” (Mielniczuk 2013, 1085).  For example, in a speech 
given by Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma, the call for a reform of the Western-crafted 
Bretton Woods institutions was vividly apparent. “Decisions are taken outside the UN 
and other global structures by developed and rich countries when these decisions have a 
great impact on the poorer countries and directly affect the lives of billions of poor 
people” (Dlamini-Zuma 2000).  
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 Thus, Mielniczuk’s assertion that the BRICS possess a developmental-multipolar 
set of interests is certainly accurate.  The BRICS, originally presented as merely an 
economic phenomenon in the international economy, has since transmuted into a political 
entity with mutual interests and paralleled intentions. These states have personified 
O’Neill’s research into an international organization with enough political and economic 
clout to establish international institutions dedicated to these very interests and 
objectives.  Similar to the ways in which the West – particularly the US – used its 
economic capacity after WWII to craft international organizations and governance in a 
way that reflected its interests, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa have begun 
to utilize their increased economic power by establishing an organizational entity that has 
started crafting institutions like the NDB that bolster their political power.  But what 
effects – if any – does this have on the existing international structure? 
 As Former Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim stated in a 2010 interview 
with Al Jazeera, “We [BRICs] are not vis-à-vis the West or against the West, but what we 
have in common is the fact that somehow we question the established order in 
international relations” (Al Jazeera 2010). The BRICS, through their mutual interests of 
development and increased multipolarity, view the current world order as unfair and in 
need of desperate change.  But the established order that Amorim references – and what 
the BRICS dispute – is one that encompasses all aspects of today’s international structure 
– from global governance initiatives via the UN to international financial institutions such 
as the IMF.  
 One particular statement, made by China in the 46th session of the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1991, alludes to this paradigm regarding human rights norms and 
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developing states’ national interests. Throughout his speech, Foreign Minister Qian 
Qichen continuously references the interests of developing states and their well-deserved 
position in a “new international order that will make our world a better one to live in” 
(Qian 1991), again echoing statements mentioned earlier in this section.  But in terms of 
human rights norms, Qian offered a particularly interesting and significant statement on 
behalf of the world’s developing states: 
We [Chinese government] believe that in order to 
effectively guarantee and promote human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of all mankind, it is necessary to 
recognize the various countries’ different features – their 
different political, economic and social systems and their 
different historical, religious, and cultural backgrounds.  In 
this regard, all countries based on the principles of respect 
for each others’ sovereignty and non-interference in each 
others’ internal affairs, should strive to achieve mutual 
understanding, seek common ground while putting aside 
differences, and replace cold war with international 
cooperation… In the field of human rights, equal 
importance should be attached to civil and political rights, 
as well as to economic, social, cultural and developmental 
rights. For the vast number of developing countries, the 
most fundamental human right is the right to subsistence 
and development [italics added] (Qian 1991, 50-51). 
 
Qian is interestingly utilizing the language of human rights to question the existing 
mechanisms and discourse surrounding international norms and offering an alternative 
put forth by the Chinese government.  Concerning human rights standards, China 
believes that consideration should be given to a country’s various circumstances or 
position and then applied appropriately – especially for developing states.  But what is 
most intriguing is the belief advocated for by China that subsistence and development are 
the most fundamental human rights.  While these rights, as previously mentioned, 
currently exist within the international human rights framework, developed states with a 
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preponderance of global economic and political power often disregard their importance 
and presence.  
As mentioned in an earlier part of this section, China is the self-proclaimed leader 
among the developing states, which proves particularly important within the BRICS and 
their organizational desires to transform the international system.  Because of this, the 
new institutionalization and political reality of the BRICS provides a new platform for 
Chinese interests to be entertained with greater authority and validation than traditional 
international forums – in particular, China’s aforementioned interpretations of 
international human rights standards.  Therefore, we are presented with the following 
question: Will the economic and political rise of the BRICS, in addition to their 
institutionalization, utilize their mutual interests regarding the existing international 
structure to advocate for an alternative norms regime that is characterized by the unique 
interests of developing states?  More specifically, how will the BRICS’ increased 
economic power and political cooperation promote a stronger emphasis on what they 
perceive as the fundamental right to development? 	  	  
III.  THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT & THE BRICS 
The “right to development” [RTD] finds itself at the cornerstone of one of the more 
controversial debates on human rights in the existing international system.  Despite its 
entrance into the human rights conversation almost thirty years ago, the notion of the 
“right to development” remains farfetched and neglected in many states around the globe 
– most notably those traditionally considered under the “Western” label.  Established 
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within the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development3, this contested right “is an 
inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all people are 
entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural, and political 
development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized” 
(Art. 1, § 1).  At its core, the RTD “emphasizes collective rights, the right of peoples to 
choose their own development model, and insists on international cooperation among 
countries” (Özden 2005, 2) in order to pursue a just world order where all rights are 
realized.   
 This section of the chapter will be divided into two subdivisions.  The first section 
will elaborate on the existing discourse regarding the RTD via two United Nations 
documents.  Once the foundations of the RTD are established, attention will then be 
given to the controversy surrounding it and the reasoning used by both those in favor of 
an established international RTD norm and those who are opposed.   
 
A. ESTABLISHING THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE 
Two critical documents exist within the existing international system that position the 
right to development within the human rights discourse – the 1986 Declaration on the 
Right to Development (DRD) and the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action. Together, these two statements address the concerns of many members of the 
international community regarding “the existence of serious obstacles to development” 
(DRD Preamble, 1986) and declare that the RTD is a fundamental and inalienable human 
right “which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The text of the Declaration on the Right to Development is reproduced in the appendix.	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and of all individuals…[in] a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in [the UDHR] can be fully realized” (DRD Preamble 1986). 
 The Declaration on the Right to Development was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly on December 4, 1986, claiming that the RTD “entitles every human 
person and all persons to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy development, in which 
all human rights can be fully realized” (de Feyter 2013, 2).  Although the RTD had 
surfaced in international political dialogue some thirty or forty years prior primarily by 
the global South, it was not until the 1986 Declaration that an official statement on its 
supposed inalienability was made (Kirchmeier 2006).  That being said, the Declaration on 
the Right to Development provides one of the first – and the most concise – definitions of 
development within the United Nations system within the first two articles of the 
Declaration: 
1. The right to development is an inalienable human right 
by virtue of which every human person and all peoples 
are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy 
economic, social, cultural, and political development, in 
which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can 
be fully realized. 
2. The human right to development also implies the full 
realization of the right of peoples to self-determination, 
which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of 
both International Covenants on Human Rights, the 
exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty 
over all their natural wealth and resources. (Art. 1, § 1 
& 2) 
 
This definition, as established by the Declaration, is thus comprised of several elements: 
“the right to self-determination, the right to an international economic order, [and] the 
right to sovereignty over resources…” (Özden 2004, 8).  But what is most important of 
the right to development is that both individuals and states have a prerogative and 
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responsibility to ensure that this very right is realized.  Stated in the last line of the 
Declaration’s Preamble, “…equality of opportunity for development is a prerogative both 
of nations and of individuals who make up nations” (DRD 1986, Preamble).  Hence, the 
Declaration establishes that the individual is not only the subject and agent of the right to 
development, but its beneficiary as well (Art. 2, § 1).  States, however, have the sole 
responsibility of creating favorable and justifiable conditions for the RTD’s recognition 
(Art. 3, § 1).   
 Yet the DRD was met with distinct opposition.  Although adopted by the United 
Nations with a vote of 146 member countries in favor, there were eight abstentions and 
one vote against – the Untied States. The abstentions comprised of countries 
conventionally considered under the umbrella of the “West” – Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Sweden, and the UK.  However, with the adoption of the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action in 1993, some argue that a broader global 
consensus regarding the RTD has been reached, particularly due to its unanimous 
approval by member states despite its reference to the RTD.  “The right to development,” 
the Vienna Declaration reiterates, “requires effective development policies at the national 
level, as well as equitable economic relations and a favorable economic environment at 
the international level” (Art. 10).   The motivation behind the RTD lies in the notion that 
within the unjust international economic system of today’s global structure, people are 
prevented from working out their development policies, further perpetuating inequality 
and deteriorating any hopes of development on all levels (Özden 2005, 22).  Nonetheless, 
it can be assumed that the states who previously opposed or abstained the DRD had 
simply adopted to the Vienna Declaration due to its overall advancement of UN efforts, 
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reinforcement of important international principles, and affirmation of the indivisibility 
and universality of all human rights.  In a statement made on the 20th anniversary of the 
Vienna Declaration’s adoption, the current UN Security-General Ban Ki-moon referred 
to it as an “important milestone in humanity’s quest for universal human rights” (Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action: 20 Years Working for Your Rights 2013).  
 While the discourse surrounding the RTD is overwhelmingly present and 
important in both of these Declarations, an additional component of the right to 
development is referenced: the “right to subsistence.”  The “right to subsistence,” 
conventionally interpreted as the right to a basic living standard and the ability to have 
access to basic means of existence (Tomalty 2012), is advocated for by developing 
countries.  As discussed in the following subsection, China does in fact actively promote 
for this specific right’s inclusion within existing human rights discourse, 
characteristically alongside the right to development. Within the Declaration on the Right 
to Development, Article 8 alludes to this right to subsistence with the following:  
States should undertake, at the national level, all necessary 
measures for the realization of the right to development and 
shall ensure, inter alia, equality of opportunity for all in 
their access to basic resources, education, health services, 
food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of 
income (Art 8, § 1). 
 
Moreover, we see this right reiterated in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for 
himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing, 
and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living 
conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to 
ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect 
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the essential importance of international cooperation based 
on free consent (Art. 11, § 1). 
 
Throughout the remainder of this paper, the right to subsistence will be included under 
the umbrella of the RTD. 
 Due to the overarching nature of the Vienna Declaration on a multitude of issues 
facing the international community and the human rights regime, this document is widely 
affirmed by nations around the world. The DRD, however, is not.  Instead, the 
Declaration is the target of fierce criticism from scholars, politicians, and governments – 
predominately from the United States and the West – regarding the validity and definition 
of the principles it gives voice to.  Therefore, while the Declaration was adopted into the 
international human rights discourse, it has predominately remained at the outskirts of the 
human rights norms regime due to disagreements from the prevalent global players of the 
West regarding its implementation and necessity.  The following section turns to this 
debate between Western powers and developing states surrounding this right to 
development with focus primarily given to the US and China.  
 
B. THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT DEBATE 
The Declaration on the Right to Development remains a document of general principle 
rather than legally binding obligations (Marks 2004).  Over the years, critical and 
skeptical views have emerged from scholars and politicians regarding its content, 
definition, and legitimacy within international relations.  Most notably, the United States 
has staunchly remained reluctant and opposed to the idea of recognizing development as 
an international human right.  Statements by US ambassadors, presidential 
administrations, and UN delegations all suggest a strong disagreement with developing 
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states regarding their interpretation of what ‘the most fundamental human right’ is, while 
maintaining “consistently negative [policies] on the RTD in the political setting of the 
Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly” (Marks 2004, 140).  This 
section will be dedicated to the dialogue used between those states strongly in favor of 
the international recognition of the RTD within human rights discourse – namely China, 
with supporting evidence from India – and those strongly against – most notably the US.  
 Before delving into the discourse used by these states, however, it is crucial that 
the RTD debate is contextualized within existing human rights scholarship.  “While a 
human rights approach to development refers to all human rights and thus emphasizes the 
interrelation and interdependence of human rights, it pays special attention to economic 
and social rights as special concerns of development policy” (Hamm 2001, 1006).  Thus, 
within the existing international human rights understanding, there exists two 
classifications that has subsequently divided human rights scholarship: civil and political 
rights – the “first generation” – and economic, social, and cultural rights – the “second 
generation.” While these classifications were originally meant as a simple means of 
categorization, they have since been understood and utilized by many as a ranking, 
putting economic, social, and cultural rights after civil and political (Hamm 2001).  
Therefore, much of the debate surrounding the RTD is grounded within the idea that is 
most often promoted by Western states – that economic, social, and cultural rights do not 
necessarily deserve equal attention and emphasis as civil and political.  
 Yet this devise within the human rights discourse did not always exist within the 
international framework.  In fact, during the crafting of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Eleanor Roosevelt, the head of the US delegation at that time, identified 
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the RTD as a cornerstone of international human rights. “We are writing a bill for the 
rights of the world, and…one of the most important rights is the opportunity for 
development” (Sengupta 2001, 2527).  However, this unified consensus on the equal 
importance of civil and political rights with economic, social, and cultural rights was 
dismantled following the spread of the Cold War, during which the Soviet Union noted 
the “importance of basic rights and freedoms for international peace and security, but 
[emphasized] the role of the state” (Shaw 2008, 268).  This focus placed on the state, as 
mentioned in Article 3 of the Declaration on the Right to Development, is the foundation 
for the RTD’s recognition. “States have the primary responsibility for the creation of 
national and international conditions favorable to the realization of the right to 
development” (Art. 3 § 1).  Whereas the Western approach to human rights places 
emphasis on the individual, the RTD instead focuses solely on role of the state.  This 
dichotomy between the centrality of the state and the individual gives rise to the 
competing notions of civil and political rights with economic, social, and cultural rights.  
At its core, the RTD relies on a different approach to human rights norms than 
what currently dominates the global sphere.  The individual rights that are primarily 
promoted within the Western-led international system are safeguards in place to protect 
citizens from oppression by the state. The RTD, however, requires a strong emphasis on 
the right of the collective and bestows this as a right of the state rather than the 
individual.  Therefore, the RTD presents a strong philosophical contradiction to the 
individual human rights norms that dominate the existing rights framework.     
This philosophical disagreement manifests itself as a political disagreement as 
well, most notably one utilized by global powers.  China, the self-proclaimed leader of 
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the developing states, uses its Government White Papers to strongly assert its belief that 
the right to development and the right to subsistence go hand-in-hand as interrelated and 
interconnected fundamental human rights.  “It is a simple truth that, for any country or 
nation, the right to subsistence is the most important of all human rights, without which 
the other rights are out of the question” (“Human Rights in China” 1991).  This belief on 
behalf of the People’s Republic of China is echoed in a statement made to the 46th session 
of the UN General Assembly in 1991 by then Foreign Minister Qian Qichen.  In his 
speech, Qian continuously references the interests of developing states and their well-
deserved position in a “new international order that will make our world a better one to 
live in” (Qian 1991), mimicking statements mentioned in the previous section.  But in 
terms of the RTD and its place within existing human rights discourse, Qian offers a 
particularly interesting and significant statement on behalf of the world’s developing 
states: 
We [Chinese government] believe that in order to 
effectively guarantee and promote human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of all mankind, it is necessary to 
recognize the various countries’ different features – their 
different political, economic and social systems and their 
different historical, religious, and cultural backgrounds.  In 
this regard, all countries based on the principles of respect 
for each others’ sovereignty and non-interference in each 
others’ internal affairs, should strive to achieve mutual 
understanding, seek common ground while putting aside 
differences, and replace cold war with international 
cooperation… In the field of human rights, equal 
importance should be attached to civil and political rights, 
as well as to economic, social, cultural and developmental 
rights. For the vast number of developing countries, the 
most fundamental human right is the right to subsistence 
and development [italics added] (Qian 1991, 50-51). 
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Chinese national discourse, as it relates to norms surrounding human rights, positions the 
right to development and the right to subsistence at the forefront of the existing discourse.  
In a separate White Paper, China proclaims that its “basic [stance] on the development of 
human rights is: placing top priority on people’s right to subsistence and development, 
making development the principal task, and promoting political, economic, and social 
and cultural rights to achieve their all-round development” (China’s Efforts and 
Achievement in Promoting the Rule of Law 2008).  India reflects similar sentiments 
toward the RTD in India’s Declaration and Recommendations Adopted at the 
Colloquium on Population Policy (2003).  This Declaration recognizes that “policies 
ought to be a part of the overall sustainable development goals, which promote an 
enabling environment for attainment of human rights of all concerned” (Preamble).  
 The United States, however, wholly asserts that development is not deserving of 
the term “right.”  Whereas developing countries often incite development as a right to be 
safeguarded by states and granted to individuals, the US and many Western counterparts 
strongly contest.  Instead, the US delegation has often claimed that the RTD is used by 
the Third World and developing countries to disregard civil and political rights and 
“distort the issue of human rights by affirming the equal importance of economic, social 
and cultural rights” (Marks 2004, 146), a sentiment established during the Reagan 
Administration.  This perspective is expressed in a statement made by the United States 
to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2003: 
In our estimation the right to development is not a 
“fundamental,” “basic,” or “essential” human right. The 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights is 
progressive and aspirational. We do not view them as 
entitlements that require correlated legal duties and 
obligations. States therefore have no obligation to provide 
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guarantees for implementation of any purposed “right to 
development” (Marks 2004, 147). 
 
Whereas developing states urge the inclusion of development within human rights 
discourse due to its fundamentality and obligatory nature, the US has previously asserted 
that development is a consequence of “economic liberties and private enterprise” (Marks 
2004, 144).  The RTD, in terms of the US’ history and own experience, is explained in a 
statement to the UN Human Rights Commission by Dr. Michael Novak: 
In 1881… no one spoke of a “right to development.” But 
our nation had an opportunity to develop, perhaps even a 
responsibility to develop. Our people knew that a 
responsibility to develop was imposed on them by their 
own capabilities and blessings, and by their new ideas 
about political economy (Marks 2004, 144). 
 
It is thus the belief of the United States that development relies on the elements of 
capitalism as the economic model that drives development.  Free enterprises and free 
trade internationally not only contribute to a country’s economic position, but to the level 
of development its citizens enjoy.   
Economic liberty as a conduit for development, however, is not the only 
contention the US has with the RTD.  Ambassador Nancy Rubin, a Clinton appointee, 
expressed the belief that development would only ensue when all necessary freedoms 
were guaranteed. In 1991, Rubin told the UN Commission on Human Rights that “her 
delegation believed that it would be useful to focus the debate on the role of individual 
freedom in fostering development and the role that transparency, good governance and 
the effective rule of law played in promoting natural growth and prosperity” (Marks 
2004, 145).  Ambassador George Moose echoed this belief advocated by Rubin in 2000 
with: 
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…it was the protection of individual liberties which 
unleashed a people’s creative and entrepreneurial spirit.  
Governments had an overriding responsibility to their 
citizens, and genuine and sustainable development was 
fostered primarily by expanding individual human rights 
(Marks, 2004: 145).  
 
In the US’ perspective, development requires the recognition and protection of favorable 
domestic environments through good governance and respect for fundamental civil and 
political rights.  “We [US] cannot accept the view that before civil and political rights can 
be fully accorded to a people, an ideal economic order must first be established” (Marks 
2004, 146).  
 The RTD remains contested within the existing human rights framework and 
international community.  Although the right, via the Declaration on the Right to 
Development and the Vienna Declaration and Programme for Action, has been 
established within the existing human rights norms regime, the reluctance of the US and 
many Western states to recognize and legitimize this has caused it to lay on the outskirts 
of the existing norms regime.  As mentioned in an earlier part of this chapter, China is the 
self-proclaimed leader among the developing states.  This position of guidance and 
direction proves particularly important within the BRICS and their organizational desires 
to transform the international system, specifically in regard to the RTD and subsistence.  
Whereas China claims such rights to be the most fundamental and inalienable human 
right, the US firmly believes that “states…have no obligation to provide guarantees for 
implementation of any purported ‘right to development’” (Marks 2004, 137). 
 For this reason, there exists a disagreement among the leader of the developed 
states – the US – and the leader of the developing – China.  This sentiment by China is 
reiterated and reinforced by the institutionalization of the BRICS, especially through the 
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their joint interests in addressing the injustices of the Washington Consensus and the 
obstacles it presents to the realization of the RTD (Özden 2005).  At the 2014 BRICS 
Summit, the nations made a joint statement in the Fortaleza Declaration regarding their 
perspective on the RTD in the face of the current international economic order:  
We agree to continue to treat all human rights, including 
the right to development, in a fair and equal manner, on the 
same footing and with the same emphasis. We will foster 
dialogue and cooperation on the basis of equality and 
mutual respect in the field of human rights, both within 
BRICS and in multilateral fora – including the United 
Nations Human Rights Council where all BRICS serve as 
members in 2014 – taking into account the necessity to 
promote, protect and fulfill human rights in a non-selective, 
non-politicized and constructive manner, and without 
double standards (Art. 28). 
 
 
IV. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The new institutionalization and political reality of the BRICS provides a new platform 
for developing states’ interests – especially China’s – to be entertained with greater 
authority and validation than traditional international forums.  This is especially 
witnessed through the aforementioned interpretations of the right to development and 
subsistence as a fundamental international human right.  Therefore, we are presented with 
the following question: Will the BRICS’ economic rise and increased political 
cooperation present an opportunity for an alternative norms regime to be created?  
Likewise, will their stringent focus on the RTD and subsistence – one that differs from 
the conventional views of the US and the West – draw on already existing ideas 
regarding this right within the outskirts of the current human rights regime and 
subsequently bring them to the forefront? 
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In order to address this question, we must first establish what the existing human 
rights discourse entails. The following chapter is dedicated to establishing three things: 1) 
a conventional definition of human rights that will be used throughout the remainder of 
the paper; 2) the foundation for which the existing global human rights regime exists; and 
3) an assessment of the global human rights regime through the lens of each of the three 
core theories of international relations. In the end, a bona fide depiction of the current 
international structure’s notion of human rights norms will be well-defined and helpful 
for supplementary chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2| THE EXISTING HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME 
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I.  WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 
Human rights, by their name and nature, are rights that one possesses simply because one 
is human.   They are held equally by all human beings – blind to race, sex, language, 
place of residence, national origin, sexual orientation, and any other identity or status one 
may hold.  Human rights are paramount moral rights recognized within international law 
that cannot be relinquished, forfeited, or destroyed, as they are an inalienable, 
interrelated, and interdependent component of our shared humanity.  
Existing notions of human rights possess a sense of universality, in so much that 
all states in the existing international framework have agreed that the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Human Rights Covenants, and a 
multitude of multilateral agreements establish a set of internationally recognized human 
rights norms (Donnelly 2013).  Nonetheless, despite this universality, ambiguity still 
exists when establishing a comprehensive image of what human rights truly are.  Hans 
Peter Schmitz and Kathryn Sikkink suggest, “human rights are a set of principled ideas 
about the treatment to which all individuals are entitled by virtue of being human” 
(Schmitz & Sikkink 2002, 515).  Tony Evans derives his understanding of human rights 
norms from the tenets of natural rights and what it means to be human (Evans 2011).  
And Paul Gordon Lauren bases his understanding of human rights on the idea of mutual 
responsibility and the deserved compassion and respect for our “human brothers and 
sisters” (Lauren 2011).   
Nevertheless, within the various circulating definitions of human rights, a general 
assumption can be made: human rights are, in their simplest form, “not what we need for 
survival but what we need for a life of dignity” (Donnelly 2013, 21). The Universal 
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Declaration of Human Rights, passed by the UN General Assembly in 1948, grounds this 
belief in “the inherent dignity…of all members of the human family [as] the foundation 
of freedom, justice, and peace in the world” (UDHR Preamble).  Thus, this human rights 
discourse strays away from a discussion concerning the foundations of human rights and 
replaces it with an emphasis on the universal ethical principles of respect for life, human 
dignity, and justice (Viotti & Kauppi 2010).  Simply put, at the core of human rights is 
the ability for all individuals to realize their self-worth. 
 While a consensus has been forming primarily within the last half of the twentieth 
century surrounding the conceptualization of human rights mentioned above, the origins 
remain contested.  And while this debate is definitely important, this paper will not go 
into great detail regarding this particular dispute.  That being said, it is important to 
recognize that the long progression in human rights discourse is “one of innovation and 
discovery – a continuous, if uneven, discourse of challenge and counterchallenge, of 
evolution, movement, and process, reflecting the dynamics of social, political, and 
economic change” (Evans 2011, 8).   
 
II.  HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT 
Since the introduction of human rights to global politics following the conclusion of 
World War II, this discourse has continued to grip the contemporary polis with increasing 
strength.  This “grip” is what will henceforth be referred to as the global human rights 
regime.  An ‘international regime’ is best defined as “rules, norms, principles, and 
procedures that focus expectations regarding international behavior” (Simmons & Martin 
2002, 193) that states and other international actors accept as authoritative within a 
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certain context.  The global human rights regime can therefore be best understood as an 
elaborate global system of states and multilateral institutions that promote this notion of 
human rights via a network of principles, rules, norms, and procedures.  
 
A. PRINCIPLE 
Perhaps the most foundational component of the global human rights regime is the 
principle by which it exists.  Originating from the relationship human rights create 
between the right holders and the obligated entities (Schmitz and Sikkink 2002), this 
notion of ‘principle’ provides an understanding of what human rights discourse is 
constructed from.  Therefore, four correlated duties between an individual and a 
responsible party – most often the state – are employed: (1) the duty not to deprive; (2) 
the duty to protect from deprivation; (3) the duty to provide effective enjoyment; and (4) 
the duty to aid the deprived (Donnelly 2011) The first duty, the duty not to deprive, is 
held universally among all human beings and actors.  Just as states do not have the right 
to deprive an individual of their fundamental human rights, human beings have no right 
in depriving a peer of his or her basic rights either.  The last three duties, which logically 
can also be applied universally, are almost exclusively held by the state.4  As Jack 
Donnelly articulates, “Everyone – all social actors – is obliged not to violate human 
rights.  Only states, though, are obliged to implement and enforce human rights, and then 
only for their citizens (and others under their jurisdiction)” (Donnelly 2011, 24).  
Therefore, it is through this relationship between the individual and the obligated entity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 A state’s duty to protect from deprivation, to provide effective enjoyment, and to aid the deprived should 
not be confused with the previous chapter’s discussion on the granting of the RTD to the state.  In this 
context, the state has a duty to safeguard and uphold individual rights for the benefit of the citizenry.  In the 
RTD debate, a “human right” is granted to the state and not necessarily the individual.     
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that we see a system the national implementation of human rights, a characteristic that is 
essential to the global human rights regime.   
 
B. RULES & NORMS 
Together, the ‘rules’ and ‘norms’ of the global human rights regime provide the 
framework for its recognition within the international system.  The doctrines for which 
this regime exists are grounded within principal documents and multilateral agreements 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International 
Human Rights Covenants (IHRC).  Both the UDHR – adopted by the UN General 
Assembly on December 10, 1948 – and the IHRC – ratified in the late 1960s – receive 
global endorsement from countries on every single continent. Articles 2-27 of the UDHR 
establish our current understanding of international human rights with, as introduced in 
the previous chapter, comprehensive sets of both civil and political rights and economic, 
social, and cultural rights.  The former recognizes and includes rights to life, liberty, and 
security of person, along with various legal protections and civil liberties, while the latter 
recognizes the right to an “adequate standard of living, social security, work, rest and 
leisure, family, education, and participation in the cultural life of the community” 
(Donnelly 2011, 6).  Evidently, economic, social, and cultural rights closely relate to the 
previously discussed definition of the RTD, particularly as it relates to an individual’s 
right to an “adequate standard of living” (Donnelly 2011, 6). 
 The UDHR remains the most authoritative statement on the condition of 
international human rights norms in today’s international structure.  However, it is not the 
only statement that exists or contributes to the regime’s framework.  Multilateral treaties 
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and conventions contribute to the human rights norms established by the UDHR and the 
IHRC by oftentimes focusing on specific issues.  In other words, treaties address specific 
areas of human rights – the rights of the child, for example – that subsequently create 
norms and rules regarding said areas.   
International treaties become legally binding when they are formally and 
voluntarily accepted by the delegation and governing body of sovereign states.  First, a 
state declares that the objective and contents of the treaty are both relevant and important 
enough for the state’s approval.  When this decision is made by the state, this state is then 
referred to as a “signatory” of the treaty or agreement.  Afterwards, states are able to 
ratify the treaty (based on their respective constitutional procedures) to then be 
considered as “parties.”  Figure 2.0 provides the core international treaties that are 
integrated within the existing human rights discourse, as well as the associated number of 
states who are parties, signatories, and those who have taken no action, as reported by the 
US Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
It is important to note that Figure 2.0 is not an exhaustive list of the treaties that 
address human rights issues, as there exists more than one hundred.  These are, however, 
the most important and overarching statements that currently exist in international law.  
Nonetheless, these treaties have provided a platform for norms and rules regarding 
different subsets and issue-areas of human rights to be created and discussed.  While 
these treaties have contributed to the crafting of norms within the global regime, we must 
still recognize the shortcomings of these treaties.  Such shortcomings predominately arise 
due to these treaties’ reliance on states in order to interpret their meaning and implement 
such interpretations within their borders.  The creation of norms through the UDHR and 
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associated treaties have thus led to an international law system based upon ‘national 
implementation of international human rights,’ which is discussed in the following 
section. 
 
Figure 2.0 
 
*Data as of November 2014 from the UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights 
 
 
C. PROCEDURE 
The final component of the global human rights regime addresses the ways in which 
these rules and norms are administered and governed within the international community.  
Convention/Treaty Parties to Treaty 
Signatories 
to Treaty 
No 
Action 
Year 
Adopted 
International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
177 5 15 1965 
International Covenant on Civil & 
Political Rights 168 7 22 1966 
International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, & Cultural Rights 162 7 28 1966 
Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women 
188 2 7 1979 
Convention Against Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment of Punishment 
156 10 31 1984 
Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 194 2 1 1989 
International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of all 
Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families 
47 19 131 1990 
Convention on the Rights or Persons 
with Disabilities 151 31 16 2006 
International Convention for the 
Protection of all Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance 
43 56 98 2006 
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Comprised of various sub-regimes and multilateral mechanisms, the existing regime is 
contingent upon on the notion of national jurisdiction and full sovereign authority by the 
state.  As Donnelly illustrates in one of his earliest works, “…national performance is 
subject to only minimal international supervision” (Donnelly 1986, 608).  Dating back to 
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the belief that states were sovereign and thus subject to 
no higher power has structured international relations for centuries, resulting in a legal 
premise of states having exclusive jurisdiction over their territory, people, and resources.  
Therefore, the creation of international standards and law has remained a struggle for the 
global human rights regime as it combats the prevailing international norm of state 
sovereignty.   
However, in recent years we have witnessed a new conception of international 
legitimacy present itself within the existing human rights regime, specifically through the 
global scope of multilateral mechanisms.  Amongst the UN and other like-minded bodies, 
a distinction has been made regarding the governing bodies of the human rights regime 
between those that are “Charter-based” and those that are “treaty-based.”  “Charter-
based” mechanisms derive their authority from the UN Charter, whereas “treaty-based” 
mechanisms, as the name implies, find their roots within specialized treaties like those 
mentioned in Figure 3.0.  In addition to the two distinctions mentioned above, regional 
human rights regimes are also considered to be major multilateral actors, even though 
such regimes prove inconsistent or even nonexistent in many areas of the world. 
 The Human Rights Council (HRC) and the UN Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR) represent the two most important Charter-based bodies of 
the existing regime.  The HRC, created in 2006 in order to replace the Commission on 
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Human Rights, is comprised of states that are elected by the UN General Assembly, 
generally without regard to their respective human rights records (Donnelly 2011).  As a 
result, the council often finds itself politicized and constrained by its composition.  
Nonetheless, it remains an overarching forum for the “consensual development of new 
international human rights norms” (Donnelly 2011, 77) and the promotion of 
internationally recognized human rights through limited monitoring.  The HRC’s 
activities mimic an information-advocacy model of human rights implementation that 
circulates information on rights violations within the international community.  This 
information regarding the state violations has the possibility of damaging the reputation 
of said states within the international community once the information was made public.  
Therefore, the council relies on the desire of the rights-violating state to keep their 
reputation intact as a motivation to improve their human rights practices and conditions 
(Donnelly 2011).  This “public shaming” approach is also embodied within the OHCHR, 
an individual who has the same global reach as the HRC without the lengthy procedures 
and possibility for politicization.  “The high commissioner may deal directly with 
governments to seek improved respect for internationally recognized human rights – but 
with the added advantage of an explicit mandate to deal with all government on all 
issues” (Donnelly 2011, 80).  The current5 OHCHR, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein of Jordan, 
provides administrative support, engages in original research, and provides necessary 
services to governments hoping to improve their practices.  More importantly, the 
OHCHR assumes the prominent role of global advocate for all human rights (Donnelly 
2011).  It is important to note that both the HRC and the OHCHR are simply advisory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  As of March 2015. 
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mechanisms that have no legal power over the states.  Instead, these mechanisms are 
solely reliant on the possible damage inflicted on a rights-violating state’s international 
reputation as their source of power. 
 “Treaty-based” bodies, like their “Charter-based” counterparts, are essential 
institutions in the overarching procedural component of the human rights regime.  As 
previously mentioned, “treaty-based” bodies receive their authority from multilateral 
human rights treaties and are often created in order to ensure that signatories and parties 
are complying with the elements of the treaty.  “When a state ratifies one of the 
international human rights treaties, it assumes a legal obligation to implement the rights 
recognized in that treaty” (Report on Indicators for Promoting and Monitoring the 
Implementation of Human Rights 2008).  Thus the treaties referenced in Figure 3.0 
establish the human rights rules and norms that serve as the foundations for their 
associated “treaty-based” body (i.e. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights, Committee on the Rights of the Child, Committee Against Torture, etc.).  
Nonetheless, when speaking in terms of these “treaty-based” bodies’ objectives, it is 
recognized that their most important activity is “to review periodic reports on compliance 
that parties are required to submit, usually every four or five years” (Donnelly 2011, 81).  
Concerned with the certain domain of human rights that is indicated by its associated 
treaty (i.e. racial discrimination, inhumane punishment, etc.), these reports are used to 
publicly discuss a state’s practices and engage in formal written exchanges.  Due to their 
ability to address violations that may not be deemed severe enough for the HRC yet still 
require international attention, “treaty-based” bodies are an invaluable asset to the global 
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human rights regime.  Additionally, these mechanisms provide a platform for general 
comments on international law and complaint procedures.   
 Before transitioning into the importance of regional human rights regimes, four 
other global multilateral actors are worth highlighting: the International Labor 
Organization (ILO); the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO); the International Criminal Court (ICC); and the UN Security 
Council.  Although each of these actors is focused around a main directive that is not 
necessarily human rights related, their work often overlaps and intersects with several 
aspects of the existing human rights regime.   
 One of the first multilateral human rights organizations to exist, the ILO was 
founded in 1919 with a mission to end social injustice in the workplace.  Because of this 
forward-looking mission and its extensive history, the ILO has often served as a model 
for other international human rights reporting and procedural systems.  Major ILO 
conventions deal with issues such as the freedom of association, forced labor, indigenous 
people, migrant workers, adequate living wages, hour regulation, and various other 
measures.  The ILO and its role within the global human rights regime – specifically the 
global labor regime – will be discussed in much greater detail in the following chapter. 
 In 1945, twenty countries collaborated on an international level to create 
UNESCO, a global multilateral actors that has addressed multiple human rights issues 
since its establishment.  The twenty founding states believed “in full and equal 
opportunities for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in the 
free exchange of ideas and knowledge” (UNESCO Constitution Preamble 1945).  This 
statement was a strong response to the atrocities of WWII, placing optimism in the 
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creation of the “defenses of peace” (UNESCO Constitution Preamble 1945).  To this 
degree, UNESCO has done substantial work in the field of cultural rights, particularly as 
it relates to the preservation of heritages and languages in the increasingly globalized 
world (Donnelly 2011). 
 The ICC was created in 2002 as “a permanent tribunal that provides individual 
criminal liability for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes” (Donnelly 
2011, 87).  The jurisdiction and functioning of the ICC is governed by the Rome Statute 
and is based in The Hague in the Netherlands (Rome Statute 1998). The cases undertaken 
by the ICC are of the gravest crimes, including – but not limited to – the ones committed 
in areas such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, the Darfur region of Sudan, 
Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya (Donnelly 2011).  Charges and trials of national leaders 
in recent years speak to the growing significance and legitimacy of global actors like the 
ICC.  
 The UN Security Council, a “Charter-based body,” is one of the strongest and 
most comprehensive components of the UN.  In other words, while the Security 
Council’s primary mission is not related to the global human rights regime, it does in fact 
find itself addressing such issues on a regular basis.  This phenomenon is largely due to 
their association with general peacekeeping operations around the globe. Similar to the 
HRC, the Security Council often finds itself plagued by the ill effects of politicization.  
However, unlike many other multilateral actors associated with human rights, the 
Security Council has the ability to use force and coercion in times of necessity.  This 
unique ability to use force is granted to the Security Council in Articles 41 and 42 of the 
UN Charter: 
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The Security Council may decide what measures not 
involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give 
effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of 
the United Nations to apply such measures. These may 
include complete or partial interruption of economic 
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and 
other means of communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations (Art. 41) 
 
Should the Security Council consider that measures 
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have 
proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, 
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, 
or land forces of Members of the United Nations (Art. 42). 
 
 
 A secondary aspect of multilateral actors is that of regional human rights regimes.  
Unlike the global actors previously discussed, regional regimes are established in a wide 
variety of contexts – from the highly systemized and judicially oriented European regime 
to the complete absence of any formalized regime in Asia.  Such regional regimes are 
seen within organizations such as the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, the African Commission, the Arab Human Rights 
Committee, and the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (Donnelly 
2011). 
 The European regime is the most sophisticated and developed regional regime in 
the entire world.  At its core is both the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms – covering mostly civil and political rights – 
and the European Social Charter – primarily addressing economic and social rights.  
Together, they help provide a platform for the fundaments of the European Court of 
Human Rights, which “exercises binding jurisdiction with respect to the European 
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convention and whose decisions create binding legal obligations for states” (Donnelly, 
2011: 95).  While these are of particular importance to the regional regime, we do see 
European states also relying on mechanisms such as the Council of Europe, the Council 
of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities.  What is essential to the European regime is that a wide variety 
of regional mechanisms are at each European states’ disposal, while simultaneously 
possessing the power and authority to not only encourage governments to abide by the 
regional covenants, but also make legally binding findings and decisions (Donnelly 
2011).  This component is widely counterintuitive to the traditional debate regarding 
national sovereignty and international human rights enforcement, as the European states 
are allowing a multilateral mechanism to make legally binding decisions that affect their 
domestic practices.  As mentioned earlier in this section, such circumstances reflect a 
slight transition away from the conventional notion of strict national sovereignty that has 
existed has existed since the 17th century.  For this reason, the European regional regime 
remains the most intricate and well developed of any region in the world.  As stated in the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, this 
sophistication is largely due to the “common heritage of political traditions, ideals, 
freedom and the rule of law” that allowed European states “to take the first steps for the 
collective enforcement of certain rights states in the Universal Declaration” (Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950).  Despite its 
complexity as a regional regime, it is important to emphasize that the European regime 
does not exist detached from the global regime established by the United Nations.  
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Instead, this regional regime acts as a sub-regime, working in tandem with the tenets and 
core beliefs of the UDHR and other multilateral agreements, even though the European 
regime possess certain enforcement mechanisms that do not exist on the international 
level.  
 The Inter-American system find its roots in the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man, which was adopted by the General Assembly of the 
Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948.  Similar to the UDHR, this declaration 
was not legally binding.  However, in 1969, the American Convention on Human Rights 
was established in high hopes of challenging the relatively weak convention that 
previously existed for one that was, in fact, a legal instrument.  Despite these hopes, only 
twenty-four of thirty-five states have ratified the Convention today.  Of the twenty-four, 
this includes all Latin American states, but not the United States, Canada, and several 
Caribbean states (Donnelly 2011).  Its weakness is indicated by the extremely small 
number of cases that are heard by the Inter-American Court that is based in San Jose, 
Cost Rica.  Nevertheless, while the Inter-American regional regime possesses similar 
conventions to that of the global regime (i.e. conventions against torture, discrimination 
against women, etc.), it still lacks the legal clout, recognition, and legitimacy that is 
apparent in its European counterpart.  
 Finally, we have the remaining regional regimes in Africa, the Middle East, and 
Asia.  The first two regions, Africa and the Middle East, do in fact operate a regional 
human rights regime.  However, they are substantively weaker than both the European 
and American equivalents.  While statements like the 1981 African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights and the 2005 Arab Charter of Human Rights are important for the 
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progress of the global human rights regime, the institutions necessary for the monitoring 
and enforcement of these statements are extremely weak and virtually nonexistent at 
times (Donnelly 2011).  In Asia, the only “quasi-mechanism” that does exist is within the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  At first, the creation of the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights in 2009 seemed to be monumental as 
the first Asian regional regime.  Yet in the years since, the body remains inactive, 
suggesting a serious lack of interest in member states’ practices.  
 The procedural component of the global human rights regime is extensive, yet it 
remains a critically important aspect of the regime’s existence.  Today, many believe this 
procedural component can be seen as a “struggle over balancing the competing claims of 
sovereignty and international human rights and the competing conceptions of legitimacy 
that they imply” (Donnelly 2011, 27). While that does vaunt substantial and somewhat 
truthful claims regarding the existing global regime, we do in fact see one example – the 
European regional regime – where the notion of sovereignty is forfeited for the legal 
obligations of multilateral mechanisms.  However, in a world where sovereign states are 
at the heart of the organized international community, “implementing human rights rests 
on persuasive diplomacy, which itself rests considerably on the power of shame that lies 
at the heart of investigatory and reporting mechanisms” (Donnelly 2011, 111). 
 
 
 
III.  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY & THE 
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME 
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The existing global human rights regime cannot be understood detached from the actors, 
agents, and norms that exist within the international structure.  In order to contextualize 
these components of the international system within existing human rights discourse, we 
must rely on the interpretations offered by the three core images of international 
relations: realism, liberalism, and constructivism.  It is essential that the core beliefs of 
these images be recognized and expounded on to understand the current human rights 
regime and the challenges that it faces.  In what follows, I will demonstrate that we 
cannot rely on just one of these images to provide a comprehensive understanding of the 
existing human rights regime. Instead, it is necessary to bring together certain 
components of each of these theories to create an inclusive image that accounts for the 
equally significant roles played by economic power, institutions, and ideas.  As Robert O. 
Keohane once stated, “No perspective has a monopoly on wisdom…contestation between 
different approaches can play a positive role in social science scholarship” (Keohane 
2002, 164). 
 
A. REALISM: THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC POWER 
As an image of international relations, realism is based on four principal assumptions: 1) 
states are the most important actors in what realists consider an anarchical world; 2) the 
state is a unitary actor; 3) the state is essentially a rational actor; 4) national and 
international security is the single most important issue facing the state (Viotti & Kauppi 
2011).  The core of realist theory is the emphasis and the focus on power and power 
politics among states.  This essence of power can be observed through the behavior in 
which states interact with one another, as well as their ability to influence the behavior of 
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other states.  For many realists, the power capabilities among states is primarily 
determined by the material power it possesses, specifically in regards to economic 
prominence and military capacity.    
 Realism stresses the “primacy in all political life of power and security” 
(Donnelly 2011, 29).  States are the sole actor in the international arena and are thus 
responsible for their own resources in the perpetual state of anarchy in which they exist.  
Neorealist John J. Mearsheimer views state activity in a relatively pessimistic light, 
claiming that states only look for opportunities to gain power at each other’s expense 
(Mearsheimer 2001). When interpreting international politics, it is the distribution of 
power that is essential and, truthfully, the only thing that matters.  As a result, 
individuals, domestic politics, and ideology have little importance in realist theory 
(Mearsheimer 2001). 
Because of this, realists do not recognize that norms such as human rights are 
significant or independent forces in the international arena (Schmitz & Sikkink 2002).  
Instead, they argue that “universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of 
states…[it] would not only be foolishly unsuccessful but also leave one’s country 
vulnerable to the power of self-interested states” (Donnelly 2011, 29). Since realists 
promote international and national security as the single most important issue facing the 
state, they consequently argue that national interests should be defined in terms of power. 
If states make the domestic conduct of other states a concern included within their own 
national interests, morality begins to conflict with the notion of power and the state is 
consequently weakened.  Thus, human rights are seen as potential threats to the overall 
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stability of the international system, directly undermining the notion of state sovereignty 
as the central organizing principle of international relations (Schmitz & Sikkink 2002).  
So where do human rights, in the realist image, originate? Moreover, if realists 
argue that the international system is in a perpetual state of anarchy, is it even possible 
for them to explain the international human rights regime we see today? First, like any 
international norms regime, realists believe that ideas such as human rights are promoted 
and diffused by a hegemon or a dominant group of states (Ikenberry & Kupchan 1990).  
Mearsheimer states that the livelihood of all states – big and small – is subjected to the 
decisions and actions of those with the greatest capability, which,  (Mearsheimer 2001). 
Likewise, capability, by realist tradition, relies solely on one’s material power. As 
Stephen D. Krasner argues, “the content of human rights issues that were at the forefront 
in various historical periods reflected the concerns of those states which possessed a 
preponderance of economic and military power” (Krasner 1993, 166).  In essence, the 
more economic or military power a state possesses, the more likely this state is to impact 
and influence the international system in a way it considers necessary.  Therefore, 
according to realism, the human rights norms we see in the international community 
today are byproducts of the distribution of material capacities. In other words, human 
rights were originated and imposed by a hegemon, evolved within hegemonic 
domination, and diffused by forcing less powerful states to adapt to the hegemony’s 
practices and beliefs (Schmitz & Sikkink 2002).  
Thus, when looking at the existing global human rights regime from the power-
based lens of realism, we must do so from the ‘current’ hegemon’s perspective.  The 
theory of hegemonic stability, a key component of realism, argues that it is the 
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distribution of power among states that determines and characterizes the international 
economic system (Webb & Krasner 1989).  Webb and Krasner are illustrating the 
importance and necessity of ‘power’ in order to depict an international system that is 
favorable to prolonging the state’s current and future success.  This ‘power capability,’ 
arguably, emanates from a state’s economic status. 
Therefore, we can take the fundaments of the hegemonic stability theory – the 
ability of a dominant power to shape the character of a specific system it is involved in – 
and apply it to the existing human rights regime. According to the hegemonic stability 
theory, “norms are epiphenomenal to the distribution of material and military capabilities 
in the international system…prevalent norms change with the rise and fall of powerful 
states” (Schmitz & Sikkink 2002, 522).  Thus, the human rights norms of the existing 
regime – under realist assumptions – were created by the economic prowess of the 
Western hegemony following World War II.  Specifically, the United States rose to 
economic preeminence as Europe worked to recover from wartime destruction.  This 
position within the international community – rooted within economic power – allowed 
the United States and its Western allies to shape the human rights regime under the 
interests of a liberal world economy and the individualistic norms of democracy and 
capitalism.  Thus the human rights norms that exist in today’s international community 
are byproducts of the distribution of material capacities originally imposed by the West.  
And, as a result, an international system was formed that correlated with the economic 
and political interests of these states.  Robert W. Cox explicates this phenomenon by 
drawing upon notions expressed by Gramsci’s political theory, particularly the idea that 
the movement towards hegemony is the diffusion of ideas by specific groups to the 
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“building of institutions and elaboration of ideas” (Cox 1996, 220).  Cox’s unique 
interpretation of the international structure will be referenced in greater details later in 
this chapter. 
This human rights regime has sustained itself within the existing international 
structure due to the strong economic power the West has held throughout the 20th and 
early 21st centuries.  To this effect, this regime is often perceived to be an outcome of the 
West’s intentions for weaker countries to adopt the standards of liberal democracy and 
capitalism as political conditionalities for diplomatic and aid-related cooperation.   
Although realists believe that the international community is one that exists in a perpetual 
state of anarchy, human rights norms have been created and reinforced by the powerful 
states that enforce them, oftentimes via coercive practices and sanctions (Krasner 1993).  
 Power is an important component of international relations that cannot – and 
should not – be ignored. For that reason, realism provides an important focus on power 
that is needed when interpreting the existing global human rights regime. This allows, as 
mentioned above, the state to assume a significant role in the international community 
and craft a system that is favorable to their domestic interests and ideas, which, in realist 
terms, can be enforced using coercive practices and sanctions.  However, Mearsheimer, 
Krasner, and various other realists often underplay or completely ignore the role of 
institutions in the international context.  While realism is helpful in understanding world 
politics at the surface, its interpretation of international relations is far too limited in 
scope.  Accordingly, one simply cannot rely on realism alone to provide a comprehensive 
theoretical approach to the existing global human rights regime.  While economic power 
did in fact act as a precursor for the West in characterizing an international system that 
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reflected its interests, this economic power did not act in solitude.  Using its economic 
capacity, the West created institutions that would reflect and advocate its interests to the 
broader global community.  For this reason, we must turn to neoliberal institutionalism 
for a theoretical explanation as to how this economic power is channeled and perpetuated 
through international institutions.  
 
B. LIBERALISM: THE IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONS 
The liberal international relations image is multidimensional in nature, in so much that it 
is influenced by many theoretical approaches.  Like realism, liberalism has four key 
assumptions: 1) states, as well as non-state, transnational actors are important in world 
politics; 2) the state is not always a unitary actor and instead joined by institutions and 
ideas operating transnationally across borders; 3) economic and other forms of 
interdependence or interconnectedness among both state and non-state actors have a 
moderating effect on state behavior; 4) state-society relation is critical to understanding 
international relations (Viotti & Kauppi 2011).  Whereas realism places emphasis on the 
notion of power within a state’s national interests, liberal international relations theory 
emphasizes the “domestic sources of state preferences as the determinant of outcomes in 
international politics” (Schmitz & Sikkink 2002, 521).  Robert O. Keohane, a pioneer in 
neoliberal institutionalism, describes liberalism as “an approach to international relations 
[that] emphasizes individuals, seeks to understand collective decisions, promotes human 
rights and validates attempts to ameliorate the human condition” (Keohane 2002, 165).  
The liberal image is a unique one in that it does not seek to provide full explanations on 
global politics.  Instead, each one of the different subsets of liberal theory explain some 
	   58 
things, but not others, in hopes of connecting them together to create a more general 
approach to international politics.  
One of those sub-theories, neoliberal institutionalism, attempts to interpret the 
international system through rule-oriented institutions. Neoliberal institutionalism 
recognizes that “international institutions help to realize common interests in world 
politics…[and] are necessary…in order to achieve state purposes” (Keohane 1984, 245).  
In other words, international institutions are essential in helping provide a platform for 
the effective cooperation of states in the existing international structure.   
As discussed in the previous subsection, realism believes that states are selfish 
and only pursue measures that will benefit their position within the hierarchical structure 
of the international community.  Keohane’s institutionalism, however, believes that this 
belief is not always true. Instead, he challenges the realist assumption of competitive 
international anarchy by asserting that states do in fact possess complementary and 
sometimes mutual interests that can be realized through certain forms of potentially 
beneficial cooperation.  “…Their [institutions] presence or absence determine whether 
governments can cooperate effectively for common ends” (Keohane 1984, 247).  We can 
interpret this image of international relations by assuming that actors will rationally 
pursue their interests and utilize their resources at their disposal to seek a desirable 
objective.  To do this, these actors must recognize the structure in which they exist and 
subsequently respond to it.  Today, this role of ‘actor’ is often assumed by the states, and 
institutions are used as a means of responding to the existing international structure.  In 
this regard, states recognize how these institutions affect their current beliefs and how 
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they can be utilized as instruments for the pursuit of their own objectives (Keohane 
2002).  
 With this in mind, how does liberalism interpret human rights norms, their 
origins, and their diffusion within the international structure? As previously mentioned, 
liberalism heavily focuses on domestic politics.  Accordingly, human rights institutions 
are established to “selectively delegate sovereignty to a supranational body” as a means 
of support and reinforcement in times of perceived domestic threats or concerns (Schmitz 
& Sikkink 2002, 522).  To this degree, Keohane’s point regarding the importance of 
institutions as a platform for international cooperation is relevant.  For example, in the 
aftermath of the Holocaust, the Western states needed a language in which human rights 
could be discussed and understood.  Creating institutions as a platform for this language 
to exist helped establish an understanding within the international community that such 
horrific actions were legally and politically intolerable.  These institutions, such as the 
United Nations, provided a global platform – albeit developed by a limited set of elites – 
where sets of issues could be discussed and where an international human rights agenda 
could be created.  In contrast, realists would argue that such institutions lack legitimacy 
and efficacy due to the overwhelming notion of state sovereignty – when push comes the 
shove, every state’s primary concern is their own interest. Liberals, however, believe that 
“interdependence among human beings produces discord, which generates a need for 
institutions… [that] are essential for the good life” (Keohane 2002, 165 & 169).  Simply 
put, for liberals, institutions provide a platform for necessary cooperation within the 
international community and between states. 
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 Human rights norms, in the liberal perspective, are diffused through domestic 
structures with a limited independent role for international institutions.  After all, these 
institutions are comprised of individual states cooperating with one another.  Thus, the 
make-up of these individual states is crucial to understanding the international institutions 
they create and the discourse used within these institutions.  Liberal theory emphasizes 
the domestic attitudes, political structures, and decision-making processes (Keohane 
1984) while simultaneously assuming “that [the] success of norms diffusion is mainly 
determined by [their] compatibility with preexisting domestic structures” (Schmitz & 
Sikkink 2002, 523).   
Therefore, when approaching the existing global human rights regime, liberalism 
believes that these norms originate via a voluntary agreement among state leaders (i.e. 
UDHR), evolve through supranational institutionalization, and are maintained through 
legal processes, domestic structures, and self-interest (Schmitz & Sikkink 2002).  
Liberals believe that the existence of international institutions allows for a universal 
platform where human rights norms and ideas can be safeguarded and discussed in a 
collaborative forum.  But these human rights norms and ideas can only be advocated for 
via international institution if the domestic politics of a state are willing to recognize and 
abide by said norms.  For example, the liberal democracies that dominate Western 
political systems tend to be more apt to accepting human rights norms.  This is largely 
due to the inherent compatibility democratic principles have with these norms.  On that 
same note, authoritarian states are less likely to view international human rights norms as 
legitimate due to their incongruity with the accepted doctrines of authoritarianism.  
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Ultimately, realists suggest that the noncompliance with international human 
rights norms emanates from a given state’s interest in maintaining its national security 
and established position within the hierarchy of political power.  Liberals suggest, 
however, that this defiance is instead a product of domestic political structures and 
systems that simply do not allow for such practices to be realized.  Yet what both realism 
and liberalism fail to rationalize is the measures taken by authoritarian states like China 
and the former Soviet Union to become parties to human rights treaties and statements 
such as the UDHR.  If the political structure of authoritarianism is inherently 
incompatible with human rights norms, why do such states agree to an international 
statement that contradicts its domestic beliefs and practices?  While liberalism explains 
how and why institutions are essential in providing a platform for the advocacy, 
monitoring, and development of these norms in the international community, it lacks the 
capacity to justify why states with opposing domestic practices would include themselves 
in such institutions.  Therefore, attention must be directed to the ways in which state 
identities are created in relation to the international system – seeing how the system 
induces behavior within states and how that behavior is then shaped outward – as an 
explanation for such seemingly contradictory involvement in these institutions.  Although 
liberalism recognizes the value of institutions within the existing human rights regime, 
constructivism provides justification for why states with conflicting domestic political 
systems would even consider being involved in such institutions.  
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C. CONSTRUCTIVISM: THE IMPORTANCE OF IDENTITIES AND INTERESTS 
Like realism and liberalism, constructivism relies on four general assumptions when 
offering an interpretive approach to understanding international relations. The first 
assumption evokes debate regarding the existing agents within the international system. 
As previously stated, realism deems that states are the sole and unitary actor, whereas 
liberalism believes that both states and institutions have a critical role in the international 
community. Constructivism, however, relies on the subjective and intersubjective 
exchanges and actions taken by human beings as agents of these state and non-state 
entities.  Given this, constructivists also claim that state identity and interests are social 
constructed through a state’s relation with another. The second assumption addresses the 
international system as a whole – which realists would describe as anarchical and liberals 
as interdependent.  Constructivists instead contend that the international structure is in 
fact a social structure pervaded with ideational factors that include norms, rules, and law.  
The third assumption opposes the restricted view of change by realists and liberals by 
instead interpreting the existing structure in a constant state of construction.  Finally, the 
fourth assumption contradicts the objectivist views of both realism and liberalism with a 
belief that objectivity is near impossible due to the diverse experiences of all human 
beings (Viotti & Kauppi 2011; Muppidi 2004).  In summation, realism focuses on power, 
liberalism relies on domestic politics, and constructivism emphasizes the independent 
role of norms and ideas in affecting both international and domestic policies.  The central 
question for constructivists is not about how states choose to pursue their national 
interest, but rather how and why these interests were initially formed (Schmitz & Sikkink 
2002).  It is this emphasis on the independent role of norms that enables constructivism to 
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explain where realism and liberalism fail; only constructivism offers an answer to the 
question of why states with a preponderance of economic and military power would 
begin pursuing human rights policies and acting on notions of social purpose when doing 
so would not be within these states’ national interests.  
 Emanuel Adler portrays constructivists as international relations theorists as those 
who “[see] the world as a project under construction, as becoming rather than being” 
(Adler 2002, 95).  The world is permeated with norms, rules, interests, and identities that 
affect how we perceive ourselves and how we relate to the world around us.  Together, 
these help form what constructivists call ‘agents.’ Whereas realism and liberalism portray 
states as the primary agents in the international system, constructivists believe that non-
governmental organizations, social movements, corporations, advocacy groups, or classes 
can also be included as agents.  Social structures can help encourage these agents to 
redefine their interests and identities (Viotti & Kauppi 2011).  Thus, agents and structures 
mutually constitute one another – agents have the ability to change structures and vise 
versa.   
For constructivists, human rights norms have intrinsic value and universalistic 
qualities.  But how do human rights norms come to fruition under the constructivist 
image?  John G. Ruggie questions the limited international or domestic scope of realists 
and liberals and instead focuses on the “content and consequences of particular regimes” 
(Schmitz & Sikkink 2002, 522).  He argues that when we attempt to understand the 
international power structure by focusing on states, it only helps in understanding the 
form of order and not the content of that structure.  Thus, when we strictly focus on states 
when examining human rights, we are disregarding the prevalent rights norms and ideas – 
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what Ruggie calls ‘social purpose’ – that aid in understanding the consequences and 
content of the rights regime (Schmitz & Sikkink, 2002).   
Kathryn Sikkink disputes this strict focus on the state’s role in human rights 
norms creation by claiming that such norms require the participation of individuals.  
Sikkink does not discredit the important role other actors have played in the origins of 
human rights norms, mentioning that it is the “collaboration among norms entrepreneurs 
inside of governments, those within international organizations, and nongovernmental 
actors that leads to the emergence of human rights norms” (Sikkink 1998, 518-519).  It is 
the successful conglomeration of all agents and actors in the international and domestic 
community that aims to develop norms that “[govern] the way states treat individuals, 
[and] how individuals treat each other” (Sikkink 1998, 518). 
Human rights norms creation began with the combined efforts of individuals from 
many backgrounds – government, NGOs, and the private sector – in the crafting of the 
UDHR in 1948.  This individual cooperation provided the framework for which human 
rights language could exist, yet required an extensive global network for its promotion 
and development.  Sikkink asserts that in many examples of international norms, 
transnational campaigns are necessary “to persuade others of the importance and value of 
the new norms” (Sikkink 1998, 519).  This global network must then rely on the support 
of powerful state actors who will accept and endorse these norms as part of their 
governmental agenda.  This process is one of persuasion, relying on a strong argument by 
these nongovernmental actors to “redefine an activity as wrong, often through the power 
of their language, information, and symbolic activity” (Sikkink 1998, 519).  In the end, 
the emergence of human rights norms is a fundamental shift in a state’s national interests 
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by the important measures taken by individuals, networks of nongovernmental actors, 
and governments.  
The origin of the idea of human rights, as claimed by constructivists, is linked to 
one of two possibilities: 1) Western ideology; 2) basic ideas of human dignity that are 
shared in many cultures around the world (Schmitz & Sikkink 2002). No matter what the 
origins of human rights are, in order for these ideas to be recognized as important, there 
needs to be an opportunity where they can be introduced into societies.  This often comes 
in the process mentioned above or in the form of revolutions, wars, and coups.  As one 
can assume, both claims made above are responsible for the establishment of current 
human rights regime following World War II.  As previously mentioned, the diffusion of 
human rights norms in today’s global context has been in no small part due to the work of 
non-state organizations and the influence they exert on global circumstances. 
Yet this idea of norms creation as being a process by which individuals, 
nongovernmental actors, and governments all work together still fails to address the 
following question: if authoritarian political structures are inherently incompatible with 
human rights norms, why do these states agree to international statements that contradict 
various domestic beliefs and practices?  Such practices are rooted within a state’s 
interests and identity, specifically as they relate to the structure of the international 
system.  This concept was exemplified in the previous chapter regarding the BRICS 
increased political cooperation in relation to the Western-led international system, but it 
is now important to contextualize these claims within international relations theory.   
Constructivism directly addresses the traditional realist belief that the uncertainty 
inherent in an anarchic international system leads to the selfish nature of states by 
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employing the concept of state identity as crucial in determining whether relations among 
states will be cooperative or conflictive.  This conceptualization of state identity helps 
theorists better understand historical circumstances where identity and interests were 
closely related – the change in identity of the USSR, for example, which led to a 
transformation of its interests and the eventual change in the international structure 
Mielniczuk 2013).  In the 1990s, Alexander Wendt offered the dominant view of 
constructivism’s concern with the origin of identities by claiming they are, “given by the 
structure, understood as a ‘structure of role,’ [and] defined by the process of interaction 
(social practices) between the actors” (Mielniczuk 2013, 1077).  These social structures 
are “defined, in part, by shared understandings, material resources, and practices” (Wendt 
1995, 300).  In principle, states interact with one another within the international system 
and, throughout this process, begin defining their social identity in juxtaposition with 
other states – friends, rivals, or enemies.  This social identity then determines the states 
interests: what states ‘want’ in relation to what they ‘are’ in the international structure.  
Wendt’s viewpoint and focus on structure has come under intense criticism for 
causal relationship it employs between the identity of states and its interests.  Not only 
does this constructivist perspective make it difficult to differentiate “between a change of 
identity and a change in the interests of actors” (Mielniczuk 2013, 1078), it claims that 
identities determine interests without the acknowledging that the opposite is also 
plausible.  For this reason, we must turn to Himadeep Muppidi’s theoretical approach that 
conceptualizing interests should be done through the interpretive concept of ‘social 
claims’ (Muppidi 2004).   
Defined as individual demands, obligations, and self-
understandings, social claims furnish analysts with a way to 
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conceptualize an agent’s action as they relate to the actions 
of other units.  When an agent demands something, 
expresses certain interests, sees herself as obligated in some 
ways, or understands herself, those demands, obligations, 
or understandings are necessarily, if implicitly, in relation 
to someone or something else. She is demanding something 
of someone, sees herself as obligated to someone, or 
understands herself in relation to someone else or 
something else (Muppidi 2004, 22).  
 
Muppidi’s theoretical interpretation is dependent on an agent’s actions and the specific 
social relationship that agent shares with others.  This social relationship finds meaning 
only when it is associated with another agent, entity, or object.  The demands, 
obligations, and self-understandings that this individual agent makes on another agent, 
entity, or object are then seen as ‘social claims’ (Muppidi 2004).  Yet these social claims 
can only be understood and made relevant when they are situated in the appropriate social 
context.  In other words, understanding an individual agent’s social claims requires an 
understanding of that agent’s preferences, history, and social interactions, which results 
in a narrative of which this agent can define itself within the international context.  “Only 
the field of social claims is productive of the identities and social powers of actors…[and] 
are constantly either transformed or reproduced through the actions of social actors” 
(Muppidi 2004, 25).  In turn, these different narratives operate in different ‘social 
imaginaries,’ which Muppidi conceptualizes as “distinctive fields of meanings and social 
power” (Muppidi 2004, 25).  These social imaginaries help give meaning to the 
“mutually constitutive relationship that exists between specific social claims and the 
distinctive social identities and inside/outside relations that they generate” (Muppidi 
2004, 25).  
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Therefore, through this perspective, we are able to overcome the ideas that the 
international system is both materially- and structurally-based, which are the dominate 
interpretations within realism and liberalism.  Instead, through constructivism, we are 
able to understand the international system as the projection of various social 
imaginaries.  In other words, constructivism allows us to understand the international 
system as a system of normative and relational preferences among actors and their social 
interactions.  Using this interpretation, we are also able to understand how and why state 
identities “change or remain the same independently of the actions of other states” 
(Mielniczuk 2013, 1078).   
  As discussed, in order for norms to be accepted by the international community, 
constructivists emphasizes the importance of cooperation among states, NGOs, 
governmental organizations, and other advocacy networks to assist in the evolution of 
rights norms within the international community.  Thus, through the constructivist lens, 
the global human rights regime was created via a progression of domestic norms through 
the advocacy of transnational networks and acceptance of these norms by states.  These 
norms, contributing to a state’s social imaginary, were then projected abroad in the form 
of social claims.  By the constructivist approach, the international structure is a complex 
network of varying social imaginaries that are comprised of numerous identities and 
interests.  Therefore, constructivism allows us “to accept that a state’s identities change 
or remain the same independently of the actions of other states” (Mielniczuk 2013, 1078).  
For that reason, there is not a single logic that can explain the phenomenon of state 
identities and interests, which assists in our understanding of the BRICS and their 
increased cooperation.  As powerful developing states, these countries’ strong mutual 
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interest in the fundamentality of the RTD has subsequently brought them together under 
one common identity – the ‘BRICS.’ This identity, and even this strong mutual interest, 
has not always pervaded the international structure, but is a product of the social 
interactions and social claims that are currently being promoted.    
 
D. A COMPREHENSIVE IMAGE: THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC POWER, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND IDENTITIES & INTERESTS 
 
Despite the in-depth perspectives offered in the three previous subsections, it remains 
difficult to theoretically interpret the existing global human rights regime with just one of 
the three core images of international relations. If we wish to accurately depict the 
emergence and preservation of the existing human rights regime in today’s international 
system, we must employ components of each of the theoretical interpretations in order to 
create one comprehensive image.  This inclusive image will prove important in 
contextualizing the BRICS’ global rise in relation to the existing human rights regime.  
Under what theoretical circumstances has their augmented economic power proven 
necessary for their political cooperation?  Will this institutionalization of power be used 
as a platform for the dissemination of norms that more appropriately coincide with these 
states’ identities and interests?  What are the BRICS states’ national interests and how 
were these interests created and formed? 
As discussed in the subsection on realism, the material capacity of states is 
something that cannot be disregarded or downplayed by any means.  It is accepted by 
realist tradition that the more economic or military power a state possesses, the more 
likely this state is to impact and influence the international system in a way it considers 
necessary.  In other words, this material wealth allows the state to assume a significant 
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role within the international community and craft a system that is favorable to its 
domestic interests and ideas.  In the comprehensive image advocated for here, economic 
power is of the utmost importance – of which the BRICS states have an increasing 
amount.  In historical context, we have witnessed the importance of economic power with 
the hegemonic status the US held at the conclusion of World War II, thus allowing for the 
creation of an international system rooted and reinforced by democracy and capitalism.   
This realist perspective, however, fails to incorporate the critical role international 
institutions play in reinforcing and disseminating this economic power.  For this reason, 
we must rely on elements of neoliberal institutionalism and the emphasis it places on the 
cooperation apparent within international institutions. To this effect, international 
institutions are utilized as multilateral platforms for the safeguarding and discussion of 
norms and state interests – specifically those associated with human rights.  Furthermore, 
institutions give states the ability to respond to the international structure they exist in and 
subsequently pursue their own motivations and intentions.  At their core, “international 
institutions embody rules which facilitate the expansion of the dominant economic and 
social forces but which at the same time permit adjustments to be made by subordinated 
interests with a minimum of pain” (Cox 1996 222).  We see the BRICS states utilize 
these institutions – in so much that they are pursuing the creation of a formalized 
institution through the New Development Bank – as means of increased economic and 
political cooperation.  Even the BRICS annual summits – a less formalized international 
institution – has given these developing states a platform for their interests to be realized 
and their motivations to be pursued.  
	   71 
Like realism, liberalism has its shortcomings as well.  This particular perspective 
fails in offering a worthy explanation of why states like China would become a party or 
member to institutions that are incompatible with their domestic political structures.  
With that in mind, we must turn to constructivism. This theoretical lens confronts this 
shortcoming by emphasizing the importance of state identities and interests within the 
international community.  Individuals, nongovernmental actors, and state agents all play a 
crucial role in the realization and development of norms.  Through these norms, states 
make individual demands, have certain obligations, and understand themselves in what is 
referred to as social claims – all influenced by preferences, history, and social 
interactions.  These social claims are then extended outwards into the international 
structure and placed in relation to other states, resulting in the characterization and 
formation of said state’s identities and interests.  Utilizing their histories, preferences, and 
social interactions within the international structure, the BRICS have identified 
themselves as developing states with social claims that surround the RTD, equal 
opportunities for like-minded states, and a fair world order. 
In sum, this comprehensive image can be described as utilizing economic power 
as means of creating international institutions that are centered on certain state interests 
and identities.  Robert W. Cox employs a similarly comprehensive approach to the global 
human rights regime that appreciates the significance of ideas, identities, institutions, and 
economics.  Cox recognizes that world hegemonic power is a “social structure, an 
economic structure, and a political structure…[that] cannot be simply one of these things 
but must be all three” (Cox 1996 222).  The internal political and economic structures of 
the state in question begin to expand their increased energies beyond their borders and 
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onto weaker states.  The economic and social institutions, culture, and technology all act 
as conduits for which these increased energies can be emulated abroad.  These energies 
then influence the norms, behaviors, and elements of the international structure and other 
states (Cox 1996).  World hegemony, as Cox puts it, is “expressed in universal norms, 
institutions, and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behavior for states and for 
those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries” (Cox 1996 222). 
 
IV. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter has offered an inclusive overview of the existing human rights regime on 
many levels.  First, a definition of human rights was established, claiming that, in their 
simplest form, they are “not what we need for survival but what we need for a life of 
dignity” (Donnelly 2013, 21).  This, of course, is the definition given to the human rights 
discourse that was established and sustained by the Western powers following World 
War II because, as we have discussed, the RTD encompasses the “what we need for 
survival” component that is disregarded in Donnelly’s definition.  The following section 
surveyed the existing regime by overviewing its principle, rule and norms, and procedural 
components.  This particular section provided a much-needed framework for 
understanding what the current human rights regime entails, as established and governed 
by multilateral agreements and institutions.  And finally, the last section relied on 
conventional international relations images to explicate a theoretical approach to what 
currently exists in the international structure.  From this, we were able to extract certain 
components and create one comprehensive image that more accurately depicts the 
existing regime, while hypothesizing about the BRICS involvement. 
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The next chapter will build upon this discussion by focusing specifically on a sub-
regime of the human rights regime – the global labor regime.  With the increased 
economic power of the BRICS, a majority of this century’s new workers, laborers, and 
consumers will be employed by these states.  At the theoretical level, labor rights will be 
emphasized because of their strong association and relationship with the RTD.  The right 
to work and the ability of individuals to be self-sufficient is a cornerstone of the RTD 
philosophy; work is a conduit for subsistence and development.  Therefore, focusing on 
the global labor regime and labor rights in particular will assist offer a deeper 
understanding into whether or not the BRICS’ rise will impact the global human rights 
regime as we currently understand it, and if so, in what ways.      
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3| THE GLOBAL LABOR REGIME 
             
 
 
 
The BRICS’ influence on the global economy continues to intensify and expand at 
unprecedented rates.  Consequently, this economic proliferation will result in a majority 
of the forthcoming century’s new workers, laborers, and consumers being employed by 
these states.  For that reason, understanding the national interests, international actions, 
and domestic practices of the BRICS countries is imperative.  To that degree, identifying 
the BRICS’ discourse and practices surrounding labor rights and the global labor regime 
will provide the evidence needed to suggest similar situations in their future bilateral and 
multilateral interactions.  Nonetheless, it is crucial that we first establish the framework 
within today’s international structure for the current labor regime and its associated 
norms.  This chapter will be dedicated to the establishment and formulation of labor 
rights as understood within the context of contemporary international relations.  First, I 
will address the reoccurring debate within the existing rights discourse regarding the 
classification of labor rights as human rights.  In the section following, I will offer a brief 
description of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and its work as the primary 
institution for the global governance and regulation of labor rights.  The final section will 
be dedicated to statements by governments and international institutions – via 
international treaties, institutional declarations, and multilateral agreements – that provide 
the framework for the existing labor norms regime. 
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I.  ARE LABOR RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS? 
Human rights, as previously discussed, are the rights one needs to pursue a life of dignity.  
In this sense, each and every human being is afforded these rights upon birth by the 
simple virtue of being human.  These rights are indestructible and cannot be forfeited to 
any individual, state, or institution under any circumstances.  Labor rights, unlike human 
rights, are only afforded to an individual by the virtue of their status as a worker or 
employee (Mantouvalou 2012).  They are the entitlements and protections afforded to 
workers while pursuing a life of dignity.   
Lawyers, academics, and activists alike have expressed doubt when confronted 
with the inclusion of labor rights within human rights discourse.  For many of the 
skeptics, the foundation for which labor rights exists – the idea that they are only 
designated to those with a particular status of employment – signifies that they are not, 
like human rights, granted to every human being.  Moreover, these skeptics have further 
claimed that human rights pertain to the relationship between the state and the individual, 
particularly as it relates to the limitation of the power of the state.  Labor rights, however, 
are based within the relationship shared between private actors and workers as it relates 
to the limitation of the power of the employer (Kolben 2010). 
That being said, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that labor rights are firmly 
embedded within the canon of human rights that exists in today’s international structure.  
Virginia Mantouvalou examines this paradox in rights discourse by identifying three 
approaches that interpret labor rights as human rights: 1) the positivist approach; 2) the 
instrumental approach; and 3) the normative approach.  Each of these approaches is 
valuable to the understanding of labor rights as human rights, though they must be 
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understood as separate from one another.  For the sake of this discussion, a brief 
summary of Mantouvalou’s argument regarding the three aforementioned approaches is 
necessary. 
The positivist perspective on labor rights as human rights is perhaps the most 
forthright of the three approaches.  At the core, the positivist approach uses the language 
in human rights documents and treaties as a foundation for the classification of labor 
rights as such.  By this approach, if a particular labor right is included within the text of a 
human rights document, that particular right is included within the established rights 
discourse and is supported within the context of international human rights law 
(Mantouvalou 2012).  With this particular approach, we can in fact determine that several 
labor rights are included in international human rights agreements and subsequently 
conclude that these labor rights are included within the existing human rights norms 
regime.  For example, the UDHR – the most authoritative statement on international 
human rights norms today – gives mention to several labor rights within its text, most 
notably Article 23.  This particular mention offers the most straightforward and 
comprehensive statement on the inclusion of labor rights in the international system, and 
does so by recognizing four essential subsections of workers’ rights: 1) the right to work, 
free choice of employment, favorable conditions at work, and protection against 
unemployment; 2) equal pay for equal work; 3) favorable remuneration for an existence 
worthy of human dignity; and 4) the right to form and join trade unions (Art. 23).  
Therefore, by the mere mention of these rights within the UDHR, the positivist 
perspective would claim that these labor rights are within the existing rights discourse 
and can be appropriately classified as human rights.  We will return to this particular 
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approach later in this chapter by examining current human rights documents and their 
contribution to the establishment of the labor regime. 
Whereas the positivist approach is the most straightforward, the instrumental 
approach is in fact the most commonly utilized perspective in international law.  Building 
upon the positivist approach’s focus on human rights documents, the instrumental 
approach utilizes these texts as leverage in determining how “institutions and civil society 
organizations fare in protecting them…” (Mantouvalou 2012, 7).  Therefore, the 
characterization of labor rights is determined based upon state and international 
institutions’ (i.e. courts, trade unions, NGOs, etc.) decision to endorse such rights as 
human rights.  Commonly utilized strategies often involve litigation and civil society 
action to promote certain workers’ rights as synonymous with human rights 
(Mantouvalou 2012).  For example, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
has recently been receptive of the rights of workers, forcing many scholars to 
consequently alter their position regarding labor rights as human rights.  The European 
Court of Human Rights, through careful interpretation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), decides various cases regarding a multitude of labor rights that, 
by virtue of its jurisdiction, can decide whether or not to extend human rights principles 
to labor rights.  Recent decisions made by the Court have in fact employed the 
institutional approach and extend much of the doctrines of the ECHR to include labor 
rights. 
The third perspective on labor rights as human rights is the normative approach.  
Unlike the positivist and instrumental approaches previously illustrated, the normative 
approach engages in theoretical interpretations of labor rights based on matters of moral 
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truth (Mantouvalou 2012).  Although this approach is the one least taken by scholars, 
recent literature has started to increasingly engage labor rights with this particular 
perspective.  Most notably, human rights scholars have employed this approach when 
opposing the compelling claims against including labor rights in human rights discourse.  
Such claims, as emphasized by Hugh (2011), are the failure of labor rights to: 1) the 
failure of labor rights to represent the equivalence of urgency in moral claims that human 
rights do; 2) the failure of labor rights to be as universally applicable as human rights; 3) 
the failure of labor rights to embody strict standards; and 4) the failure of labor rights to 
exemplify a sense of timelessness and instead a sense of development (Hugh 2011) 
Engaging with the normative approach, Mantouvalou does a fantastic job in addressing 
each of these claims and strengthening the argument for the inclusivity of labor rights in 
human rights discourse.   
Mantouvalou asserts that it is erroneous to avow that labor rights do not represent 
the same moral claims as human rights.  Human rights, by their very existence, are claims 
that prohibit severe moral wrongdoings.  Likewise, a number of labor rights exist for the 
same purpose – to prohibit employers, states, and institutions from committing degrading 
and humiliating acts to workers, which is impeccably represented in the right from forced 
labor.  Second, sufficient criticism exists surrounding the idea that labor rights are not 
human rights due to their lack of universality.  It would be fallacious to claim that a right 
conditional upon an individual’s particular status is not a human right.  Mantouvalou 
avows that, “what makes them universal human rights is that if and as soon as any person 
is found in this position – becomes a worker, a migrant, or imprisoned – that person will 
be entitled to be treated with the respect that universal human rights require” 
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(Mantouvalou 2012, 19).  Third, Mantouvalou questions the assertion that labor rights 
differentiate from human rights because of their “non-strict” nature.  For example, the 
right to a minimum pay varies among countries due to its dependency on both what one 
particular society can afford and its currency’s purchasing power.  Therefore, certain 
labor rights are not stringent entitlements due to their dependency on the resources 
available.  However, the fact that a particular society cannot afford or is incapable of 
complying with a particular labor right does not indicate that these rights are “non-strict.” 
Instead, the normative approach affirms the belief that there exists a moral standard that 
every society should strive to achieve (Mantouvalou 2012).  This particular critique of 
labor rights is often invoked by developing states.  And finally, the fourth claim states 
that labor rights are solely dependent on systems of production, forms of work, and the 
labor environment of a particular society, whereas human rights are timeless and 
interminable.  Mantouvalou ascertains that labor rights do in fact possess a timeless 
nature – decent working conditions and freedom from slavery are both abstract claims 
that do not depend on a particular context (Mantouvalou 2012).  In fact, “labor rights that 
attain the status of human rights do not have to be revised when the system of production 
changes [because]…they entail abstract principles that are always applicable, irrespective 
of the historic circumstances” (Mantouvalou 2012, 22).   
To claim that labor rights should not be encompassed within human rights 
discourse is inaccurate.  Although these three approaches surrounding this debate are 
quite distinctive, they each engage with important aspects of the human rights regime – 
documents, institutions, and theory/morality.  With that in mind, attention will now be 
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given to the ways in which labor rights are institutionally safeguarded and established as 
human rights per the International Labor Organization (ILO). 
 
II.  THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) 
The twentieth century saw a complete transformation in the world of work as the 
transition from agriculture to industry accelerated.  Interconnectedness across borders 
began to characterize labor markets while political agendas became increasingly 
dominated by the essence of “work” (Rodgers, Lee, Swepston, & Van Daele 2009).  
Following the conclusion of World War I, the Paris Peace Conference resulted in the 
Treaty of Versailles, which, in specific sections, reflected this newfound societal focus on 
the concept of work.  Using the content and statements within the Treaty as a foundation, 
the world witnessed the creation of the very first international institution in 1919 – the 
International Labor Organization (ILO).  Henceforth, the realm of work and labor 
possessed a transnational forum in which multilateral discussion could ensue and 
workers’ rights could be recognized. 
 
A. THE ILO’S CONCEPTION & CENTRAL IDEAS 
On the ILO, Franklin Delano Roosevelt is quoted in saying, “Who had ever heard of 
Governments getting together to raise the standards of labor on an international plane?... 
[The] ILO will be an invaluable instrument for peace… [an essential part] in building up 
a stable international system of social justice for all peoples everywhere” (Rodgers et al 
2009, 2).   As previously mentioned, the ILO was one of the first international institutions 
constructed and, to some extent, an unheard of political experiment at that time.  
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Although constructed in the early twentieth century, the origins of the ILO extend as far 
back as the nineteenth, as rapid industrialization began to transform the economy and 
society at macro levels.  Such transformations produced a substantial political issue –
industrialization’s social consequences of inequality and injustice managed (Rodger et al 
2009).  Drawing on aspects of European social democracy, Christian democracy, and 
social liberalism, the substantial post-WWI powers crafted a transnational institution that 
would address these very issues.  As the ILO’s Fifth Director-General David Morse said 
in 1969, “the ILO, in short, offered the world an alternative to social strife; it provided it 
with the procedures and techniques of bargaining and negotiation to replace violent 
conflict as a mean of securing more human and dignified conditions of work” (Rodgers et 
al 2009, 15).   
Moreover, in a century increasingly characterized by this concept of work, the 
ILO framers desired an avenue in which the inequalities and injustices of industrialization 
could be addressed via dialogue and cooperation among employers and employees.  As a 
result, the institution’s founding was predominantly based on one principled belief – that 
social justice was an essential basis for peace.  This belief is outwardly reflected within 
the Preamble of the ILO’s Constitution:  
Whereas universal and lasting peace can be established 
only if it is based upon social justice; And whereas 
conditions of labor exist involving such injustice, hardship, 
and privation to large numbers of people as to produce 
unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are 
imperiled; And an improvement of those conditions is 
urgently required…(ILO Constitution Preamble 1919).  
  
Thus, the ILO established, in the name of social justice, humane conditions of labor and 
the recognition of labor rights for citizens of every member country. 
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In a unique tripartite structure that will be discussed in detail later in this chapter, 
the ILO’s establishment “promote[s] social progress [to] overcome social and economic 
conflicts of interest through dialogue and cooperation” (Rodgers et al 2009).  By virtue of 
the ILO’s existence, workers, employers, and governments alike have been endowed with 
equal power to discuss common rules, policies, and behaviors surrounding work in a non-
confrontational manner.  “The workers saw these efforts as coordinated international 
attempts to achieve better conditions of work and to control the adverse effects on labor 
market forces, [whereas] employers favored equalizing conditions of work in order to 
facilitate the expansion of trade and remove unequal conditions of international 
commercial competition” (Rodgers et al 2009, 5).  Consequentially, a social framework 
was established for formal economic exchange between employers and employees that 
also provided the groundwork for an unbiased world trading system.  
 In their book, The ILO and the Quest for Social Justice, 1919-2009, Gerry 
Rodgers, Eddy Lee, Lee Swepston, and Jasmien Van Daele identify five core principles 
that are enshrined in the ILO’s work and are essential to the mission of the institution:  
1) Lasting peace cannot be achieved unless it is based on social justice, grounded in 
freedom, dignity, economic security and equal opportunity; 
2) Labor should not be regarded as a mere commodity or an article of commerce; 
3) There should be freedom of association, for both workers and employers, along 
with freedom of expression, and the right to collective bargaining; 
4) These principles are fully applicable to all human beings, irrespective of race, 
creed, or sex; 
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5) Poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere, and must be 
addressed through both national and international action (Rodgers et al 2009, 7). 
 
The policy concerns and work of the ILO strongly reflect these principles.  The 
promotion of full employment, an adequate living wage, the regulation of work hours, the 
abolition of child labor, the rights of migrant workers, and the extension of social security 
measures are all embodied within the aforementioned framework of principles, guiding 
the ILO in its actions and duties.  However, at the very core of the ILO’s 
institutionalization of labor, is the quintessential concept of “decent work.”  This idea 
“synthesizes rights at work, employment, and social protection into an overall vision, 
pursued through social dialogue, [and] pays particular attention to the mutual 
reinforcement of action in different fields” (Rodgers et al 2009, 10).  It is strongly 
reinforced and promoted by many of the ILO’s declarations and documents.  At the core 
of the ILO’s founding was the desire to achieve the protection of workers’ rights and the 
development of a global consensus on the need for social justice within the existing 
international structure, all in the pursuit of “decent work” (Rodríguez Garcia 2010). 
 
B. THE STRUCTURE & GOVERNANCE OF THE ILO 
The ILO Constitution not only establishes the principled beliefs of the institution, but also 
provides the blueprints for its unique structure and governance.  Rodgers, Lee, Swepston, 
and Van Daele identify four means of governance that are witnessed within the ILO: 
1) Tripartism and the equal representation of workers, employers, and governments 
in free discussion and democratic decision-making; 
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2) Adoption of international conventions and recommendations to be submitted to 
national authorities for ratification or other action; 
3) System of inspection and supervision that ensures enforcement of the laws and 
regulations; 
4) Collaboration among other international bodies in order to ensure that all 
economic and financial policies contribute to social progress and well-being 
(Rodgers et al 2009, 9). 
 
Apart from being the first international institution to exist, the ILO also boasts a 
unique system of governance – it is the only international intergovernmental institution 
where governments do not have exclusive power when establishing standards and 
policies.  This allows, as one may suspect, the equal participation of workers, employers, 
and governments in ILO discussions, administration, and governance.  Article 3 of the 
ILO Constitution states that “The…General Conference…shall be composed of four 
representatives of each of the Members, of whom two shall be Government delegates and 
the two others shall be delegates representing respectively the employers and the 
workpeople of each of the Members” (ILO Constitution 1919).  This structure, referred to 
as tripartism, allows for equitable discourse from all parties involved regarding the 
adoption, ratification, and supervision of labor standards. Through tripartism, 
collaboration among the actors involved is based on structured interests and “adds a 
connection with reality that cannot be reproduced in an organization where governments 
are the only spokespersons” (Rodgers et al 2009, 15).  As the ILO website elaborates, this 
tripartite structure provides a “unique forum in which the governments and the social 
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partners of the economy and its [ILO’s] 185 member states can freely and openly debate 
and elaborate labor standards and policies” (“Structure” 2015).   
Perhaps the most important aspect of the ILO is its ability to create Conventions 
and Recommendations that establish standard expectations and labor rights for members.  
Although both assist in inaugurating universal labor standards for member states, there is 
a stark difference between an ILO Convention and an ILO Recommendation.  The former 
is considered to be a “legally binding international treaty that may be ratified by member 
states,” whereas the latter “serves as non-binding guidelines” (Rodríguez Garcia 2010, 
462).  According to Article 19 of the ILO Constitution, once a Convention or a 
Recommendation is brought forward and passed by the ILO General Conference, the 
member states have an obligation to return to their respective competent authorities for 
ratification – in the case of a Convention – or any legislative action – in the case of a 
Recommendation (ILO Constitution, Article 19).  As of January 2015, 189 Conventions 
and 203 Recommendations had been adopted since 1919, all of which “cover virtually all 
aspects of labor law and labor relations” (Rodgers et al 2009, 20) and are widely accepted 
at the national level by most of the 185 member states. 
Of particular importance to the effectiveness of the ILO’s mission is the 
supervision and system of enforcement used concerning Conventions and 
Recommendations.  As stated in a quote from Magaly Rodríguez Garcia’s, “ILO’s Impact 
on the World,” the documents produced by the ILO “may be ratified by member states” 
(Rodríguez Garcia 2010, 462).  Ratification and adherence to the Conventions and 
Recommendations is not required for membership in the ILO.  To this degree, when 
members offend various agreed-upon components of labor standards, the only 
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repercussions are moral censures.  The fact that the institutional statements made by the 
ILO are voluntary by member states is indicative of the fallacy and weakness of the 
global labor regime.  Richard P. McIntyre addresses this paradox with the following 
overarching statement:  
Ratification of ILO conventions alone does not guarantee 
the fair treatment of workers, nor does the lack of 
ratification mean that workers are being oppressed. A 
number of governments have ratified ILO conventions for 
show with no intention of enforcing them6; others have 
ratified conventions in good faith but lack the resources or 
technical expertise to implement their requirements; and 
still others seem to believe they are in compliance but have 
standards that vary widely from international norms. On the 
other hand, there are nations that have not ratified 
conventions for one reason or another – usually 
constitutional constraints or other legal technicalities – but, 
in general, provide protections for worker rights (McIntyre 
2008, 104).  
 
This statement seamlessly illustrates the weakness of the labor regime due to its inherent 
voluntarism.   
When engaging this voluntarism with regime theory, Jack Donnelly positions the 
labor regime in what he refers to as a mixture of a ‘promotional’ and ‘implementation’ 
regime.  Firstly, Donnelly suggests that when characterizing and identifying human rights 
regimes, there are four distinct possibilities: 1) declaratory regimes (which include norms 
but no specific decision-making procedures, except for developing norms); 2) 
promotional regimes (which encourage states to implement norms and disseminate 
information concerning state practices); 3) implementation regimes (which involved 
formal or informal powers to determine whether violations have occurred); and 4) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  Regarding this lack of enforcement despite a member state’s ratification, we can turn to the 
constructivism section of the previous chapter for the explanation of state identities in relation to the 
international structure. 
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enforcement regimes (where multilateral bodies have at least some binding enforcement 
authority, usually judicially but possibly force) (Donnelly 2013, 104).  The labor regime, 
as Donnelly claims, is a combination of both promotional and implementation regimes 
because while global labor standards are strong, they still possess exemptions. Moreover, 
while the ILO monitors the procedure behind the implementation of these standards, this 
regime still possesses characteristics associated with a promotional regime.  Therefore, it 
is apparent that when the labor regime is contextualized within regime theory, it still 
exists among the weaker regimes.  Yet due to its complex identity within both the 
promotional- and implementation-based regimes, there exists, as previously mentioned, a 
system of monitoring on behalf of the ILO.  
The monitoring and supervisory system reinforced by the ILO wholly relies “on 
government papers and ad hoc supervision in response to complaints” (Rodríguez Garcia 
2010, 463).  Per Article 26 of the ILO Constitution, “Any of the Members shall have the 
right to file a complaint with the International Labor Office if it is not satisfied that any 
other Member is securing the effective observance of any Convention which both have 
ratified in accordance with the foregoing articles” (Art. 26).  In addition to members who 
have ratified the Convention in question, ILO delegates and employers’ or workers’ 
organizations also have the ability to file complaints regarding a member’s disregard for 
a Convention (Rodgers et al 2009).  With this particular supervisory system, some 
countries aver that they are subjected to biased and harsh criticisms that apply “Western” 
values to their unique situations – for example, developing states and particular labor 
rights emphasized by the West.  This phenomenon is very much the basis of debates 
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between developed and developing states regarding labor rights, which will be expanded 
upon later in this paper. 
By virtue of labor rights inclusion within the human rights discourse, the ILO is 
automatically engaged and interconnected with other multilateral institutions.  Perhaps 
most notable of these would be, of course, the UN.  These relationships are a necessity 
for the ILO due to its substantial lack of “teeth” when addressing egregious violations of 
labor rights.  Therefore, the ILO seeks assistance in the form of sanctions or forced 
implementation from other international organizations to help enforce its decision and 
associated discourse (Rodgers et al 2009).  Additionally, the ILO worked jointly with the 
UN to safeguard workers rights by legitimizing human rights as a global concern.  If we 
were to revisit the positivist approach, we would notice that the labor rights stressed by 
the ILO are included within – and reliant on – the doctrines of other multilateral 
institutions.  Most notably, the international labor regime is deeply engrained within the 
global human rights regime due to its interrelation with the UN and their shared missions 
of social justice.  The following section addresses this interconnection by first analyzing 
the UN human rights documents that contribute to the global labor regime, followed by a 
focused examination of the most important ILO Conventions that comprise the 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (FPRW).    
 
III.  PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTS OF THE LABOR REGIME 
Work is a vital human institution, particularly for the means of aggregating societal 
wealth.  At the core of human productivity and development lies the essence of labor 
rights.  The previous section was dedicated to the institutionalization of labor rights via 
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the ILO and its responsibilities in fostering dialogue between governments and 
nongovernmental actors.  Since its inception in 1919, the ILO has moored the concept of 
social and economic rights in the twentieth century human rights discourse, particularly 
as they associate with the foundations of labor rights (Rodgers et al 2009).  Yet the 
standards and principles championed by the ILO find their origins within human rights 
discourse via treaties, conventions, and international agreements.  The framework for 
which the ILO’s labor rights colloquy endures is rooted within UN Covenants and ILO-
sponsored multilateral declarations and agreements.  This section of the chapter will be 
dedicated to unearthing the rudiments for which the ILO finds its central ideas and 
operation in the existing international structure.  
 
A. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE LABOR REGIME VIA UN DOCUMENTS 
 
The ILO and the UN conjointly pursue aspects of the international rights discourse for 
purposes of social justice and peace.  The UN, as the seat of global governance, provides 
overarching statements on several aspects of labor rights that consequently support and 
construct the responsibilities and central ideas of the ILO.  Of the statements on human 
rights made by the UN in the form of covenants and declarations, seven mention the 
rights of workers in some respect: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966), International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969), Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (1990), International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families (1990), and the Convention on the Rights of 
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Persons with Disabilities (2006). For the establishment of the labor regime, the most 
crucial and overarching statements are the UDHR, the International Covenant for Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant for Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) – with the latter being particularly critical.   
 As previously discussed, the UDHR gives particular reference to labor rights in 
Article 23 and 24.  As the document that has established and wholly contributed to the 
construction of the existing international structure, the mere existence of labor rights in 
the text is imperative for the influence and weight of the labor regime.  The right to work, 
favorable workplace conditions, equal pay for equal work, the right to join trade unions, 
and the limitation of working hours are all among the workers’ rights guaranteed within 
the UDHR.  As a result, general multilateral and UN support for the operation of the ILO 
is provided (Art. 23 & 24).   
 Although traditionally considered to be an economic and social right, “work” is 
still briefly highlighted within the ICCPR – particularly as it exists within political 
discourse.  In pursuit of a world of freedom, justice, and peace, this Covenant was 
adopted to achieve universality regarding the conditions of civil and political rights that 
“derive from the inherent dignity of the human person” (ICCPR Preamble 1966).  
Encompassing items such as the death penalty, criminal proceedings, and freedom of 
thought, this statement also includes two particularly important and conventional labor 
rights that allow individuals to “pursue their economic, social, and cultural 
development…[without being] deprived of [their] own means of subsistence” (Art. 1).  
Article 8 addresses a particular labor right that is at the intersection of civil/political and 
	   91 
economic/social rights – the freedom from forced labor.  Divided into three separate 
clauses, Article 8 states:  
1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-
trade in all their forms shall be prohibited; 
2. No one shall be held in servitude; 
3. (a) No one shall be required to perform forced or 
compulsory labor (Art. 8).  
 
Additionally, Article 22 of the Covenant articulates the right to freedom of association 
that is granted to every individual: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association 
with others, including the right to form and join trade 
unions for the protection of his interests; (Art. 22, §1).  
 
Thus, two of the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work – the freedom from forced 
labor and the freedom of association – are buttressed by the United Nations through the 
text of the ICCPR.   
 Perhaps most important to the labor regime discourse is the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 (ICESCR).  Similar to the 
ICCPR, the ICESCR speaks to the dignity of the human person by recognizing that “all 
peoples have the right of self-determination… [and to] freely pursue their economic, 
social, and cultural development…[without being] deprived of [their] own means of 
subsistence” (Art. 1).  Unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR alludes to several aspects and 
components of the labor regime by including various workers’ rights – most of which 
exist within Part II of the document.  Article 6, for example, speaks to the right of 
individuals to freely choose their own work; Article 7 provides the framework for 
favorable conditions at work with “fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal 
value…safe and healthy working conditions…rest, leisure, and reasonable limitation of 
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working hours…” (Art. 7).  Furthermore, the freedom of association is represented in 
Article 8, according to which everyone has a right “to form trade unions and join the 
trade union of his choice…for the promotion and protection of economic and social 
interests” (Art. 8, §1), followed by the right of social security.  While certain mechanisms 
within the text certainly echo previously discussed documents such as the UDHR and 
ICCPR, the ICESCR provides a comprehensive outlook from a different lens and 
subsequently adds to the multilateral justification and formulation of labor rights.7 
 The remaining UN documents, although stringently focused on a specific rights 
topic, still include and refer to various characteristics of the labor rights regime.  Most 
notably, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families (ICPRMW) provides a lengthy statement on the 
fair treatment and safeguarding of migrant workers – an entire document strictly 
dedicated to the issue of labor rights.  Such rights include, but are certainly not limited to: 
freedom of thought, freedom from servitude, security of person, and protection from false 
imprisonment (ICPRMW 1990).  Moreover, Article 32 of the Convention on the Rights  
of the Child (CRC) dictates that State Parties should: 
1. Provide for a minimum age or minimum ages for 
admission to employment; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Although not considered to be within the labor rights regime, it is also worth mentioning, for sake of this 
paper, that the right to subsistence – what China and many developing states emphasize as the most 
important fundamental human right alongside the RTD – is included within Article 11 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights:  
 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his 
family, including adequate food, clothing, and housing, and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties 
will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, 
recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international 
cooperation based on free consent (Art. 11, § 1). 	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2. Provide for appropriate regulation of the hours and 
conditions of employment; (Art. 32, §1 & 2) 
 
In Article 5 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD), a detailed outline of rights that should be enjoyed by members 
of all races is listed, which includes “the right to work…just and favorable conditions of 
work…equal pay for equal work… [and] the right to join and form trade unions” (Art. 5, 
Cause E).  And finally, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 
illustrates, in Article 27, the right of individuals with disabilities for fair treatment in the 
world of work (Art. 27).   
 The incorporation of labor rights in the UN-reinforced human rights discourse 
permits the subsistence of the labor regime and the ILO.  Nonetheless, documents 
specifically conceived by the ILO offer an even greater breadth of labor rights than those 
prescribed by the UN.  The following section is dedicated to two specific ILO documents 
– one of which is supported by eight Conventions – that have firmly established the 
canon of labor rights as human rights: the Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944 and the 
Fundamental Principles and Rights of Work of 1998.   
 
B. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE LABOR REGIME VIA ILO DOCUMENTS 
 
The ILO’s central ideas, while reinforced by UN official statements, are heavily 
substantiated via institutional declarations and documents.  Although members have the 
option of ratifying Conventions or approving Recommendations made by the ILO, these 
overarching statements are theoretically acknowledged by all member states.  This is 
especially true for the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (FPRW).  
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i. THE 1944 DECLARATION OF PHILADELPHIA 
At the time of the Declaration of Philadelphia’s8 singing in 1944, the world faced a brutal 
and horrific Second World War.  With that in mind, this Declaration aimed at reinforcing 
and expanding the principles of the comparatively new ideas of the ILO.  In its entirety, 
the Declaration of Philadelphia expounded on the original Constitution with an adoptive 
“strong statement [on] the need for international and national action for universal social 
progress” (Rodgers et al 2009, 7).  Upon its implementation, the Declaration of 
Philadelphia reiterated the commitments to decent work, personal well-being, social 
integration, democracy, equality, and the reduction of poverty, ultimately causing a 
tantamount shift in both the ILO and international labor rights discourse.  More 
importantly, the passing of the Declaration launched the next phase of labor rights by: 
…[laying] down the intellectual foundation of much of the 
subsequent human rights standard-setting in the UN…[and 
exercising] a major influence in setting a floor under 
workplace policies, and human rights more generally, in the 
emerging post-colonial world (Rodger et al 2009, 45). 
 
 The Declaration alludes to the existence of the ILO’s fundamental beliefs 
including: the idea that labor is not a commodity, the understanding that the freedom of 
expression/association are essential for sustained progress, that poverty hinders 
prosperity, and that there ought to be equal representation of workers, employers, and 
governments in democratic discussion (Declaration of Philadelphia 1944).  The 
Declaration of Philadelphia additionally provides the groundwork for the ten obligations 
of the ILO, all of which are imperative for the development of labor rights in nations 
around the world.  These ten items include but are not limited to: raising standards of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The text of the Declaration of Philadelphia is reproduced in the appendix.	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living, guaranteeing a minimum wage, protecting the right to collective bargaining, and 
ensuring the provision of child welfare (Declaration of Philadelphia 1944).  Henceforth, 
the conceptualization of universal social rights was distinguished and further reinforced 
by the prevailing social objective of member states to implement appropriate economic 
policies.  As Rodgers et al make explicitly clear, the Declaration of Philadelphia is crucial 
in understanding the full applicability of rights to all peoples, and is “the context in which 
the connection was made for the first time between economic and social development and 
basic human rights principles” (Rodger et al 2009, 44).  Thus, one of the first statements 
was made in which development and human rights were amassed into official discourse 
via the endorsement of “true” development.  This, of course, recognized that freedom 
from discrimination and forced labor, as well as the ability to represent one’s own 
interests through freedom of association, were well-defined – three of the four FPRW. 
 
ii. THE 1998 DECLARATION ON THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES & 
 RIGHTS AT WORK 
 
In 1998, the ILO continued to advance its promotion of labor rights by declaring four 
core themes of the ILO’s human rights agenda via the Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work (FPRW)9.  These core themes were: the freedom of 
association, the freedom from forced labor, the freedom from child labor, and the 
freedom from discrimination.  Such themes are, for the sake of this paper and for the 
general labor regime, the most important and fundamental labor rights in today’s 
international structure. They are the basic enabling rights one is guaranteed as a worker to 
“claim freely and on the basis of equality their fair share of the wealth which they have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The text of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work is reproduced in the appendix.	  
	   96 
helped generate, and to achieve fully their human potential…” (FPRW Preamble 1998).  
They are, as the Preamble continues, “…specific rights and obligations in Conventions 
recognized as fundamental both inside and outside the Organization” (FPRW Preamble 
1998).  It is believed that once these rights are recognized and safeguarded, they facilitate 
the pursuit and existence of other labor rights. 
Spanning almost seventy years of ILO history, these four core rights are 
expressed in eight different Conventions – ranging from the Forced Labor Convention, 
1930 (No. 29) to the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, 1999 (No. 182).  Yet 
despite these rights’ existence in ILO discourse prior to their inclusion within FPRW, it 
was not until the post-Cold War dynamics of the world economy embarked with on the 
path of globalization that they were explicitly recognized as such (International Labor 
Conference 101st Session Report 2012).  In this sense, the safeguarding of “basic 
workers’ rights” was seen as pertinent to achieving economic growth and sustainable 
development.  Here, it is important to distinguish that the establishment of these four core 
rights was not to differentiate a “rights hierarchy” or disregard other labor standards, but 
merely to recognize that these rights are “instrumental in promoting international labor 
standards in general, as a key means of achieving all constitutional objectives of the 
Organization” (International Labor Conference, 101st Session Report 2012, 6). 
Before delving into details regarding each of the four rights, it is important to 
mention that the FPRW are unlike many of the other ILO Conventions.  As previously 
mentioned, the ratification of a Convention is not required by member states upon its 
adoption in the ILO.  It is up to the discretion of the domestic governing authorities to 
determine whether their state will ratify a Convention or not.  Nonetheless, the eight 
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Conventions included with the FPRW are universal among all members per the 1998 
Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work.  
…all Members, even if they have not ratified the 
Conventions in question, have an obligation arising from 
the very fact of membership in the Organization, to respect, 
to promote and to realize, in good faith and in good 
accordance with the Constitution, the principles concerning 
the fundamental rights which are subject of those 
Conventions (FPRW 1998). 
 
Therefore, by virtue of a state’s membership in the ILO, it is ineluctably required to 
acknowledge the fundamentality of these four core rights, regardless of the opinions or 
actions of a state’s domestic authority.  This will be particularly important for leading the 
discussion in the following chapter.  
 
a. THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION & THE RIGHT  
TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
 The freedom of association is best defined as the “right of all workers and employers to 
create and join organizations of their own choosing in order to freely defend their 
respective interests and to negotiate collectively” (International Labor Conference, 101st 
Session Report 2012, 20).  In other words, the freedom of association and the right to 
collective bargaining translates to the ability of individuals to form trade unions and 
engage in free conversation with employers regarding work conditions.  This 
fundamental right – what Rodgers et al consider “the most thoroughly examined human 
right in the international sphere” (Rodgers et al 2009, 49) – is deeply rooted and 
engrained within the functions of political democracy and “essential [for] sustained 
progress” (Declaration of Philadelphia 1944).  Without freedom of association, political 
democracy is jeopardized. 
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 The Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 
1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 
(No. 98) are the two Conventions related to this first principle.  Figure 3.0 provides an 
analysis of which BRICS and G7 countries have officially ratified these two 
Conventions.  Of particular interest is the failure of India, China, and the USA to ratify 
either of the Conventions regarding freedom of association and collective bargaining.  
The Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 
1948 (No. 87) establishes its principal ideas via Articles 2 through 5.  Within these 
Articles, five specific rights are established: 1) the right to establish and join 
organizations of one’s choosing; 2) the right to draw up constitutions and rules, elect 
representatives, and organization administration and activities for their programs; 3) the 
freedom from interference by public authorities; 4) the freedom from suspension by 
administrative authority; 5) the right to establish and join federations and confederations, 
and the right of those organizations to affiliate with international organizations of 
workers and employers (Art. 2-5).  These rights, included within the Convention, all aim 
to reinforce the ILO Constitution and the Declaration of Philadelphia in the pursuit of 
establishing peace, improving conditions of labor, and promoting sustained progress (No. 
87, 1948: Preamble).   
The Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) 
boasts much of its significant content within the first two Articles.  Similar to the 
Convention described above, Convention No. 98 states: 1) workers shall be protected 
from anti-union discrimination; 2) such protection shall bar employers from using one’s 
status in a union as grounds for dismissal; 3) protection against any acts of interference 
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by workers’ and employers’ organizations; and 4) ability to establish appropriate 
machinery for the purpose of ensuring respect for the right to organize (Art. 1 – 2).   
What Rodgers et al refer to as “probably the most thoroughly examined human 
right in the international system” (Rodger et al 2009, 49), the general right to associate is 
deeply rooted within – and essential for – the doctrines of political democracy.  
Therefore, this right has been of the utmost importance to ILO discourse as the leadership 
has been dominated by the Western states that contend liberal democratic ideals are 
essential within today’s international structure.  In the same sense, union leaders are often 
persecuted by repressive or authoritarian regimes that view such organizations as threats 
to governmental power, primarily due to union leaders’ ability to enact and inspire 
political, social, and economic change.  More importantly, however, is the importance of 
the right to association in regard to other fundamental rights.  The ILO’s Freedom of 
Association: Digest of Decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association of the 
Governing Body of the ILO (2006) stated that: “A free trade union movement can develop 
only under a regime which guarantees fundamental rights…” (FADDCFA 2006, 31).  
Therefore, if a state refuses to recognize the freedom of association, the environment of 
that state forbids the existence of a very basic and fundamental human right.  
Consequentially, this state could be considered a repressive regime under the existing 
rights discourse.  
Under this interpretation, the United States’ failure to ratify both Nos. 87 and 98 
could thus classify it as a repressive regime in regard to human and labor rights norms.  
As discussed later in this section, using the ratification status of states as the sole 
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indicator of their rights practices has many shortcomings.  For this reason, we must look 
to their national discourse and domestic policies.   
Returning to the statement previously made by Richard P. McIntyre regarding the 
structure and governance of the ILO, “there are nations that have not ratified conventions 
for one reason or another – usually constitutional constraints or other legal technicalities 
– but, in general, provide protections for worker rights” (McIntyre 2008, 104).  The US, 
McIntyre claims, is among this group of states that, despite its failure to officially ratify 
Conventions regarding labor rights, still offers protections and appropriate working 
conditions within its borders.  “It is has not ratified conventions due to legal constraints, 
but generally complies with the broad purposes – if not the details – of nearly all ILO 
conventions” (McIntyre 2008, 104).  Specifically related to Nos. 87 and 98, the US gives 
three principal reasons for its non-ratification: 1) the federal system, due to states 
maintaining certain rights, makes ratification problematic, particularly due to the 
conventions affecting the employees of state, county, and municipal governments, as well 
as all those who fall outside federal labor statutes; 2) well-established national labor 
policy fulfills the broad purposes of the Conventions and should not be distressed to 
accommodate an international agency’s demands; 3) the US has a responsibility based on 
its membership in the ILO – regardless of its ratification or not – to uphold the 
Conventions included within the FPRW, making their ratification rather superfluous 
(McIntyre 2008, 105).  These arguments, while specifically targeted to the freedom of 
association, are undoubtedly invoked by the US when confronted with its failure to ratify 
other FPRW as well. 
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b. THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF FORCED  
OR COMPULSORY LABOR 
 
Forced or compulsory labor is defined by Convention No. 29 as “all work or service, 
which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said 
person has not offered himself voluntarily” (Art. 2). In 2005, the ILO estimated that at 
least 12.3 million men, women, and children were victims of forced labor (International 
Labor Conference, 101st Session Report 2012). And while that number has significantly 
decreased in terms of state-imposed forced labor, it is important to recognize that forced 
labor strongly perseveres within the private sector.  Therefore, as the private sector 
becomes increasingly present in an era of globalization, the issue of forced labor is of 
considerable importance.   
The oldest Convention of the eight included within the FPRW, and one of the 
earliest of the ILO, is in regard to forced labor.  Convention No. 29, the Forced Labor 
 No. 87 No. 98 
Brazil No Yes 
Russia Yes Yes 
India No No 
China No No 
S. Africa Yes Yes 
 No. 87 No. 98 
Canada Yes No 
France Yes Yes 
Germany Yes Yes 
Italy Yes Yes 
Japan Yes Yes 
UK Yes Yes 
USA No No 
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Convention (1930), offers an unusual account that is largely considered to be no longer 
applicable.  Articles 3 to 24 in fact allow for the continuation of forced labor within the 
European colonies, but only for a transitional period of unspecified length and with the 
understanding that it was in the process of being abolished.  For that reason, Convention 
No. 29 is particularly unimportant in today’s human rights discourse and characterization 
of the labor rights regime.  Instead, its sister Convention, the Abolition of Forced Labor 
Convention, 1957 (No. 105), serves as the predominant and moderately more important 
document when contextualizing the freedom from forced labor.  Within Article 1 of No. 
105, the ILO immediately establishes all definitions and circumstances in which forced 
labor could hypothetically be used, thus demanding that member states vow to not make 
use of any of the listed conditionalities:  
(a) as a means of political coercion or education or as a 
punishment for holding or expressing political views or 
views ideologically opposed to the established political, 
social, or economic system; 
(b) as a method of mobilizing and using labor for purposes 
of economic development; 
(c) as a means of labor discipline; 
(d) as a punishment for having participated in strikes; 
(e) as a means of racial, social, national, or religious 
discrimination (Art. 1).  
 
Characteristically, No. 105 “finds its main application in situations [that] are in 
themselves beyond the ILO’s immediate human rights mandate – such as the exercise of 
free speech…” (Rodgers et al 2009, 67).  Nevertheless, Conventions Nos. 29 and 105 
remain the most commonly ratified ILO standards in the world.  Figure 3.1 provides an 
account of the BRICS and G7 countries that have ratified Nos. 29 and 105.  It is 
important to acknowledge that China has failed to ratify either of the Conventions, which 
is primarily due to its reliance on forced labor within its penal system.  Nonetheless, by 
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virtue of its membership in the ILO, China is still obligated to follow the guidelines of 
the said documents.  This will be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter. 
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c. THE EFFECTIVE ABOLITION OF CHILD LABOR 
 It is first obligatory to disclose that not all work done by children is categorized under 
the label of “child labor.”  It is legal, in some circumstances, for children under the age of 
eighteen to be employed in appropriate environments.  With that in mind, the definition 
of child labor used here can be defined as the “work performed by children who are under 
the minimum age legally specified for that kind [my italics] of work, or work which, 
because of its detrimental nature or conditions, is considered unacceptable for children 
and is prohibited” (i.e. slavery, trafficking, debt bondage, etc.) (International Labor 
Conference, 101st Session Report 2012, 27).  Simply put, this right allows a child to lead 
a life of dignity like their adult counterparts. 
 No. 29 No. 105 
Brazil Yes Yes 
Russia Yes Yes 
India Yes Yes 
China No No 
S. Africa Yes Yes 
 No. 29 No. 105 
Canada Yes Yes 
France Yes Yes 
Germany Yes Yes 
Italy Yes Yes 
Japan Yes No 
UK Yes Yes 
USA No Yes 
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 In 2008, the ILO reports that approximately 306 million children between the 
ages of five and seventeen were employed, of which 70 percent were estimated to be 
victims of child labor in some form (International Labor Conference, 101st Session 
Report 2012).  And even though child labor is considered to be one of the earliest topics 
of discussion within human rights discourse, dating as far back as the nineteenth century 
in Great Britain, official standards were not created until the late twentieth century.  The 
first child labor Convention to be considered within the FPRW was the Minimum Age 
Convention, 1973 (No. 138), followed by the well-received Worst Forms of Child Labor 
Convention, 1999 (No. 182).  The former, as one could assume, worked to establish a 
minimum age in which children were permitted to become workers by raising “the 
minimum age for admission to employment or work to a level consistent with the fullest 
physical and mental development of young persons” (Art. 1).  In addition to a minimum 
age not less than fourteen (dependent on the type of work in question), the ILO 
representatives demanded limited hours of work and compulsory education.  The Worst 
Forms of Child Labor Convention, 1999 (No. 182) is, comparatively, much more 
elaborate and specific in terms of the treatment of minors.  Believing that child labor 
would effectively be eliminated with sustained economic growth that would then lead to 
social progress, No. 182 examines several approaches to the definition of child labor.  
Examples of servitude, prostitution, social integration, free education, and a stringent 
focus on the special situation of girls are all included within the Convention (Art. 5-7).   
 Figure 3.2 provides an overview of the BRICS and G7 countries that have ratified 
the Conventions on the freedom from child labor, of which India has not ratified either.  
Rodgers et al claims that the Indian government of the twentieth century claimed a 
	   105 
“principle of gradualness” approach to child labor.  This particular perspective refers to 
the fact that India’s “developing industrialism should not be ‘stifled and hampered’ by 
regulations for entirely different conditions by countries that were competitors to India” 
(Rodgers et al 2009, 70).  Unfortunately, this particular argument has in fact continued 
into the twenty-first century and is a substantial component to the right to development 
that was illustrated in previous chapters.  
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c. THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION IN RESPECT  
OF EMPLOYMENT & OCCUPATION 
 
Pursuant to the Declaration of Philadelphia’s affirmation that all human beings, 
regardless of any particular status, have the right to work, the fourth fundamental 
principle reinforces such by offering circumstances in which discrimination is intolerable.   
Discrimination within the world of work is defined as:  
…any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the 
basis of race, color, sex, religion, political opinion, national 
 No. 138 No. 182 
Brazil Yes Yes 
Russia Yes Yes 
India No No 
China Yes Yes 
S. Africa Yes Yes 
 No. 138 No. 182 
Canada No No 
France Yes Yes 
Germany Yes Yes 
Italy Yes Yes 
Japan Yes Yes 
UK Yes Yes 
USA No Yes 
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extraction or social origin, which has the effect of 
nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment 
in employment or occupation (No. 111, Art. 1). 
 
Therefore, within the discourse that currently exists, several “statuses” are included and 
hence protected.  Of these, discrimination of employment most commonly occurs on the 
basis of gender – with women receiving the brunt of ambivalent and antiquated attitudes 
within the workforce – followed by racial/ethnic discrimination and discrimination based 
on migrant status/national origin.  Interestingly enough, states have indicated a new trend 
in recent years dedicated to the expansion of these “statuses” protected from 
discrimination mentioned within No. 111 to include: HIV status, sexual orientation, age, 
employment status, and disability (International Labor Conference, 101st Session Report 
2012).  Such expansions have no specified timeline within the ILO and still remain 
debated among member states. 
 Conventions Nos. 100 and 111 are closely associated with the elimination of 
discrimination within employment.  The Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 
100) targets the gender inequality plaguing the workforce manifested in the idea of equal 
pay for equal work.  Article 2 of No. 100 orders the promotion of the equal remuneration 
principle and its application by means of: 1) national laws or regulations; 2) legally 
established or recognized machinery for wage discrimination; 3) collective agreements 
between employers and workers; or 4) a combination of these various forms (Art. 2).  
The Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) primarily 
addresses the conventional ideas of discrimination within the workforce by not only 
targeting the particular aforementioned “statuses,” but by proposing methods that 
member states could assume for the demise of workplace discrimination.  Such methods 
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include: formation of workers’ and employers’ organizations, educational programs, and 
the removal of inconsistent policies for the promotion of respectful ones (Art. 3).   
 Figure 3.3 depicts which of the BRICS and G7 countries have and have not 
ratified both Conventions on discrimination.   Particularly interesting is the fact that the 
US has not ratified either of the Conventions in question, whereas every other country 
has – except Japan and No. 111.  Despite this, the US is still considered by many actors 
within the international structure as a leader in the pursuit of fair labor rights.  If we 
return to the argument used within the freedom of association section, one could assume 
that the US’ failure to ratify Nos. 100 and 111 could be due to its automatic adherence to 
said Conventions by virtue of its ILO membership, making ratification superfluous.  That 
being said, it is no secret that the US does struggle with issues of discrimination at work, 
particularly as it relates to equal remuneration.  This could insinuate that the failure of 
one of a leader to completely adhere to global labor standards is an indication of 
Donnelly’s designation of the labor regime as a weak one. 
              Figure 3.3 
                           BRICS            G7  
     
               
 
 
 
 
 
     
 No. 100 No. 111 
Brazil Yes Yes 
Russia Yes Yes 
India Yes Yes 
China Yes Yes 
S. Africa Yes Yes 
 No. 100 No. 111 
Canada Yes Yes 
France Yes Yes 
Germany Yes Yes 
Italy Yes Yes 
Japan Yes No 
UK Yes Yes 
USA No No 
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IV. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The classification of labor rights as human rights is at the center of the existing 
international structure’s global labor regime.  And while debate persists regarding the 
inclusion of labor rights in human rights discourse, it is imperative to recognize that 
document texts, legal institutions, and theoretical approaches all provide sufficient 
evidence otherwise.  Together, they assist in comprising the labor regime as one that is 
longstanding, yet in constant flux.  In this chapter, we examined this debate in detail by 
utilizing Virginia Mantouvalou’s argument for the inclusion of labor rights within 
existing rights discourse.  This provided the foundations for the discussion on the ILO 
and the examination of the UN and ILO documents that supported the existing labor 
rights regime.   
 This chapter, while purposed for laying the framework for which the existing 
labor regime subsists, has also led one to believe that the very labor regime in question is 
in fact a weak one.  By the mere existence of a debate surrounding the incorporation of 
labor rights within the human rights discourse, we are faced with the contradictory 
policies of skeptics and critics. And when trying to establish the labor regime’s 
incorporation within the existing rights discourse, the lack of universality and agreement 
immediately weakens the foundations of the labor regime within the international 
structure, classifying it as both promotional and implementation in nature – strong 
standards but weak monitoring mechanisms.  This is further reinforced by the inherent 
weakness of the ILO and its lack of authority and influence in properly enforcing its 
discourse. Furthermore, of the Conventions and Recommendations produced by the ILO, 
the ratifications and acknowledgement of their content by states is merely voluntary.  
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When referencing the four charts in the previous sections regarding the FPRW, it is 
undoubtedly apparent that even some of the leading and largest developed states within 
the international system have failed to ratify these fundamental rights.  Granted, by virtue 
of a state’s membership within the ILO, it is obligated to recognize and safeguard these 
FPRW, yet the absence of ratifications by states suggests an intrinsic weakness within its 
national authority.   
With the forthcoming century’s workers being primarily supplied by the BRICS 
and other developing countries, it is crucial that attention is given to the labor rights 
within these states.  Therefore, the following chapter will be dedicated to the analysis and 
study of labor rights as demonstrated by China’s involvement in international politics and 
diplomacy by virtue of China’s increased presence in Africa. As the self-proclaimed 
leader of the developing world and the proposed largest world economy by 2030, China’s 
amplified role on the African continent is of the greatest importance.  Through specific 
Ghanaian and Zambian case studies, the BRICS’ emphasis on the RTD will be 
contextualized with China’s role in the evasion of labor rights per a developmental 
agenda. 
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4| CHINA IN AFRICA  
             
 
 
 
The BRICS have, by way of their increased cooperation with one another, increased their 
presence within the economic and political elements of the developing world.  For 
example, much of the African continent, home to the world’s highest number of 
developing states, currently possesses a strong relationship in regard to the BRICS states. 
As one recent Reuters article claims, the “BRICS are now Africa’s largest trading 
partners and its biggest new group of investors” (Reuters 2013).  As the self-proclaimed 
leader of the BRICS, China has subsequently reinforced its role as the guiding force in 
the multilateral cooperation of the developing world.  In 2011, a senior Chinese official 
claimed that, “the BRICS countries are not only committed to their own development, but 
also to the development of all of the countries and the whole world” (FOCAC 
“Exchanges & Dialogue” 2011).  Retrospectively, this statement foreshadowed the 2013 
announcement regarding the creation of the BRICS New Development Bank.  With this, 
we see the institutionalization of the BRICS’ economic and political power for the 
support of the RTD and “the purpose of mobilizing resources for infrastructure and 
sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing 
economies” (Fortaleza Declaration 2014).  Given this, we see the pursuit of development 
become the cornerstone of the BRICS’ cooperation and multilateral discourse within the 
developing world.  But how do the BRICS states demonstrate their focus on the 
developing world and the RTD in relation to the existing international structure?  In other 
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words, how is this focus on the RTD manifested within contemporary international 
politics, and what, if any, are the implications of these practices on the developing world 
and existing human rights norms? 
This final chapter will seek to address this phenomenon by focusing on China’s 
leadership and economic role within the developing African states.  In what follows, I 
will explore how the RTD discourse is used by China in justifying its economic ventures 
on the African continent and examine the impact China’s involvement in African states 
has had on labor practices and conditions.  The first section will provide a brief summary 
of the current status of labor rights in China in order to contextualize its multilateral 
actions that are discussed in the sections that follow.  The proceeding section will be 
dedicated to the historical, economic, and political aspects of China’s involvement in 
Africa, with a strong focus on the development discourse used by Chinese officials.  The 
nature of China’s diplomatic relations with African states will be examined as well, 
specifically as they relate to China’s failure to require any human rights-based 
conditionalities on their investments.  And finally, this chapter will conclude with case 
studies on the labor conditions reported within Chinese-owned companies in Ghana and 
Zambia.  The abusive labor practices present within two recent Ghanaian infrastructure 
projects and one influential copper mining corporation in Zambia will provide evidence 
that the focus on the RTD promoted by the BRICS undermines the importance of 
individual rights.  
 
I. THE SITUATION OF LABOR RIGHTS IN CHINA 
Before delving into the labor practices of the Chinese-owned businesses in Ghana and 
Zambia, it is important to first contextualize these practices with a brief background on 
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the labor conditions within China.  To demonstrate such, it will be necessary to first 
expose the varying perceptions that exist within China regarding human rights. 
Chinese authorities have often asserted that civil and political rights (CPR) should 
not be prioritized over economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCR).  In this regard, 
China has claimed that “ESCR are achieved through economic development and 
investment, and deviations from an economic growth path for the sake of CPR are not 
justifiable” (Condon 2012, 7-8).  The RTD debate discussed in the first chapter is 
illustrative of the Chinese authorities’ perceived hierarchy within the existing rights 
discourse by prioritizing ESCR over CPR.  Given these sentiments, China has 
correspondingly expressed “a strong conviction of the non-universality of human rights” 
(Condon 2012, 8), or what it claims as a close alignment with the “Asian values” thesis 
promulgated by former Singaporean Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew (Elgin 2010).  This 
“Asian model,” expounded on by the former Prime Minister in a 1994 interview with 
Fareed Zakaria, claims that “Eastern societies10 believe that the individual exists in the 
context of the family. He is not separate or pristine.  The family is part of the extended 
family, and then friends and wider society” (Zakaria 1994, 113).  In other words, the 
“Asian values” argument claims that differences exist between the principles deemed 
important by the East Asian region and those emphasized by the Western world.  As 
rationalized by Lee Kuan Yew, East Asian states place focus on the community and 
family, while Western states emphasize the individual – a belief that has been ingrained 
within the international structure as the cornerstone of the human rights regime.  
Therefore, because of these sentiments, China claims that it “do[es] not require 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Lee Kuan Yew averred that the term “Eastern societies” only encompasses Korea, Japan, China, and 
Vietnam.  The Southeast Asian region does not possess the same “Asian model,” though does share some 
similarities.  
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international human rights guarantees that emphasize individual civil and political rights” 
(Brown & Sriram 2008, 252).  From this argument, two assumptions can be made: 1) 
since China places more emphasis on ESCR, the RTD is perceived as more important 
than CPR; and 2) the “Asian values’” emphasis on the community over the individual 
contextualizes China’s emphasis on the RTD, which places the right of the state over the 
right of the individual.  Yet how does this “Asian values” system impact the realization of 
human rights within the borders of China?  In other words, with the right to work being 
included within Articles 6 and 7 of the ICESCR and thus classified as an ESCR, in what 
ways does China recognize the existence and importance of labor rights?   
Due to the labor regime’s inclusion within the framework of the ESCR discourse, 
China hypothetically should, by association, recognize labor rights as vital to its 
community.  That being said, domestic circumstances and labor conditions tend to 
suggest otherwise, as core international labor standards are often flouted and disputed by 
Chinese authorities and management.  With China’s first labor only enacted in 1994, it is 
evident that the existence of labor rights within Chinese borders has not been of the 
utmost importance.  It was not until this 1994 law that basic labor rights such as 
employment contracts, rest days, wages, dismissals, layoffs, working hours, health and 
safety were finally stipulated and recognized by Chinese authorities (Yaw Baah & Jauch 
2009).11  In 2008, the new Labor Contract Law and the Labor Disputes Conciliation and 
Arbitration Law, intended to update the 1994 statement by ensuring that “every employee 
should have a contract that stipulates all the workers’ rights and entitlement, failure of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Chinese authorities have since updated the 1994 labor law by instituting the Labor Contract Law and the 
Labor Disputes Conciliation and Arbitration Law in 2008.   
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which will compel the employer to pay twice the compensation to the workers” (Yaw 
Baah & Jauch 2009, 57).    
In terms of China’s domestic labor discourse, it is important to first contextualize 
these circumstances by referencing China’s involvement within the global labor regime. 
Regarding the core global labor standards outlined by ILO Conventions, China has 
ratified only 25 of the total 189, whereas highly developed countries such as France and 
the UK have ratified 125 and 87 respectively.  That being said, we cannot solely rely on 
the number of Conventions a state has ratified to unequivocally demonstrate its adherence 
– or lack thereof – to global labor standards.  To that effect, it should be noted that the US 
has ratified only 14 of the 189 Conventions, a significantly less amount than almost every 
other nation in the world.  As explained in chapter three, the US often claims that its 
failure to ratify many Conventions is due to its federal system, well-established national 
policies, and membership within the ILO.  Nevertheless, in regard to China’s position 
within the global labor regime, of the eight core Conventions of the FPRW outlined in 
chapter three, China has failed to ratify four – the two forced labor and the two freedom 
of association Conventions (Nos. 87, 98, 29, and 105).     
Like the US, China also offers explanations – though quite different – as to why it 
has failed to ratify many of the ILO Conventions, specifically those related to forced 
labor and freedom of association.  In regard to the former, China’s decision to not ratify 
the two Conventions on forced labor is chiefly due to their inherent incompatibility with 
China’s prison labor and penal system (Yaw Baah & Jauch 2009).  Known as Labor 
Reform Camps (LRC), this extensive network within the Chinese penal system addresses 
and involves forced labor as a means of reformation for criminals and political dissidents 
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(Koehn 2010).  What originally began as system for removing political opposition while 
simultaneously contributing to the country’s economic performance, these camps subject 
criminals to at least twelve hours of intensive laborious work every single day.  
Regardless of whether or not these criminals have performed a petty crime or have 
intently shared political dissidence, these camps require the use of forced labor as a 
means of punishment, which is a direct violation of Article 1 of ILO Convention No. 105. 
Forced or compulsory labor should not be used “as a means of political coercion or 
education or as a punishment for holding or expressing political views or views 
ideologically opposed to the established political, social, or economic system” (Art. 1).  
And while Chinese authorities have recently made strides to improve the conditions 
surrounding these camps, they still remain opposed to ratifying the two core forced labor 
Conventions.   
In terms of freedom of association, China has rejected the two Conventions due to 
China having only one legal trade union – the government-recognized All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU).  With the largest membership of any trade union 
in the world, the ACFTU was formed in 1925 as a close partner with the Chinese 
Communist Party and the Communist Red International.  Since then, ACFTU as 
continued identifying itself with the government as a “bridge and bond linking the Party 
and the masses of the workers and staff members, an important pillar of the state power 
of the country, and the representative of the interests of the trade union members and 
workers and staff members (ACFTU Constitution 1998).  Yet while the ACFTU claims 
that its objectives are defending workers’ rights, educating workers, promoting a socialist 
market economy, and participating in public affairs, many Chinese citizens see it merely 
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as an extension of the government.  In fact, many agree that ACFTU “plays no supportive 
role in the direct action of workers” (Yaw Baah & Jauch 2009, 63).  For this reason, the 
two core Conventions on the freedom of association will not be ratified by China in the 
foreseeable future. 
 China’s failure to ratify four of the eight core Conventions, however, does not 
mean that China remains outside the existing human rights regime.  China is a signatory 
to many critical multilateral statements that encompass discourse regarding human rights, 
and especially those inclusive of labor rights – the UDHR, the ICESCR (ratified in 2001 
with an exemption on the freedom of association), and the ICCPR (China is a signatory, 
but the People’s Congress has not officially ratified it due to the emphasis it places on the 
importance of CPR).  Given this context, focus will now be given to the historical, 
economic, and political circumstances for China’s involvement in Africa.   
 
II. THE HISTORY, ECONOMICS, & POLITICS OF  
CHINA IN AFRICA 
 
Though China’s involvement in Africa is a phenomenon that has only recently received 
widespread international attention, modern Chinese-African interactions date as far back 
as 1956, when China and Egypt first began diplomatic relations.  Contemporary Chinese-
African diplomacy, however, began in 2000, with Beijing’s invitation to African 
ministers to establish the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation  (FOCAC) (Chidaushe 
2007).  This multilateral platform, created for the collective and pragmatic cooperation 
among African states and the East Asian giant, is meant “to further strengthen the 
friendly cooperation between China and Africa under the new circumstances, to jointly 
meet the challenge of economic globalization, and to promote common development” 
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(Jansson 2009).  At its inaugural meeting in Beijing, a framework was created for the 
mutual benefit and common developmental interests that would soon be embedded within 
Chinese-African diplomatic relations.   
 At the 2006 FOCAC summit, government personnel and state leaders from China 
and 48 African countries established a number of detailed commitments that would 
further enhance their bilateral relations.  These commitments included: the doubling of 
China’s development aid to Africa; the establishment of a $5 billion China-Africa 
development fund; non-tariff treatment of over 440 African exports; building of 30 
hospitals and schools; doubling the number of scholarships for Africans by 2009; and a 
number of obligations dedicated to the overall development of the African continent 
(Jansson 2009).  In essence, the FOCAC characterized Chinese-African relations with 
two overarching objectives: 1) to strengthen consultation and expand cooperation with 
relevant African states; and 2) to promote political dialogue and economic cooperation 
and trade with African countries in order to achieve mutual reinforcement and common 
development” (Ampiah & Naidu 2008, 7). 
Since its inception, the FOCAC has become the “main vehicle for shaping and 
managing China’s cooperation framework with Africa across a range of technical, 
economic, and political platforms” (le Pere 2008).  Yet the success this multilateral 
platform has had in establishing diplomatic relations between Africa and China has not 
acted alone.  The actions and sentiments of the FOCAC have been firmly reinforced by 
the 2006 “China’s African Policy.”  By first addressing the ever-changing global 
landscape, this government document establishes the foundations for the many 
components of Chinese-African relations, particularly in regard to the promotion of 
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development as a pivotal characteristic of their bilateral cooperation.  We see this 
commitment to development within the text, claiming that “safeguarding peace, 
promoting development, and enhancing cooperation” are among the common desires of 
all people in today’s world community (China’s Africa Policy 2006).  Through this text, 
China recognizes itself as the “largest developing country in the world” and juxtaposes 
the African continent as the home to the “largest number of developing countries” 
(China’s Africa Policy 2006).  It is for this reason, Chinese authorities claim, that the 
mutual development of both regions is necessary as a conduit for “world peace and 
development” and thus the cornerstone of Chinese-African diplomacy (China’s Africa 
Policy 2006).  Therefore, a coherent policy on China’s involvement in Africa is further 
articulated as a strategic partnership and mutual commitment that has resulted in, as 
previously mentioned, high-level exchange visits, consultation for trade and investment, 
resources, infrastructure, debt relief, science and technology (Chidaushe 2007).   
“China’s Africa Policy” components further enhance the interaction among 
African states and China by way of focusing on the principles of the RTD.  These notions 
are manifested in mutually beneficial economic and diplomatic interests among states 
considered within the developing world.  
The Chinese government encourages and supports 
competent Chinese companies to cooperate with African 
nations in various ways on the principles of mutual benefit 
and common development [my italics], to develop and 
exploit rationally their natural resources, with a view to 
helping African nations to translate their advantages in 
resources to competitive strength, and realize sustainable 
development in their own countries and continent as a 
whole (China’s Africa Policy 2006). 
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The statement above notes that Chinese-owned companies have recognized the 
opportunities this partnership presents within African states and has capitalized on the 
availability of natural resources and cheap labor via foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Thus we see this mutually beneficial cooperation manifested within China’s exploitation 
of Africa’s natural resources, and, on behalf of Africa, increased utilization of its own 
resources for the realization of sustainable development.   
Purposing China-Africa relations for development purposes has been reiterated in 
a later statement by the FOCAC: “China and Africa match one another for development 
and offer each other important opportunities for deepening mutually beneficial 
cooperation” (FOCAC News 2015).  But in what ways is this notion of mutually 
beneficial cooperation significant to Chinese-African relations?  Furthermore, how are 
these bilateral relations pursuing and supporting this notion of the RTD?  Some profess 
that the concept of “mutually beneficial cooperation” is simply a preemptive argument by 
China in order to combat Western state’ claims that the East Asian giant is engaging in 
“imperialistic-like” ventures in the African continent.  Chinese and African authorities, 
however, approach this cooperation as a conduit for the realization of the RTD via a 
partnership between the largest developing state (China) and the largest community of 
developing states (Africa).   
As previously mentioned, this realization of the RTD is the cornerstone of the 
BRICS’ joint statement within the Fortaleza Declaration, claiming that they share a joint 
“purpose of mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects 
in BRICS and other emerging and developing economies” (Fortaleza Declaration 2014).  
And this objective has certainly been demonstrated within Chinese-African relations.  In 
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recent years, this cooperation between developing states has manifested itself within 
China’s pursuit of valuable resources – necessary for the subsistence of its massive 
population – and the influx of Chinese FDI into African states – necessary for economic 
and infrastructural improvements.  A convincing example of this phenomenon would be 
the newly erected, 100 meter high African Union (AU) Headquarters in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia – a $200 million project that was entirely funded by the Chinese government as 
a gift to the AU.  The impressive infrastructural feat is symbolic of “China’s 
determination to boost its trade with Africa and increase its influence right across the 
continent” (BBC News 2012).  Upon its completion, Jia Qinglin, China’s most senior 
political advisor, claimed that, “The towering complex speaks volumes about our 
friendship to the African people, and testifies to our strong resolve to support African 
development” (BBC News 2012).  Simply put, the foundation of Chinese-African 
relations involves China receiving invaluable African natural resources in exchange for 
investment that promotes the realization of sustainable development. 
In a February 2015 FOCAC press release on the 24th African Union (AU) 
Summit, Zhang Ming, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and Special Envoy of the 
Chinese government, references this sentiment and its role within Chinese-African 
bilateral relations by stating that the “China-Africa cooperation is presenting stronger 
momentum and [that] the two sides can move ahead together for development” (FOCAC 
News 2015).  This statement holds especially true when contextualized with recent 
economic circumstances.  In 2013, the Chinese government published an update to the 
2006 White Paper entitled the “China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation,” in 
which the changing global landscape, the recent rapid economic growth, and the latest 
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developmental advances between China and Africa were reflected upon.  “Africa, a 
continent full of hope and thirsty for development, has become one of the world’s fastest 
growing regions, while China, the world’s largest developing country, has maintained 
forward momentum in its development” (China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation 
2013).  Amidst the economic recession that had plagued the global economy, China-
Africa trade development continued on a track of rapid momentum and expansion.    
In 2009, China became Africa's No. 1 trade partner. In the 
following two years, the scale of China-Africa trade 
expanded rapidly. In 2012, the total volume of China-
Africa trade reached US$198.49 billion, a year-on-year 
growth of 19.3%. Of this, US$85.319 billion consisted of 
China's exports to Africa, up 16.7%, and US$113.171 
billion was contributed by China's imports from Africa, up 
21.4%. Total China-Africa trade volume, China's export 
volume to Africa[,] and China's import volume from Africa 
[have] all reached new highs (China-Africa Economic and 
Trade Cooperation 2013). 
 
As imagine, this mutually beneficial cooperation has been met with strong support 
and by both the Chinese and African governments.  The influx of Chinese companies into 
the Africa addresses the infrastructural problems that plague the continent while 
simultaneously promoting sustainable development.  China, in return, is receiving 
necessary natural resources for the sustenance of its population and boosting trade across 
the developing world.  That being said, these strong sentiments of support are n universal 
within the international system.  Instead, these actions have been met with strong 
opposition by Western states and unwavering disapproval by human rights networks, for 
the China’s activity in Africa has challenged the “Western aid status-quo” by employing 
a “little or no strings attached” approach to investment and aid (Condon 2012, 5). 
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     Embedded within the notion of mutually beneficial cooperation, the Chinese 
development approach in Africa has been a “long-held theoretical [debate] in the human 
rights community” (Condon 2012, 5).  Conventionally, the Western approach to loans 
and aid generally imposes conditions related to the promotion of democracy, corruption 
reduction, and a respectable human rights record.  However, China has established its 
bilateral cooperation with Africa on the principles of nonintervention and respect for 
national sovereignty.  Chinese authorities claim that their development approach 
…respects African countries’ choice in political system and 
development path suited to their own national conditions, 
does not interfere in internal affairs of African countries, 
and supports them in their just struggles for safeguarding 
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity 
(Condon 2012, 6).  
 
These beliefs, strongly advocated for by China, are rooted within the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence, a 1954 treaty between India and China that understood diplomatic 
relations as the following: 1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty; 2) mutual non-aggression; 3) mutual non-interference in each other’s 
internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit; and 5) peaceful coexistence (Ampiah & 
Naidu, 2008).  Of these, principles one, three, and four are particularly relevant when 
contextualized with Chinese-African diplomacy. 
 On the basis of principles one and three – “mutual respect for each other’s 
territorial integrity and sovereignty” and “mutual non-interference in each other’s internal 
affairs” – China advocates for a “no-strings attached” based assistance to the African 
continent.  This specific approach “circumvents the conditions upon which assistance 
from the West and international financial institutions is predicated” (Brown & Sriram 
2008, 251) by advocating for a “horizontal rather than a top-bottom approach” 
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(Chidaushe 2007, 108).  In other words, while the West sees itself in a paternal role with 
Africa, China instead views itself as a business partner.  The West emphasizes 
“liberalization, privatization, structural adjustment, and good governance” as 
preconditionalities, whereas China only requires one thing – the recognition of Taiwan as 
a part of China.  In a statement by the FOCAC, China “fully respects African countries’ 
rights in choosing their own political systems and road of development independently, 
and never imposes its will on them” (China’s Assistance to Africa: Irreproachable 2011).  
In other words, China’s diplomatic and economic relations with an African nation are 
blind to any and all internal situations that may be occurring – particularly human rights 
abuses – based on the principle that another country should not involve itself within the 
internal affairs of another.  Furthermore, China promotes the belief that every state has 
the ability to pursue development in the way it deems necessary and appropriate for its 
social, historical, economic, political, and cultural context. 
As one can assume, this has posed significant problems for the existing 
international human rights regime.  By not requiring conditionalities surrounding 
measures of good governance, China has in fact precipitated notorious abuse and 
violations that undermine the norms of the existing human rights regime.  China’s 
investment in Africa focuses on the economic development of that African state, and, by 
nature, emphasizes the right of the state over the individual.  As a result, Western states 
have offered a large amount of criticism towards China by calling it a “rogue” state by 
not only failing to comply with international law, but disregarding the importance of 
democracy, anti-corruption campaigns, and respect for the established human rights 
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norms (Ampiah & Naidu 2008, 3).  In response to this increased criticism, China has 
offered a lengthy rebuttal on the FOCAC website: 
…China’s “no-string attached” assistance to Africa in 
recent years has been frequently subjected to criticism from 
some Western politicians, media and NGOs, who maintain 
such a principle is de facto support to “rogue” or “failed” 
states and impedes Western efforts promoting democracy, 
human rights and fighting autocracy and corruption. 
Although such criticism sounds somewhat plausible at first, 
when dug deeper, one would find it quite far-fetched. A 
country’s development mainly depends on its own efforts. 
More importantly, “democracy”, “human rights” and “good 
governance” are not mirages hanging over a beach, nor can 
they be realized in a short span of time with high-sounding 
slogans and propagandizing. They must be built on the 
basis of economic development, better education level and 
increased legal and democratic awareness. Therefore, 
China is in fact consolidating the economic and human 
foundation for Africa to achieve democracy and good 
governance through vigorous efforts of boosting the trade 
(China-Africa trade alone contributed to 20% of Africa’s 
economic growth in recent years), helping African 
countries develop infrastructure, improving the living 
standard of African people, reducing poverty, and offering 
human resources training to Africa on a large-scale. After 
all, nonetheless, Africa’s development road is up to the 
choice of the African people (China’s Assistance to Africa: 
Irreproachable 2011).   
 
Therefore, China rebuts the Western criticism by claiming the importance of the RTD.  
China argues that requiring African nations to comply with human rights norms and 
democratic political systems in order to receive aid fails to recognize the fundamentality 
of the RTD.  In essence, China claims that pursuing the RTD will in allow the realization 
of democracy, good governance, and other human rights, which is the primary reasoning 
behind not only China’s belief in the fundamentality of the RTD, but the other BRICS 
states’ as well.  
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  Given this, the following section will be dedicated to examining the realization of 
this RTD via Chinese-owned businesses in Ghanaian infrastructure projects and Zambian 
copper mines.  The labor conditions that are exposed by workers and related personnel 
will demonstrate how the RTD emphasizes the right of the state over the individual.  As a 
result, the existence of new norms will be made present within Chinese-African relations. 
 	  
III. PURSUING THE RTD IN AFRICA  
 
As previously discussed, according to China’s official policy, its involvement in Africa is 
based on mutual cooperation, equality, and respect for the internal affairs and sovereignty 
of the host country.  As a result, investment opportunities are presented with no 
conditionalities and a complete disregard for the host country’s political or economic 
environment.  Consequently, abusive regimes with deplorable human rights records 
receive investment opportunities that further perpetuate their unacceptable practices.  As 
Patrick J. Keenan makes clear, “unconditioned wealth, whether it comes in the form of 
unencumbered investment from China or from discovery of a valuable natural resource, 
can create or exacerbate incentives that increase the prospect of human rights abuses” 
(Keenan 2009, 6).  Although Keenan emphasizes the abusive practices of African states 
that have resulted from investments and aid without conditionalities, such abuse is not 
exclusive to African nations. China’s complete disregard for political conditionalities 
such as human rights has also permeated into the operations and labor conditions of 
Chinese-owned businesses in Africa.  This paradigm exists to such an extent that “the 
Chinese companies operating in Africa do not adhere to the ILO Conventions and basic 
national laws governing labor and industrial relations... [causing] Chinese firms [to] flout 
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basic labor laws…” (Yaw Baah & Jauch 2009, 44).  While China may claim that its 
relationship with Africa is based on mutual cooperation, equality, and respect for 
sovereignty – which, to some degree, does carry a small amount of truth – the 
overwhelming characteristic of Chinese-owned businesses in Africa is their poor working 
conditions and flagrant disregard for the rights established within the global labor regime.   
 All across the African continent, Chinese employers routinely violate the ILO 
Conventions that comprise the core labor standards outlined by the FPRW.  “Studies in 
many African countries consistently show that there is a very high tendency for Chinese 
companies to ignore internationally-recognized ILO labor standards, including those that 
have been ratified by the country in which they operate” (Yaw Baah & Jauch 2009, 72).  
Workers’ abilities to join trade unions, to bargain collectively, to be protected from 
discrimination, and to be free from instances of compulsory labor have been mostly 
ignored by Chinese managers.  There are workers who recount times when they were 
“locked-in” their factory, forcing them to work and stripping them of their basic right to 
freedom.  Union-bashing strategies and the suppression of collective bargaining are 
commonplace at most Chinese companies, hindering the right of workers to organize and 
express concern regarding their own working conditions.  Discrimination ensues as 
female workers often find their employment terminated once the management discovers 
they are pregnant.  And managers pay Africans workers substantially less than their 
Chinese counterparts (Yaw Baah & Jauch 2009).   
At the root of much of this labor rights abuse is a common feature of working 
conditions in Chinese-owned businesses – the use of “casual workers.”  Casual workers, 
or Africans who do not have contracts or any record of their employment, provide 
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Chinese management the ability to sidestep much of the labor standards and expectations 
due to the lack of evidence that such workers even exist.  As a result, these workers are 
subjected to arbitrary determination of their wages and innumerable grave working 
conditions.  Unfortunately, due to their status as  “casual workers,” these individuals have 
no union representation and no ability to fight for their rights.  In fact, due to their lack of 
contractual agreements, many of these workers are not even aware that they possess 
certain labor rights. Without a legitimate contract there exists no protection under the 
existing labor laws (Yaw Baah & Jauch, 2009).   
This section will be dedicated to two case studies on labor conditions in Chinese-
owned companies in Africa.  The first case study will look at two specific projects in 
Ghana that were completed with the help of Chinese funds – the Bui Hydroelectric Power 
Project (Bui Dam Complex) and the Essipon Stadium Project. These projects not only 
received massive amounts of funds from Chinese companies to aid in their full 
completion, but were also under the management and supervision of Chinese-owned 
companies.  This specific case study will heavily rely on a 2009 report and associated 
field interviews conducted by Anthony Yaw Baah, Kwabena Nyarko Otoo, and Edward 
Fokuoh Ampratwurm.  The second case study will be focused on the copper-mining 
industry in Zambia, specifically those under the management of the China Non-Ferrous 
Metals Mining Corporation (CNMC).  This specific case study will depend on the field 
interviews and observations included within the 2011 Human Rights Watch report 
“You’ll Be Fired if You Refuse.”   
Together, these case studies on Ghana and Zambia will illustrate how China has 
utilized its investments in African states to pursue the RTD and consequently disregard 
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well-established global labor standards.  This phenomenon can be witnessed with China’s 
decision to not impose conditionalities regarding human rights practices and the 
subsequent abusive practices that ensue within Chinese-owned companies in Africa. 
 
A. GHANA 
 
China-Ghana relations extend as far back as 1960, immediately following Ghana’s 
independence from Britain (Yaw Baah, Otoo, & Ampratwurm 2009).  Since then, China 
and Ghana have maintained political and economic diplomatic endeavors that have 
continued to strengthen in recent years (Tsikata, Fenny, & Aryeety 2008).  First and 
foremost, the diplomatic cooperation between the East Asian giant and the West African 
gulf state is wholly based on respect for each other’s territory and sovereignty, a 
previously discussed key principle of Chinese diplomacy.  Additionally, a critical 
component of Chinese-Ghanaian diplomatic cooperation is Ghana’s adherence to the 
“One China Policy” – a bilateral agreement that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the 
People’s Republic of China (Tsikata et al 2008).  This diplomatic prerequisite is not 
unique to Ghana, however, as China refuses to engage with any country that recognizes 
Taiwan as a sovereign state.  In Africa, only four states officially recognize Taipei and 
thus have no diplomatic relations with China – Swaziland, Burkina Faso, São Tomé and 
Príncipe, and Gambia, though Gambia began severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 
2013 for what many believe to be a strive for Chinese-Gambian relations (Al Jazeera 
2013). 
 Another component of Chinese-Ghanaian relations is that of aid and debt relief, 
which in recent years has been a substantial part of these two countries’ cooperation. 
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Being an integral developmental partner to Ghana, China has offered an increased 
amount of “aid comprising loans, grants, and technical assistance” (Tsikata 2008, 6) to 
such an extent that China even agreed to absolve $25 million of Ghana’s debt in 2007.  
Most of this aid given to Ghana is intended for the funding of wide scale infrastructure 
projects. 
In terms of economic cooperation, China is one of the world’s leading investors in 
the Ghanaian state, causing trade between the two countries to skyrocket in recent years 
(Yaw Baah et al 2009).  More specifically, the areas of agriculture and infrastructure have 
witnessed a recent surge in investment and activity among Chinese-owned business.  
And, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, infrastructure is arguably the area of 
greatest cooperation between China and Ghana with a multitude of construction projects 
having been completed, in the process of being completed, or are planned to be 
completed (Tsikata et al 2008).  Appropriately enough, the two Ghanaian projects 
analyzed in this subsection are considered enormous infrastructure investments and 
undertakings that have been made possible only by China-Ghana cooperation.  Yet while 
these points just made suggest a fruitful relationship between China and Ghana, there 
exists a “general perception in Ghana that Chinese employers do not respect labor rights” 
(Yaw Baah et al 2009, 97).  The discourse used by workers regarding labor conditions 
during the construction of the Bui Dam Complex and the Essipon Stadium Project will be 
expounded on in the next two subsections. 
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i. THE BUI DAM COMPLEX 
Nestled in the Bui Gorge of the Black Volta River, the Bui Hydroelectric Power Project 
(henceforth referred to as the Bui Dam Complex) is a 400-megawatt hydroelectric project 
constructed with hopes of propelling the Ghanaian economy to middle income status by 
2015 (Yaw Baah et al 2009).  This project, considered to be the single largest Chinese-
funded project in Ghana, is under the management of the Chinese state-owned SinoHydro 
Coporation Limited, with additional supervision offered by the Ghanaian Bui Power 
Authority (BPA) – a group whose purpose is to ensure that the construction process 
correlates with the pre-established contract (Yaw Baah et al 2009).  Although the Bui 
Dam Complex was completed in 2013 and construction has since ceased, the labor 
conditions and abuses that emanated during the construction process cannot be 
disregarded, particularly as they relate to the cooperation between the Ghanaian 
government and SinoHydro.   
 All field interviews, as indicated by Yaw Baah et al, were conducted with 
officials at the Chinese embassy, SinoHydro headquarters, and the BPA.  More 
importantly, numerous interviews were conducted with Ghanaian workers, of which 
almost all were “casual workers.”  In this regard, almost all Ghanaians working on the 
Bui Dam Complex did not have a contract of employment and were thus considered to be 
only temporary – once these workers had completed the work they were assigned, they 
were to be dismissed from their duties.  Unfortunately, many workers were not informed 
that this was the nature of their employment (Yaw Baah et al 2009).  Therefore, when 
discussing the labor conditions of the Bui Dam Complex workers, it is important to 
understand that most workers could not rely on the enforcement of labor laws for their 
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protection as they did not have contracts, record of employment, or strong union 
representation to substantiate their claims.  Even though Ghanaian law requires that 
employers “regularize the employment of casual workers after six months of continuous 
employment” (Yaw Baah et al 2009, 100), Chinese management made no effort to abide 
by it.   Instead, the Chinese employers relished in deliberately not signing contracts with 
their workers, thus allowing them to fire workers at their choosing and preventing them 
from joining or forming any trade unions.  In response, the “the resident engineers of the 
[BPA] attempted to fill the void created by the absence of union by taking up concerns of 
the workers with the Management of SinoHydro” (Yaw Baah 2009, 104), yet were 
immediately met with orders by Chinese superiors to cease all interventions. 
 The concept of freedom of association and the right to collectively bargain is 
often a farfetched idea in Chinese-owned companies.  During the field interviews at the 
Bui Dam Complex in July 2008, workers still had not formed or joined a trade union 
even though the construction process was more than two years old.  According to Yaw 
Baah et al, many workers recount their initial attempts to join a trade union and were only 
met with “open intimidation and victimization” by their Chinese managers (Yaw Baah et 
al 2009, 104).  In fact, when BPA attempted to address this issue as part of their primary 
duties, the Chinese responded that such actions were “unnecessary and interfering in the 
affairs of the Chinese” (Yaw Baah et al 2009, 104).  The violation of the Ghanaian 
workers’ rights to associate themselves and bargain collectively for their opinions left 
these workers without any channel through which their concerns could be recognized.  As 
a result, SinoHydro’s brazen violations of labor rights continued.  Ghanaian workers were 
quoted in saying: 
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We know that forming the union will help us. Please Ghana 
Trade Unions Congress (TUC), what has happened to the 
collective bargaining certificate? We need it so that we can 
negotiate with the Chinese (Yaw Baah et al 2009, 105) 
 
I have been telling my colleagues to be patient and wait for 
TUC, once they come in the Chinese can no longer cheat us 
(Yaw Baah et al 2009, 105) 
 
Finally, due to the inability of SinoHydro to handle the increased agitation of the workers, 
the corporation allowed minimal union representation by the workers.   
The right to freedom of association and collective bargaining is a fundamental 
enabling right by which all other labor rights can be realized.  Therefore, the SinoHydro 
management’s flagrant disregard for the right to freedom of association throughout the 
construction process insinuates that other fundamental labor rights were also violated.  
For example, Ghanaian law requires that normal working hours consist of eight hours a 
day, forty hours a week – what is considered a conventional work week in most of the 
world.  If, for any reason, overtime is needed, workers must, by Ghanaian law, volunteer 
their time, though an exception exists if “the nature of the work requires compulsory 
overtime work in order to be profitable” (Yaw Baah et al 2009, 100).  That being said, 
very rarely did SinoHydro workers only work eight hours a day.  In fact, SinoHydro itself 
reported that all workers were required to work at least nine hours a day and that 
overtime was compulsory on the weekends and public holidays.  Furthermore, the 
security guards of the Complex were in fact required to work twelve hours shifts, seven 
days a week, and were not paid for the extra hours that would normally be considered 
overtime.  Workers in all aspects of the Bui Dam construction process often complained 
that they were in fact being compelled to work – a direct violation of the fundamental 
right to be free from forced labor.  If workers were to refuse overtime work, miss work 
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for any reason whatsoever, or ask for sick leave due to a serious illness, they could expect 
their wages to be reduced or their employment completely terminated altogether.  A 
Ghanaian worker is quoted in saying:  
If, for some reason, you are not able to come to work on 
Saturday or Sunday, then you have to be prepared for your 
dismissal on Monday  (Yaw Baah et al 2009, 101) 
 
 Along with the long hours of work and lack of collective representation, Yaw 
Baah et al discovered that perhaps the most egregious of labor violations within the Bui 
Dam Complex was the unsatisfactory pay level of the workers.  Although it was not 
below the national Ghanaian minimum wage, when contextualized with the expectations 
and environment in which these workers were placed, as well as the rise in the cost of 
living, the pay grade was exceptionally low and unreasonable.  In the same vein, Bui 
Dam site workers reported that workers across the board were receiving different wages 
for the same work, all based upon their relationship with the management and whether or 
not they were Chinese or African (Yaw Baah et al 2009).  Such practices are in direct 
violation of ILO Convention 111 – of which China and Ghana are both signatories to – 
that states any distinctions made between workers based on “race, color, sex, religion, 
political opinion, national extraction, or social origin” are unacceptable (No. 111, 
Preamble). 
 
ii. THE ESSIPON STADIUM PROJECT 
Essipon Stadium is one of Ghana’s finest sport facilities, primarily used for soccer 
matches and the home field of Sekondi Hasaacas FC.  Located in the western region of 
Ghana at Sekondi-Takoradi, the Essipon Stadium is one of two stadiums that were funded 
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by the Chinese construction company, Shanghai Construction Group (SGC) (Yaw Baah 
et al 2009).  Like the Bui Dam Complex, this stadium’s construction has been completed 
(2007) and was a joint cooperation between China (SGC) and Ghana (Bank of Ghana 
Limited), with Chinese funding comprising approximately 10% of the final project.  
Nonetheless, despite China’s comparably small investment, the SGC was the responsible 
entity for its construction and the employment of workers, who, as one could imagine, 
were all casual workers with no company contracts (Yaw Baah et al 2009). 
 Per the previous section, casual workers were, in the eyes of the Chinese, 
employable due to the temporary and short-term nature of their employment.  If, for any 
reason, a problem with a worker emerged, SGC could easily dismiss the worker and find 
an immediate replacement.  Like SinoHydro, this casual worker phenomenon gave way 
to a work environment that was hostile towards trade unions and collective representation.  
On the Essipon site, no trade union existed and many workers were unaware of its 
meaning and significance.  Those who did know what a trade union was, however, said 
that “they could not have thought of joining or forming one because of fear of 
victimization and possible dismissal” (Yaw Baah et al 2009, 109), a sentiment also 
shared with many workers of the Bui Dam Complex.   
 Without union representation, the working conditions on the Essipon Stadium 
construction site were not only poor, but in direct violation of several core ILO standards.  
In fact, conditions were so poor that when Yaw Baah et al asked workers to compare 
their current conditions at SGC with those of previous workplaces, the workers 
“unanimously agreed that conditions in their previous companies were better than those 
at Shanghai Group” (Yaw Baah et al 2009, 108).  For example, 73% of those interviewed 
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said that they worked at least 56 hours a week instead of the “legal” 40.  Each worker 
also claimed that they were never forced into working overtime, despite the fact that 
working 56 hours a week indicates otherwise.  In reality, these workers did not believe 
they were involved in overtime work simply because, as casual workers, they were not 
made aware of the fact nor compensated for it.  Instead, these workers were under the 
assumption that a normal workweek consisted of 56 hours rather than 40.  This practice 
disregards Article 4 of ILO Convention 29 on the Abolition of Forced Labor – of which 
China is not a signatory and Ghana is – that states forced or compulsory labor shall not be 
used for “the benefit of private individuals, companies, or associations” (Article 4, § 1), 
which includes the SGC.  Moreover, an element of discrimination existed on the Essipon 
Stadium Project site as the SGC preferred to hire Chinese migrants to the native 
Ghanaians – of the 230 total employees working on the Project, 150 (65%) were Chinese 
(Yaw Baah et al 2009).  
Yaw Baah et al make an extensive claim that, based on their findings, “the 
Chinese management [is] taking advantage of the ignorance of their mostly illiterate and 
unskilled workforce. The employment of a large proportion of unskilled workers in their 
workforce may therefore be deliberate” (Yaw Baah et al 2009, 114).  There is a blatant 
disregard for established ILO Conventions regarding the freedom of association and 
collective bargaining, freedom from forced labor, and the freedom from discrimination in 
recent Chinese-funded infrastructure projects in Ghana.  Of these labor rights abuses, 
almost all are deeply rooted in the casualization of workers, thus excluding them from 
nearly all forms of worker protection.  Generally speaking, without allusion to any 
particular Chinese-owned company, there is a strong inclination amongst Chinese 
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management against the concept of worker unionization and collective bargaining.  The 
General Secretary of the construction union in Ghana is quoted in saying that “they [the 
Chinese]…prefer to deal with individual workers” (Yaw Baah et al 2009, 116).  With 
regard to working conditions, wages, discrimination, and forced labor, this construction 
union contends that, “the Chinese appear to have the notion that they can operate in 
Ghana with whatever system of labor relations [that exists] in China. They are therefore 
very reluctant to adhere to existing labor relations practices in the country” (Yaw Baah et 
al 2009, 116).  More importantly, Chinese-owned companies are not only in violation of 
local Ghanaian labor laws, they are in fact in violation of a number of core ILO 
Conventions included within the FPRW.12  Whereas Chinese involvement in Ghanaian 
infrastructure projects has certainly increased the economic output of the African state, 
there has certainly been a trade-off with respect to the adherence of established ILO labor 
standards and rights. 
 
B. ZAMBIA 
 
China-Zambia relations originated during the African liberation wars of the 1960s and 
1980s.  Zambia, formally known as the British protectorate of Northern Rhodesia, 
partnered with China for purposes of the training and arming of liberation movements 
(Ndulo 2008), as well as strong financial assistance (Mwanawina 2008).  In the decades 
since, China has remained fervently committed to the economic development of Zambia 
– one of the least underdeveloped states in the world – despite its rich mineral wealth 
(Mwanawina 2008).  In a study commissioned by the African Economic Research 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 All of the ILO core standards were violated, to some degree, in African nations receiving Chinese 
investment and in Chinese-owned businesses except the two core Conventions on child labor. In all case 
studies that I came across, there were never any findings of underage workers or child labor abuse.  China 
is a signatory and has ratified both child labor Conventions.  
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Consortium (AERC) in 2008, Inyambo Mwanawina makes the claim that Chinese-
Zambian relations can be divided into three historical periods: 1) independence struggle 
(1949-1979); 2) Chinese-African reforms (1979-1999); and 3) the promotion of 
development goals (1999-present). 
 From 1949-1979, China’s involvement with Zambia began as a support system 
during the struggle for independence and liberation from the European colonial powers.  
This support was provided in the form of economic and reconstruction aid, as well as 
consolidation of national independence.  Perhaps one of the most well known cooperative 
projects between China and Zambia was the construction and completion of the 
Tanzania-Zambia Railway in 1976.  When Zambia failed to receive the necessary 
Western support for the construction of the line, China stepped-in with an agreement to 
build the railway.  Though there were many doubts from the Western states regarding 
China’s ability to complete such an overwhelming project, the railway was completed in 
a timely manner, silencing the Western skeptics surrounding China’s capability (Ndulo 
2008).  Like most of China’s diplomatic endeavors, the establishment of Chinese-Zambia 
relations was not without mutual benefit and cooperation.  For China, Zambia offered 
diplomatic missions and support within the international system as the East Asian giant 
began its global rise (Mwanawina 2008).   
 The second period, from 1979-1999, is characterized by the political and 
economic reforms that plagued both China and Africa.  In China, the Cultural Revolution 
ended, bringing profound economic crises and social disarray to most of the population.  
Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms of the 1980s, known as the “Open Door Policy,” 
emphasized the importance of economic development as an integral part of national 
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policy.  In Africa, IMF- and World Bank-sponsored liberalization programs ran rampant 
all over the continent, reinforced by intense pressure for the adoption of multi-party 
democratic systems.  In China, chaos and crises arose from the aftermath of the Cultural 
Revolution, forcing China to adopt an “Open Door” policy that placed economic 
development at the center of its policies.  Then, in 1991, China’s “Going Out” policy 
targeted Africa as an area of extreme policy concern.  Thus, both China and Africa’s 
circumstances during this period forced a strengthening of the China-Africa relationship.  
In particular, China-Zambia relations were targeted as a possibility for increased 
economic and political cooperation (Mwanawina 2008). 
 Finally, the third and current period (1999-present) is characterized by the pursuit 
of development on behalf of both China and Zambia. China’s unprecedented rise to 
global economic preeminence has been necessary and valuable for the promotion of 
economic development on the African continent.  A focus on the Millennium 
Development Goals, wealth creation, poverty reduction, and peace and stability 
promotion currently characterize the diplomatic relationship between China and Zambia.  
In 2007, Zambia became the first African site for China’s special economic zones (SEZ), 
which later became formally known as the Zambia-China Economic and Trade 
Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ) (HRW Report 2011).  Like the SEZs that exist in China, the 
SEZs established in Africa are designed to provide “a combination of world-class 
infrastructure, expedited customs and administrative procedures, and (usually) fiscal 
incentives that overcome barriers to investment in the wider economy” (HRW Report 
2011, 21).   
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Like many of China’s African partners, Zambia’s foreign policy and engagement 
with China is focused on issues related to the many aspects of development.  In this sense, 
while China’s involvement in Ghana was related to funding infrastructure projects, its 
involvement in Zambia is in reference to the most important sector of the Zambian 
economy – copper mining (Ndulo 2008).  In general, Zambian development, like 
elsewhere in Africa, is widely affected by the unavailability and poor quality of human 
capital (Ndulo 2008).  And, as of the 2013 United Nations’ Development Program’s 
Human Development Index, Zambia ranked 141 out of 187 countries for levels of human 
development, which is measured considering the populations’ longevity, education, and 
income (UNDP Human Development Report 2014).  Human capital is, as Muna Ndulo 
makes clear, one of the principle factors affecting development in Africa, and specifically 
Zambia.   
Economic development is achieved through the productive 
employment of labor and the full utilization of natural 
resources. The productive employment of labor requires 
capital and presupposes an increase in the general level of 
education and the acquisition of technical skills, as well as 
the formation of a body of capable administrators and 
entrepreneurs (Ndulo 2008, 141) 
 
Despite the lack of valuable human capital, China’s involvement within Zambia is largely 
due to its mineral-rich land and valuable natural resources.  As a result, China has 
become one of Zambia’s top investors with intentions of mutual cooperation, natural 
resource exploitation, and Zambia economic and human development.  Hundreds of 
Chinese companies have since set up businesses in Zambia, ranging from mining, textile, 
construction, and agriculture, to service-based industries like restaurants, banking, and 
medical clinics (Ndulo 2008).   
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Yet despite Zambia’s multiparty democracy and practical environment for 
investment opportunities (Ndulo 2008), Chinese companies were, according to the 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, the “biggest violator of workers’ rights” (HRW 
Report 2011), particularly in Zambia’s copper industry.  This section will examine this 
labor rights abuse and poor working conditions by specifically focusing on the China 
Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Corporation (CNMC) and its extensive control over daily 
operations in Zambia’s copper industry, as “Chinese-run companies are generally the 
worst on issues involving health and safety, hours of work, and the right to organize” 
(HRW Report 2011, 97). 
 
i. CHINA NON-FERROUS METALS MINING CORPORATION (CNMC) 
Like Ghana’s infrastructure and construction industry, the use of casual workers by 
Chinese companies is also commonplace in Zambia’s copper-mining industry.  Because 
of the low level of human development throughout Zambia, Chinese companies like 
CNMC have “found it easy to fill a number of positions with short-term hires who are 
generally paid less and not provided the benefits and allowances that regular employees 
receive” (HRW Report 2011, 45).  Yet the labor conditions of CNMC’s subsidiaries are 
often in contradiction with the established labor standards within the FPRW and other 
ILO Conventions.  For example, in April 2005, 46 Zambian workers were killed in an 
explosion at a CNMC-owned factory that manufactured cheap mining explosives (HRW 
Report 2011).  This tragedy, making international headlines, exposed the unacceptable 
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and egregious violations of international labor standards that existed – and still exist – 
within Africa’s Chinese-owned companies13.  
 CNMC’s involvement within the Zambian copper-mining sector began in 1998, 
with official operations beginning five years later in 2003 (HRW Report, 2011).  Like 
other Chinese-owned businesses in Africa, CNMC is under the management of the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) of the State 
Council.  The State Council of China is the “highest executive organ of State power, as 
well as the highest organ of State administration” (HRW Report 2011, 13).  Given this, 
the actions of CNMC can also be considered as a representation of the Chinese 
government – though it is important to note that not all Chinese investment is malignant 
as some does boast certain potential for “improving economic conditions in Africa” 
(HRW Report 2011, 14). 
 The foremost concern regarding labor conditions in CNMC-owned copper mines 
is regarding unfair and inappropriate wages for workers.  This specific concern emanates 
from the fact that the CNMC base salary is “one-fourth of their competitors’ for the same 
work” (HRW Report 2011, 24).  It should be noted that CNMC does in fact pay their 
workers more than the monthly Zambian minimum wage (419,000 Kwacha/US$87 as of 
2011).  That being said, this pay grade is “insufficient to meet their [workers’] basic 
needs” and general standard of living (HRW Report 2011, 30).  This is especially 
disconcerting, as across Zambia’s Copperbelt and throughout CNMC-owned mines, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  This section will depend on a widely cited and reviewed 2011 Human Rights Watch report in which 
HRW gathered extensive information via field interviews and research missions in November 2010 and 
July 2011.  The majority of the report – and the substance of what is used in this section – is based on field 
interviews conducted with 143 miners at the four CNMC locations, as well as management officials from 
the Chinese-run mines, the Zambian national trade unions for miners, Zambian government officials, and 
national and international aid organizations.  It is also important to note that while most of the interviews 
held were of workers within Chinese-owned mines, a small amount of interviews were also conducted in 
non-Chinese copper mining facilities to provide an appropriate cross-comparison.	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workers are required to work under extreme conditions for a long duration of time.  “At 
one extreme, some miners at Sino Metals [a subsidiary of CNMC] described working a 
78-hour week, while others described working 365 days a year without a day off” (HRW 
Report 2011, 75).  Evidently, the wages offered by CNMC are not appropriate for the 
intense working conditions it imposed on its workers. 
Not only are CNMC’s wages insufficient for workers’ basic needs and 
incomparable with those of non-Chinese owned mines, but, as just mentioned, the 
lengthy hours and extreme conditions the workers are subjected to are irrational.  To this 
effect, miners at CNMC subsidiaries are exposed to harmful chemicals, fumes, and dust 
for periods of time that far surpass the “normal” 48-hour Zambian workweek.  A high-
ranking union official for the Zambian National Union of Miners and Allied Workers 
(NUMAW) is quoted in saying: 
Some workers in Chinese mines are forced to work 12 
hours or more a day for six days a week…The Chinese 
want people to work seven days a week and longer hours. 
It’s one of the most common complaints we receive, but the 
Chinese refuse to change (HRW Report 2011, 75). 
 
A Zambian worker told HRW researchers about his experience at the CNMC mines: 
It gets very tiring, I never see my family. We don’t 
understand why we can’t have normal hours like the other 
companies on the Copperbelt… If you’re absent for even 
one day, because you’re tired, because you have other 
responsibilities to your family, they deduct from your basic 
pay. Far more than what one-day’s pay should be… (HRW 
Report 2011, 76) 
 
According to Zambian law, compensation for overtime work should be one and one half 
of the hourly wage and double the hourly wage on public holidays and Sundays.  HRW 
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researchers discovered that overtime work was almost never compensated for at CNMC 
subsidiaries, and workers were often required to work beyond the standard hours. 
Last month, I received less than 200,000 Kwacha (US$42) 
for overtime. Yet I put in 30 hours of overtime every week! 
They don’t tell us how they calculate this, they refuse… 
Our hours are too long for the pay we receive (HRW 
Report 2011, 77). 
 
The experience recounted by these miners is in direct violation of Article 7 of the 
ICESCR – of which both China and Zambia are signatories – which states that workers 
have a right to “rest, leisure, and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic 
holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays” (ICESCR, Art. 7, § 4).   
 When confronted with the accusations of long workdays and inappropriate wages, 
SinoMetals denies that, “departments force workers to work 365 days without a off day” 
(HRW Report 2011, 77).  Considering the recent union agreements, SinoMetals has 
affirmed that it is instead “in agreement that shift lengths [should] be implemented in line 
with its workers’ wishes” (HRW Report 2011, 77).  Chambishi Copper Smelter (CCS), 
another CNMC subsidiary, defended the 12-hour shifts as necessary for the operation of 
the mine.  “The 12-hour shift will continue, as it’s required for our smelter’s operations 
[that] need to be maintained for 12 hours… The labor law says 48 hours, but production 
is continuous” (HRW Report 2011, 78).  CCS miners are not duly compensated for their 
work nor receive sufficient rest periods.  As one worker puts it: 
Normally, our hours are considered to be eight hours a day, 
six days a week. But I often work ten hours a day, six days 
a week, without overtime.  The Chinese are very reluctant 
to pay overtime… And some days, there may be a 
breakdown at 3:30 p.m., right as I’m knocking off. If the 
next person on shift isn’t there, I’m told to go repair it, even 
though it’s time to knock off. The Chinese boss will say, 
“You’ll lose your job if you don’t go.” So what choice do I 
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have? I’m still not paid overtime even when this happens… 
(HRW Report 2011, 82) 
 
Although this worker specifically focuses on remuneration, he alludes to yet another 
matter regarding labor standards in CNMC mines: forced and compulsory labor. 
 China has not ratified either of the ILO Conventions that eradicate forced or 
compulsory labor, which, according to the Chinese government, is due to their use of 
forced labor in their penal system.  Nonetheless, it is important to recall that by virtue of 
China’s membership in the ILO, it has a duty to recognize and uphold the eight core 
Conventions included within the FPRW, including the one that bans the use of forced 
labor. HRW researchers encountered several instances in which miners claimed the 
Chinese management repeatedly forced them to work in unsafe environments and despite 
injury, health problem, or illness (HRW Report 2011).   
They force us to work in unsafe places. As the person-in-
charge, I will say, “This is unsafe, we should not go 
ahead.” But the Chinese boss will say. “No, go work,” and 
threaten to dismiss me. If you don’t go along, you don’t 
keep your job (HRW Report 2011, 55).   
 
Another worker recounts the conditions his Chinese boss forced him to work in: 
After a blast, it takes an hour for the dust, gases, and fumes 
to move out of the area. We’re supposed to wait to go in. 
But with the Chinese, they say, “Go, go, rush right away!” 
And if you don’t, they’ll terminate your contract [that is, of 
course, if the worker has a contract at all] (HRW Report 
2011, 56).   
 
One worker details the experiences workers have when forced to work while ill and not 
granted sick leave by the Chinese management: 
When you’re sick, the Chinese will sometimes refuse to 
give you leave. Sometimes it doesn’t matter what the 
doctor says. Once, I was very sick and told to stay home by 
the SinoZam doctor. I had a sick note. The Chinese boss 
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said he’d give me two days. And then that same night he 
called and said, “Report tomorrow.” I had malaria, but it 
didn’t matter to him. All that mattered is that they were 
short on drivers to get the amount of copper they wanted 
that day (HRW Report 2011, 57).   
 
When safety hazards are circumvented for the purpose of continued efficiency, the 
Chinese bosses of CNMC act in such a way that is closely related to the notions of forced 
labor.  These unsafe working conditions were commented in detail by two miners: 
We work underground and there are problems with the dust 
and the noise. The Chinese don’t give me a respirator or 
earpieces. At KCM14, I received both for the same work… 
The lack of respirator causes lots of lung problems. I cough 
all the time and have started feeling sharp pains in my chest 
after long hours underground… NFCA [CNMC subsidiary] 
only gives earpieces to those who work directly with 
jackhammers, while KCM would give them if you were 
anywhere near one. They also gave us routine ear 
exams…The union and the safety department have said 
they’ll talk to the Chinese, but nothing happens. We are 
voiceless – if you push, you can be fired (HRW Report 
2011, 41). 
 
For those on the surface, we are given attire for a year – 
that’s the timeframe. For boots, belt, hardhat, overalls, we 
get one for a full year. It’s supposed to be six months, 
which is what it is for the underground workers. And then 
if there is a premature defect, you can’t get a new one. No 
matter how bad, no matter if it happened during work use 
only, they won’t give you a new one. Your salary is 
deducted… so many people continue working with the 
damaged [equipment] (HRW Report 2011, 40). 
 
Not only are these unsafe working conditions in violation of the previously discussed 
Convention 29, but also completely disregarding the work safety discourse used within 
the ICESCR and the UDHR.  Article 23, Section 1 of the UDHR makes it clear that 
workers have the right “to just and favorable working conditions” (Art. 23, § 1), which is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Konkola Copper Mines [KCM] is an international mining conglomerate based in Mumbai, India and 
London, UK and is Zambia’s largest integrated copper producer (KCM Website). 
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further reinforced by the right to “safe and healthy working conditions” (Art. 7, § 2) in 
Article 7 of the ICESCR.   
 Despite CNMC’s blatant neglect in preventing forced labor and providing safe 
and healthy working conditions, in many circumstances, Zambian workers still find 
themselves voiceless.  When workers do challenge the Chinese management they 
immediately find themselves suffering penalties such as docked pay, written notices, or 
even loss of employment.  A worker recalls his termination when refusing to work near a 
fire with no fire safety equipment: 
I asked, “What have I done wrong?” and [the supervisor] 
replied, “Don’t you know you’re not supposed to talk, 
you’re a slave.” [My boss] and his supervisor spoke in 
Chinese for several minutes, and then he said I was fired 
(HRW Report 2011, 59). 
 
 A circumstance similar to the miner’s mentioned above requires the support of 
trade unions and collective bargaining.  There are two trade unions in Zambia that are 
solely meant for to give representation and voices to mineworkers: the Mineworkers 
Union of Zambia (MUZ) and the National Union of Miners and Allied Workers 
(NUMAW).  While branches of both unions exist at every non-Chinese copper mine in 
Zambia, CNMC mines have hindered workers from joining MUZ, despite a clear 
indication that many workers would in fact prefer to represented by MUZ over NUMAW 
(HRW Report 2011).  MUZ, established in 1948 before Zambian independence, is often 
presumed by many Zambians to have greater access to resources and thus allow for 
stronger representation of members’ rights than the newly created (2003) NUMAW.   
We have two main unions here in Zambia, MUZ and 
NUMAW… The Chinese know that MUZ is considered 
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pro-[Sata15], and also that it has more power. It’s older and 
stronger. MUZ tried to establish a branch here at CCS, with 
NUMAW already here. The chief executive of CCH kept 
them out though. The management wants to make sure and 
keep us from being able to join them, even though many of 
us want to… The majority of workers in fact think that 
NUMAW is weak, but we cannot join MUZ (HRW Report 
2011. 88).   
 
Right now, we only have NUMAW; the management won’t 
allow MUZ to come in, because they know it’s stronger. 
They say if we bring MUZ, MUZ will cause too much 
problems advocating for [our rights] (HRW Report 2011, 
88). 
 
The limitation placed on workers and their right to freedom of association at CNMC 
mines is a violation of ILO Convention 87 on the Freedom of Association and Protection 
of the Right to Organize – of which Zambia is a signatory and China is not – due to the 
existence of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU).  Yet, as previously 
mentioned, China is required to uphold the doctrines of this core labor standard because 
of its ILO membership.  Article 2 of Convention No. 87 gives workers and employers the 
right to “establish and…join organizations of their own choosing without previous 
authorization” (Art. 2, § 1).  Despite this international standard, Chinese bosses have still 
threatened to immediately dismiss any worker who attempts to establish an MUZ branch 
at any CNMC location.  In the case of CCS, the Chinese management has addressed this 
issue with the belief that “one union suffices” (HRW Report 2011, 88) for a company 
with less than 1,000 workers.  To the management, the mere existence of a union on the 
grounds of CNMC indicates that the workers’ opinions are being acknowledged and that 
their free will is respected.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Michael Sata was the fifth President of Zambia from 2011-2014.  He ran an election campaign that 
vowed to clean up the labor conditions in Chinese-owned companies and was consequently perceived as 
anti-Chinese.  For this reason, he was strongly opposed by Chinese investors. 
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 HRW researchers, however, encountered workers and union officials at CNMC 
sites with different opinions than those advocated for by CNMC.  A union representative 
at SinoMetals described his interactions with CNMC and union activities: 
The Chinese don’t understand the concept of a union. They 
intimidate those that lead or are part of a union. If they 
know you’re a representative, you’ll encounter problems; 
they’ll try to frustrate you until you leave the job.  For me, 
before I was working in the [omitted to protect anonymity] 
department. But they transferred me to the crusher 
department because I’m a representative. We all know why 
these transfers happen, as it always touches the same 
people, [union representatives]… Basically, if you’re in the 
union, they’re going to try to frustrate you. If you don’t 
ever talk, if you don’t ever complain, then the Chinese will 
like you (HRW Report 2011, 90).  
 
A union representative at CCS told HRW researchers: 
They don’t understand unions at all. To go to a union 
meeting, you need to get a note from HR, who takes it to 
the Chinese. We do this, but the Chinese still cause us 
problems. I get bad performance assessments that say,  
“Always going to meetings.” So they allow us to go, they 
don’t expressly bar us from going, but they view us as bad 
workers for taking care of our union responsibilities. And 
the problem is that when it comes time for renewing 
contracts – because we’re all just on one- or two-year 
contracts – they won’t renew you because of your bad 
performance reviews… We are all worried that our 
contracts will not be renewed, so we can’t strike, we can’t 
complain, we can’t do anything to show our displeasure 
with the conditions (HRW Report 2011, 92). 
 
This union representative’s experience illustrates how workers are unable to bargain and 
withstand anti-union pressure in order to maintain their job security. Of course, the 
intimidation and discrimination Chinese managers exhibit towards CNMC workers who 
are involved with unions violates ILO Convention 98, the Right to Organize and 
Collective Bargaining – of which Zambia is a signatory and China is not.  This 
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Convention provides protection to workers from anti-union discrimination and forbids the 
“dismissal of or otherwise prejudice [of] a worker by reason of union membership or 
because of participation in union activities outside working hours or, with the consent of 
the employer, within working hours” (Art. 1,  § 1).   
 Despite the interviews that indicated labor violations regarding unsuitable wages, 
long working hours, forced labor unsafe conditions, and anti-union pressure, CNMC 
officials claimed, “its companies had harmonious relations with the unions” (HRW 
Report 2011, 92).  At this point, it is important to note a follow-up report was published 
by HRW in 2013 with updates on CNMC working conditions following the 2011 
publishing of “You’ll Be Fired if You Refuse.”  In this follow-up report, HRW notes that 
subsequent to the 2011 report and the election of Michael Sata as Zambian President, 
“CNMC’s subsidiaries made some notable improvements on reducing work hours and 
respecting freedom of association, but the miners continued to face poor health and safety 
conditions and threats by managers if they tried to assert their rights” (Zambia: Safety 
Gaps Threaten Copper Mines 2013).  Additionally, the Zambian government appears to 
be making a greater commitment to labor rights and standards.  While improvements are 
indeed respectable, the original conditions of these mines and dozens of other Chinese-
owned companies cannot be forgotten.  
 
IV. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
There exists a common Western misconception and stereotype regarding Africa.  
Through years of conditioned aid, Westerners have developed and been exposed to ideas 
that Africa is a “global backwater plagued by poverty, disease, ethnicity, conflict, and 
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corruption” (Ndulo 2008, 139).  As a result, Western-African diplomatic relations are 
characterized by paternalism and essences of cultural superiority.  China, on the other 
hand, has approached African states in a different light, one that focuses on the essence of 
partnership – seeking out business deals and investments that are mutually beneficial to 
both parties involved.  The question that emerges is whether or not this partnership is in 
fact beneficial to Africa.   
In this chapter, the BRICS’ commitment to the RTD was exemplified using the 
increased investment and diplomatic endeavors present within Chinese-African bilateral 
relations.  In doing such, China’s role as the self-proclaimed leader of the developing 
world was analyzed, specifically as it relates to the Fortaleza Declaration’s commitment 
to developing states.  Before doing such, there was a brief discussion related to the 
historical, economical, and political elements of China’s presence in Africa.  However, 
the primary purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate the ways in which China’s 
promotion of the RTD in Africa circumvented core labor standards and thus undermined 
the individualistic norms of the prevailing human rights regime.  In this regard, it is 
important to note the discourse used by China to justify this evasion for the pursuit of the 
RTD.  
 In a case study done on China’s involvement in Namibian labor relations, a 
Chinese Embassy official in the role of economic and commercial counselor advised 
Namibian officials to: 
Sacrifice a little bit of labor protection. The labor cost is too 
high. Namibia does not have production. In China, if you 
have N$1,000 you are rich, but in Namibia, you cannot buy 
anything with it because you import everything. If you 
sacrifice on labor costs now for future generations, then 
Namibia will develop. Let people be paid lower wages now 
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and attract more FDI and set up manufacturing so that the 
future generation will reap the benefits of the sacrifices 
(Jauch & Sakaria 2009, 218). 
 
In this statement, a Chinese government official is encouraging the evasion of labor 
practices – minimum wage, for example – for the purpose of Namibian development. 
This Chinese government official is advocating certain rights be paralleled to the level of 
a country’s development and that citizens should “sacrifice a little bit of labor protection” 
for the pursuit of the RTD.  In other words, Chinese authorities are in fact advocating for 
the violation of conventional labor standards in order to pursue the RTD.   
This discourse is further reiterated in the 2011 HRW Report with a Chinese 
government official making the following statement on behalf of Zambia: 
The laws are really “too sound” – the standard of the legal 
system is a little too ahead of its time… It is necessary to 
have some [my italics] in the early stages of development; 
equality gets sacrificed. Inequalities are a reality at every 
stage of development. They [Zambians] should learn to 
accept this (HRW Report 2011, 24).     
 
In this discussion, China is reinforcing its RTD belief that was alluded to in chapter one.  
China’s “basic [stance] on the development of human rights is: placing top priority on 
people’s right to subsistence and development, making development the principal task, 
and promoting political, economic, and social and cultural rights to achieve their all-
round development” (Legal Systems of Respecting and Safeguarding Human Rights 
2008).   
Yet the decision to place the RTD above all other rights has, as indicated by the 
case studies above, resulted in the egregious violations of core labor standards.  The 
freedom of association, freedom from forced labor, and freedom from discrimination, all 
considered under the FPRW, have been circumvented or disregarded by Chinese-owned 
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companies for purposes of increase developmental output.  Despite evidence that dictates 
the evasion of labor rights for purposes of economic development are not acceptable – 
Article 1 of ILO Convention 105 stating forced labor cannot be used “for purposes of 
economic development” (Art. 1, § 1) – the actions and practices of Chinese companies 
suggests otherwise.  In this regard, the RTD comes at the expense of individual rights, 
and thus undermines the existing human rights regime. 	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CONCLUSION 
             	  	  	  	  	  	  
In recent years, the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – have 
experienced unprecedented growth and accelerated achievements that have caused the 
emergence of new economic, philosophical, and geopolitical trends.  The introduction of 
these new trends into the existing international structure has been met with speculation 
and curiosity, specifically regarding the influence these new ideas and actors will have on 
the current world order.  The BRICS’ cooperation with each other represents a substantial 
shift within the existing international context that posits new interpretations of 
international politics.  Thus we are presented with questions similar to Ikenberry’s: Will 
the existing order be overthrown by these rising powers or will they simply become a part 
of it?  More specifically, is there a possibility that the rise of the BRICS will impact the 
global human rights regime that is firmly embedded within today’s international 
structure? 
This paper has addressed these questions by offering the following answer: The 
institutionalization of the BRICS – led by China – will allow these states to pursue their 
desires and establish a new norms regime centered on the notion of the right to 
development.  This alternative norms regime will focus on the rights of the state over the 
rights of the individual and contradict the discourse that currently exists within the 
current human rights regime.  Due to the global rise and increased economic and political 
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cooperation among the BRICS states, there now exists the possibility for these new 
norms to be supported via international institutions like the New Development Bank.  
Therefore, Ikenberry’s dichotomous approach to the future of the existing world order 
does not appropriately characterize the global rise of the BRICS. 
This paper began with an overview of the discourse surrounding the BRICS’ 
geopolitical association.  Since O’Neill’s initial recognition of these states as economic 
engines of growth, these states have institutionalized their augmented economic power 
into a cooperative political entity.  First, I discussed why these states have been 
considered strong developing countries with the potential to impact the existing 
international system, followed by a detailed synopsis of the ways in which these states 
have made their presence known.  Here, the creation of the BRICS New Development 
Bank was highlighted as the formal institutionalization of their economic and political 
power and a platform for the pursuit of their specific interests.  The notion of interests 
and identities among the referenced states was also emphasized.  Finally, Chapter One 
concluded with an important conceptualization of the right to development and the debate 
regarding its fundamentality between developed and developing states.  With this, it was 
established that the RTD – what the BRICS have deemed the most fundamental human 
right – is a right given to the state rather than the individual.  
Chapter Two was dedicated to engaging the core international relations theories 
with the prevailing human rights discourse.  In doing such, this chapter provided a 
theoretical foundation for contextualizing the potential impact the BRICS’ rise could 
have on the existing human rights framework.  First, a definition of human rights was 
offered as, “not what we need for survival but what we need for a life of dignity” 
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(Donnelly 2013, 21).  This definition speaks to the individualistic norms that characterize 
the prevailing norms regime, whereas the RTD and the right to subsistence are in fact 
firmly based in the notion of “what we need for survival.”  This definition was used to 
understand the global human rights regime as an elaborate system of states and 
multilateral institutions that promote human rights via a network of principles, rules, 
norms, and procedures.  Finally, Chapter Two provided an overarching and extensive 
survey of realism, liberalism, and constructivism, and how their respective theoretical 
lenses interpret the existence and sustenance of the current norms regime.  Given that, I 
claimed that a comprehensive image is necessary for not only understanding the existing 
human rights regime, but also for understanding the importance of the global rise of the 
BRICS.  In essence, interests and identities require international institutions for their 
realization, which, in turn, require increased economic capacity to be created in the first 
place.  
Due to the BRICS states employing a majority of the world’s workers in the 
coming century, labor conditions and the rights of workers were the focus of Chapter 
Three.  Specifically, this chapter expounded on the existence of the global labor regime 
and discussed its interconnectedness both with the prevailing norms regime and the RTD.  
Furthermore, an analysis on the many components of the labor regime was offered, 
specifically related to the labor regime’s central ideas, how these were created, and in 
what ways they are administered (i.e. International Labor Organization).  This chapter’s 
primary purpose was to serve as a foundation for the final chapter by offering an 
extensive look into the global labor regime and how the BRICS states are theoretically 
incorporated.   
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At the 2014 BRICS Summit in Fortaleza, Brazil, the BRICS states came together 
to affirm their commitment to “the purpose of mobilizing resources for infrastructure and 
sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing 
economies” (Fortaleza Declaration 2014).  For this reason, Chapter Four addressed the 
current circumstances surrounding the partnership between the largest developing state – 
China – and the largest community of developing states – Africa.  Chapter Four 
contextualized the BRICS’ Fortaleza statement and commitment to the RTD with 
examples of what this commitment entails when manifested within the international 
system.  Building upon Chapter Three’s labor rights discussion, this chapter explored the 
labor conditions and practices in Chinese-owned companies in Ghana and Zambia.  The 
Chinese managements’ flagrant disregard for core labor standards within Ghanaian 
infrastructure projects and Zambian copper mines provided crucial evidence as to how 
China manifests its RTD discourse.  Moreover, this evasion of core labor standards for 
purposes of economic development illustrated how the BRICS’ promotion of these new 
norms will affect the prevailing norms regime.  This labor abuse demonstrates how the 
focus on the RTD comes at the expense of individual rights, thus undermining the 
foundations of the existing human rights discourse.  
Since their recognition in 2001, the BRICS states have stringently been viewed 
and analyzed from an economic perspective.  However, in light of recent cooperative 
efforts and their formalized institutionalization of power, the BRICS are becoming an 
increasingly omnipresent political entity in the international system.  For this reason, it is 
crucial that future scholarship views the BRICS as an economic and political entity with 
the capability of altering the prevailing norms of the existing international structure.   
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In summary, the institutionalization of the BRICS has bestowed upon these states 
the opportunity to establish a new norms regime centered on the right to development.  
As seen in China’s involvement in Ghana and Zambia, this alternative norms regime 
focuses on the right of the state over the right of the individual.  Due to the global rise 
and increased economic and political cooperation among the BRICS states, there now 
exists the possibility for these new norms to be supported via international institutions 
like the New Development Bank.  As a result, the prevailing norms of the existing global 
human rights regime will continue to be ignored and undermined. 	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APPENDIX 
             
 
 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
[1945] 
 
PREAMBLE 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, 
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the 
conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech 
and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common 
people, 
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against 
tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law, 
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations, 
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have 
determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, 
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the 
promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full 
realization of this pledge, 
Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that 
every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by 
teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, 
national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among 
the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction. 
Article 1. 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 
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Article 2. 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any 
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, 
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be 
independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. 
Article 3. 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. 
Article 4. 
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their 
forms. 
Article 5. 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
Article 6. 
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law. 
Article 7. 
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. 
All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against 
any incitement to such discrimination. 
Article 8. 
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the 
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law. 
Article 9. 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. 
Article 10. 
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, 
in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him. 
Article 11. 
(1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence. 
(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not 
constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor 
shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was 
committed. 
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Article 12. 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor 
to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks. 
Article 13. 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. 
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. 
Article 14. 
(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. 
(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes 
or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
Article 15. 
(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. 
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality. 
Article 16. 
(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right 
to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at 
its dissolution. 
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. 
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by 
society and the State. 
Article 17. 
(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
Article 18. 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 
change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. 
Article 19. 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media 
and regardless of frontiers. 
Article 20. 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. 
(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association. 
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Article 21. 
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely 
chosen representatives. 
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. 
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed 
in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by 
secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 
Article 22. 
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through 
national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of 
each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free 
development of his personality. 
Article 23. 
(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of 
work and to protection against unemployment. 
(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. 
(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his 
family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social 
protection. 
(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 
Article 24. 
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic 
holidays with pay. 
Article 25. 
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and 
of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the 
right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of 
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. 
(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in 
or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection. 
Article 26. 
(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and 
fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education 
shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of 
merit. 
(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening 
of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and 
friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United 
Nations for the maintenance of peace. 
(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children. 
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Article 27. 
(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and 
to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. 
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author. 
Article 28. 
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration can be fully realized. 
Article 29. 
(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his 
personality is possible. 
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society. 
(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations. 
Article 30. 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to 
engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms 
set forth herein. 
 
             
 
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 
[1986] 
 
 
The General Assembly,         
 Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the 
achievement of international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural 
or humanitarian nature, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,        
 
 Recognizing that development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political 
process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all 
individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair 
distribution of benefits resulting therefrom,         
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Considering that under the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights everyone is entitled to 
a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in that Declaration can be fully 
realized,        
 
 Recalling the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,     
 
 Recalling further the relevant agreements, conventions, resolutions, recommendations and other 
instruments of the United Nations and its specialized agencies concerning the integral development of the 
human being, economic and social progress and development of all peoples, including those instruments 
concerning decolonization, the prevention of discrimination, respect for and observance of, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, the maintenance of international peace and security and the further promotion 
of friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter,          
 
 Recalling the right of peoples to self-determination, by virtue of which they have the right freely 
to determine their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development,         
 
 Recalling also the right of peoples to exercise, subject to the relevant provisions of both 
International Covenants on Human Rights, full and complete sovereignty over all their natural wealth and 
resources,         
  
 Mindful of the obligation of States under the Charter to promote universal respect for and 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction of any kind such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status,        
 
  Considering that the elimination of the massive and flagrant violations of the human rights of 
the peoples and individuals affected by situations such as those resulting from colonialism, neo-
colonialism, apartheid, all forms of racism and racial discrimination, foreign domination and occupation, 
aggression and threats against national sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity and threats of war 
would contribute to the establishment of circumstances propitious to the development of a great part of 
mankind,         
 
 Concerned at the existence of serious obstacles to development, as well as to the complete 
fulfilment of human beings and of peoples, constituted, inter alia, by the denial of civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights, and considering that all human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible 
and interdependent and that, in order to promote development, equal attention and urgent consideration 
should be given to the implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights and that, accordingly, the promotion of, respect for and enjoyment of certain human rights 
and fundamental freedoms cannot justify the denial of other human rights and fundamental freedoms,         
 
 Considering that international peace and security are essential elements for the realization of the 
right to development, 
         
 Reaffirming that there is a close relationship between disarmament and development and that 
progress in the field of disarmament would considerably promote progress in the field of development and 
that resources released through disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social 
development and well-being of all peoples and, in particular, those of the developing countries,         
 
 Recognizing that the human person is the central subject of the development process and that 
development policy should therefore make the human being the main participant and beneficiary of 
development,         
 
 Recognizing that the creation of conditions favourable to the development of peoples and 
individuals is the primary responsibility of their States,         
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 Aware that efforts at the international level to promote and protect human rights should be 
accompanied by efforts to establish a new international economic order,         
 
 Confirming that the right to development is an inalienable human right and that equality of 
opportunity for development is a prerogative both of nations and of individuals who make up nations,        
Proclaims the following Declaration on the Right to Development:                                      
 
Article 1       
1.   The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all 
peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political 
development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.         
2.   The human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of peoples to self-
determination, which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of both International Covenants on Human 
Rights, the exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources.                                      
 
Article 2       
1.   The human person is the central subject of development and should be the active participant and 
beneficiary of the right to development.        
 2.   All human beings have a responsibility for development, individually and collectively, taking into 
account the need for full respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as their duties to 
the community, which alone can ensure the free and complete fulfilment of the human being, and they 
should therefore promote and protect an appropriate political, social and economic order for development.        
3.   States have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national development policies that aim at the 
constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of their 
active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting 
therefrom.                                      
 
Article 3       
1.   States have the primary responsibility for the creation of national and international conditions 
favourable to the realization of the right to development.         
2.   The realization of the right to development requires full respect for the principles of international law 
concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations.          
3.   States have the duty to co-operate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to 
development.  States should realize their rights and fulfil their duties in such a manner as to promote a new 
international economic order based on sovereign equality, interdependence, mutual interest and co-
operation among all States, as well as to encourage the observance and realization of human rights.                                      
 
Article 4       
1.   States have the duty to take steps, individually and collectively, to formulate international development 
policies with a view to facilitating the full realization of the right to development.         
2.   Sustained action is required to promote more rapid development of developing countries.  As a 
complement to the efforts of developing countries, effective international co-operation is essential in 
providing these countries with appropriate means and facilities to foster their comprehensive development.                                    
 
Article 5       
 States shall take resolute steps to eliminate the massive and flagrant violations of the human 
rights of peoples and human beings affected by situations such as those resulting from apartheid, all forms 
of racism and racial discrimination, colonialism, foreign domination and occupation, aggression, foreign 
interference and threats against national sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity, threats of war 
and refusal to recognize the fundamental right of peoples to self-determination.                                      
 
Article 6       
1.   All States should co-operate with a view to promoting, encouraging and strengthening universal respect 
for and observance of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without any distinction as to race, 
sex, language or religion.        
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 2.   All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent; equal attention and 
urgent consideration should be given to the implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights.         
3.   States should take steps to eliminate obstacles to development resulting from failure to observe civil 
and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights.                                      
 
Article 7       
 All States should promote the establishment, maintenance and strengthening of international 
peace and security and, to that end, should do their utmost to achieve general and complete disarmament 
under effective international control, as well as to ensure that the resources released by effective 
disarmament measures are used for comprehensive development, in particular that of the developing 
countries.                                      
 
Article 8        
1.   States should undertake, at the national level, all necessary measures for the realization of the right to 
development and shall ensure, inter alia, equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, 
education, health services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of income.  Effective 
measures should be undertaken to ensure that women have an active role in the development process.  
Appropriate economic and social reforms should be carried out with a view to eradicating all social 
injustices.         
2.   States should encourage popular participation in all spheres as an important factor in development and 
in the full realization of all human rights.                                    
 
Article 9       
1.   All the aspects of the right to development set forth in the present Declaration are indivisible and 
interdependent and each of them should be considered in the context of the whole.         
2.   Nothing in the present Declaration shall be construed as being contrary to the purposes and principles 
of the United Nations, or as implying that any State, group or person has a right to engage in any activity or 
to perform any act aimed at the violation of the rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and in the International Covenants on Human Rights.                                    
 
Article 10       
 Steps should be taken to ensure the full exercise and progressive enhancement of the right to 
development, including the formulation, adoption and implementation of policy, legislative and other 
measures at the national and international levels. 
 
             
 
 DECLARATION OF PHILADELPHIA 
[1944] 
The General Conference of the International Labour Organization, meeting in its Twenty-sixth Session in 
Philadelphia, hereby adopts, this tenth day of May in the year nineteen hundred and forty-four, the present 
Declaration of the aims and purposes of the International Labour Organization and of the principles which 
should inspire the policy of its Members. 
I 
The Conference reaffirms the fundamental principles on which the Organization is based and, in particular, 
that: 
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§ (a) labour is not a commodity; 
§ (b) freedom of expression and of association are essential to sustained progress; 
§ (c) poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere; 
§ (d) the war against want requires to be carried on with unrelenting vigour within each nation, and by 
continuous and concerted international effort in which the representatives of workers and employers, 
enjoying equal status with those of governments, join with them in free discussion and democratic 
decision with a view to the promotion of the common welfare. 
II 
Believing that experience has fully demonstrated the truth of the statement in the Constitution of the 
International Labour Organisation that lasting peace can be established only if it is based on social justice, 
the Conference affirms that: 
§ (a) all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their material 
well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security 
and equal opportunity; 
§ (b) the attainment of the conditions in which this shall be possible must constitute the central aim of 
national and international policy; 
§ (c) all national and international policies and measures, in particular those of an economic and 
financial character, should be judged in this light and accepted only in so far as they may be held to 
promote and not to hinder the achievement of this fundamental objective; 
§ (d) it is a responsibility of the International Labour Organization to examine and consider all 
international economic and financial policies and measures in the light of this fundamental objective; 
§ (e) in discharging the tasks entrusted to it the International Labour Organization, having considered 
all relevant economic and financial factors, may include in its decisions and recommendations any 
provisions which it considers appropriate. 
III 
The Conference recognizes the solemn obligation of the International Labour Organization to further 
among the nations of the world programmes which will achieve: 
§ (a) full employment and the raising of standards of living; 
§ (b) the employment of workers in the occupations in which they can have the satisfaction of giving 
the fullest measure of their skill and attainments and make their greatest contribution to the common 
well-being; 
§ (c) the provision, as a means to the attainment of this end and under adequate guarantees for all 
concerned, of facilities for training and the transfer of labour, including migration for employment 
and settlement; 
§ (d) policies in regard to wages and earnings, hours and other conditions of work calculated to ensure 
a just share of the fruits of progress to all, and a minimum living wage to all employed and in need of 
such protection; 
§ (e) the effective recognition of the right of collective bargaining, the cooperation of management and 
labour in the continuous improvement of productive efficiency, and the collaboration of workers and 
employers in the preparation and application of social and economic measures; 
§ (f) the extension of social security measures to provide a basic income to all in need of such 
protection and comprehensive medical care; 
§ (g) adequate protection for the life and health of workers in all occupations; 
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§ (h) provision for child welfare and maternity protection; 
§ (i) the provision of adequate nutrition, housing and facilities for recreation and culture; 
§ (j) the assurance of equality of educational and vocational opportunity. 
IV 
Confident that the fuller and broader utilization of the world's productive resources necessary for the 
achievement of the objectives set forth in this Declaration can be secured by effective international and 
national action, including measures to expand production and consumption, to avoid severe economic 
fluctuations to promote the economic and social advancement of the less developed regions of the world, to 
assure greater stability in world prices of primary products, and to promote a high and steady volume of 
international trade, the Conference pledges the full cooperation of the International Labour Organization 
with such international bodies as may be entrusted with a share of the responsibility for this great task and 
for the promotion of the health, education and well-being of all peoples. 
V 
The conference affirms that the principles set forth in this Declaration are fully applicable to all peoples 
everywhere and that, while the manner of their application must be determined with due regard to the stage 
of social and economic development reached by each people, their progressive application to peoples who 
are still dependent, as well as to those who have already achieved self-government, is a matter of concern 
to the whole civilized world. 
 
             
 
 
DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND 
RIGHTS AT WORK 
[1998] 
 
Whereas the ILO was founded in the conviction that social justice is essential to universal and lasting 
peace; 
Whereas economic growth is essential but not sufficient to ensure equity, social progress and the 
eradication of poverty, confirming the need for the ILO to promote strong social policies, justice and 
democratic institutions; 
Whereas the ILO should, now more than ever, draw upon all its standard-setting, technical cooperation and 
research resources in all its areas of competence, in particular employment, vocational training and working 
conditions, to ensure that, in the context of a global strategy for economic and social development, 
economic and social policies are mutually reinforcing components in order to create broad-based 
sustainable development; 
Whereas the ILO should give special attention to the problems of persons with special social needs, 
particularly the unemployed and migrant workers, and mobilize and encourage international, regional and 
national efforts aimed at resolving their problems, and promote effective policies aimed at job creation; 
Whereas, in seeking to maintain the link between social progress and economic growth, the guarantee of 
fundamental principles and rights at work is of particular significance in that it enables the persons 
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concerned, to claim freely and on the basis of equality of opportunity, their fair share of the wealth which 
they have helped to generate, and to achieve fully their human potential; 
Whereas the ILO is the constitutionally mandated international organization and the competent body to set 
and deal with international labour standards, and enjoys universal support and acknowledgement in 
promoting Fundamental Rights at Work as the expression of its constitutional principles; 
Whereas it is urgent, in a situation of growing economic interdependence, to reaffirm the immutable nature 
of the fundamental principles and rights embodied in the Constitution of the Organization and to promote 
their universal application; 
THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE 
1. Recalls:  
(a) that in freely joining the ILO, all Members have endorsed the principles and rights set out in its 
Constitution and in the Declaration of Philadelphia, and have undertaken to work towards attaining the 
overall objectives of the Organization to the best of their resources and fully in line with their specific 
circumstances;  
(b) that these principles and rights have been expressed and developed in the form of specific rights and 
obligations in Conventions recognized as fundamental both inside and outside the Organization. 
2. Declares that all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in question, have an obligation 
arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization to respect, to promote and to realize, in good 
faith and in accordance with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are 
the subject of those Conventions, namely:  
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;  
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;  
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and  
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
3. Recognizes the obligation on the Organization to assist its Members, in response to their established and 
expressed needs, in order to attain these objectives by making full use of its constitutional, operational and 
budgetary resources, including, by the mobilization of external resources and support, as well as by 
encouraging other international organizations with which the ILO has established relations, pursuant to 
article 12 of its Constitution, to support these efforts: 
(a) by offering technical cooperation and advisory services to promote the ratification and implementation 
of the fundamental Conventions;  
(b) by assisting those Members not yet in a position to ratify some or all of these Conventions in their 
efforts to respect, to promote and to realize the principles concerning fundamental rights which are the 
subject of these Conventions; and  
(c) by helping the Members in their efforts to create a climate for economic and social development. 
4. Decides that, to give full effect to this Declaration, a promotional follow-up, which is meaningful and 
effective, shall be implemented in accordance with the measures specified in the annex hereto, which shall 
be considered as an integral part of this Declaration. 
5. Stresses that labour standards should not be used for protectionist trade purposes, and that nothing in this 
Declaration and its follow-up shall be invoked or otherwise used for such purposes; in addition, the 
comparative advantage of any country should in no way be called into question by this Declaration and its 
follow-up. 
Annex (Revised) 
Follow-up to the Declaration 
 
I. OVERALL PURPOSE 
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1. The aim of the follow-up described below is to encourage the efforts made by the Members of the 
Organization to promote the fundamental principles and rights enshrined in the Constitution of the ILO and 
the Declaration of Philadelphia and reaffirmed in this Declaration. 
2. In line with this objective, which is of a strictly promotional nature, this follow up will allow the 
identification of areas in which the assistance of the Organization through its technical cooperation 
activities may prove useful to its Members to help them implement these fundamental principles and rights. 
It is not a substitute for the established supervisory mechanisms, nor shall it impede their functioning; 
consequently, specific situations within the purview of those mechanisms shall not be examined or re-
examined within the framework of this follow-up. 
3. The two aspects of this follow-up, described below, are based on existing procedures: the annual follow-
up concerning non-ratified fundamental Conventions will entail merely some adaptation of the present 
modalities of application of article 19, paragraph 5(e), of the Constitution; and the Global Report on the 
effect given to the promotion of the fundamental principles and rights at work that will serve to inform the 
recurrent discussion at the Conference on the needs of the Members, the ILO action undertaken, and the 
results achieved in the promotion of the fundamental principles and rights at work. 
II. ANNUAL FOLLOW-UP CONCERNING NON-RATIFIED FUNDAMENTAL CONVENTIONS 
A. Purpose and scope 
1. The purpose is to provide an opportunity to review each year, by means of simplified procedures, the 
efforts made in accordance with the Declaration by Members which have not yet ratified all the 
fundamental Conventions. 
2. The follow-up will cover the four categories of fundamental principles and rights specified in the 
Declaration. 
B. Modalities 
1. The follow-up will be based on reports requested from Members under article 19, paragraph 5(e), of the 
Constitution. The report forms will be drawn up so as to obtain information from governments which have 
not ratified one or more of the fundamental Conventions, on any changes which may have taken place in 
their law and practice, taking due account of article 23 of the Constitution and established practice. 
2. These reports, as compiled by the Office, will be reviewed by the Governing Body. 
3. Adjustments to the Governing Body’s existing procedures should be examined to allow Members which 
are not represented on the Governing Body to provide, in the most appropriate way, clarifications which 
might prove necessary or useful during Governing Body discussions to supplement the information 
contained in their reports. 
III. GLOBAL REPORT ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS AT WORK 
A. Purpose and scope 
1. The purpose of the Global Report is to provide a dynamic global picture relating to the four categories of 
fundamental principles and rights at work noted during the preceding period, and to serve as a basis for 
assessing the effectiveness of the assistance provided by the Organization, and for determining priorities for 
the following period, including in the form of action plans for technical cooperation designed in particular 
to mobilize the internal and external resources necessary to carry them out. 
B. Modalities 
1. The report will be drawn up under the responsibility of the Director-General on the basis of official 
information, or information gathered and assessed in accordance with established procedures. In the case of 
States which have not ratified the fundamental Conventions, it will be based in particular on the findings of 
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the aforementioned annual follow-up. In the case of Members which have ratified the Conventions 
concerned, the report will be based in particular on reports as dealt with pursuant to article 22 of the 
Constitution. It will also refer to the experience gained from technical cooperation and other relevant 
activities of the ILO. 
2. This report will be submitted to the Conference for a recurrent discussion on the strategic objective of 
fundamental principles and rights at work based on the modalities agreed by the Governing Body. It will 
then be for the Conference to draw conclusions from this discussion on all available ILO means of action, 
including the priorities and plans of action for technical cooperation to be implemented for the following 
period, and to guide the Governing Body and the Office in their responsibilities. 
IV. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT: 
1. The Conference shall, in due course, review the operation of this follow-up in the light of the experience 
acquired to assess whether it has adequately fulfilled the overall purpose articulated in Part I. 
 	  
